Cavalry

The proportion of cavalry in a Civil War army could vary a great deal: the New Model approached Monck’s ideal ratio of one cavalryman to every two infantry, having 11 600 man regiments of horse, and again this might be taken as about that usual, but the Royalists in particular could have up to half a field army of cavalry.

In theory, cavalry regiments were of six troops, and the troops usually 71 strong, giving an overall strength of about 420-500 men. In practice, a few units, especially those of commanders, were stronger than this (for example, Rupert’s own regiment had ten troops, Cromwell’s 14). Many were smaller, and theirtroopsalso understrength, especially in the Royalist army. Parliamentarian troops were sometimes overstrength, and in the New Model were to be of 100 men.

In battle, cavalry regiments were formed into tactical units, squadrons, normally of two troops each.

The great majority of horse were of the ’light cavalry’ pattern standardised by the Swedes during the 30 Years’ War: that is, they were protected by corselet (breastplate shot-proof, backplate pistol-proof), buff coat, and very voluminous floppy leather boots, whose tops would reach the thigh if turned up (which they seldom were). A helmet would normally be worn. This could be a ’lobstertail’ or ’Dutch’ pot — the English versions usually having a more elaborate three-bar facial protection than earlier Continental models (which normally had asingle adjustable nasal, or none); alternatively a ’secret’ or steel skull-cap worn beneath a broad-brimmed felt.

They were armed with a long straight ’tuck' suitable for both cutting and thrusting (though some ‘Pappenheimers’ and other rapiers were also carried), and a pair of wheel-lock pistols firing bullets weighing about 34 to the pound. Though such cavalry were sometimes still referred to as ‘Harque-busiers' or 'Carbineers’, carbines were occasionally carried by officers, but not by troopers. Light ‘poll-axes’ or ‘horseman’s axes’ like those of the Poles and Imperialists could also be carried, slung by a ribbon from the wrist so as to leave the hands free for the pistols.

The Swedish model was most clearly followed in the case of cavalry, who were normally drawn up in squadrons, three ranks deep, and finished their charge at the gallop, relying upon the sword for shock and employing pistols only at the last moment, or in the melee. Such tactics were the most successful but earlier in the war were primarily employed by the dashing cavalry provided by Royalist gentry and their servants and retainers and trained on these lines by Prince Rupert. The ‘decayed serving-men and tapsters’ of the early Parliamentary horse (and even some early Royalists too) used deeper ‘Dutch’ formations and tended to advance at the trot, relying on pistol fire. Occasionally charges were received at the halt, with the disastrous results to be expected, though this is probably to be attributed to inexperience, not any particular tactical system. The ‘Cuirassiers’, with three-quarter armour and closed helmets, a few units of which were used by Parliament (Essex’s Life Guard and Sir Arthur Haselrig’s ‘Lobsters’) also used Dutch tactics: as Captain Rudd stated in 1663, the Cuirassier ‘is commonly to give the charge upon a trot, and seldom gallopeth, but upon a Pursuit. Having spent both his pistols, and having no opportunity to load again, he must then betake himself to the last refuge — his sword'.

Even in the later stages of the war, the Parliamentarians quite often formed six deep, and gave the charge at ‘a good round trot’ rather than a gallop, though relying on the sword; this may be related to the success of Cromwell and others in keeping their men in hand and rallying them ready for further action, whereas victorious Cavaliers were likely to be spread all over the surrounding countryside; often a decisive factor, as it was, for example, at Marston Moor in 1644. However, in the earlier part of the war both sides’ cavalry frequently vanished from the field in rout or pursuit, leaving the infantry to fight it out alone, while, to be fair, there are instances of Royalist units which rallied and charged for a second or even third time in a single action — something which could hardly be said of the British heavy cavalry of Napoleonic times, for instance.

Whatever happened, the success or failure of the horse, and in particular its reappearance on the field in time to affect the infantry fight, was still commonly the decisive factor in battle.