Theodicy

In this last section, we shall focus upon the problem of evil as portrayed by Maimonides in Guide II: 10-13. Maimon-ides’ discussion represent a model attempt to explain how it is that an ominiscient, omnipotent, and benevolent deity permits the existence of evil in general, and the suffering of innocents in particular. Many Jewish thinkers took into consideration The Book ofJob, and Maimonides is no exception; his discussions of evil and divine omniscience are applied to the travails of Job. In chapters II.11 and 12, Maimonides undertakes a classical theodicy, drawn on conventional distinctions. Maimonides claims that the preponderance of moral evils (those that occur between humans) are the result of ignorance, or the privation of knowledge. Reflecting the platonic maxim that to know the good is to do the good, Maimonides suggests that it is as a result of ignorance that we inflict harm upon ourselves and upon others. It is only because we view the universe from our limited perspective that we perceive matters as worse than in fact they are; were we to adopt a more holistic view, we would realize that humans are but a speck of sand, and that our travails represent but a minor chord in the vast orchestra of the universe.

Nevertheless, Maimonides realizes that this response is not in itself satisfying for the vast number of individuals who are unable to attain this intellectually detached perspective. He therefore introduces a straightforward typology, distinguishing between metaphysical, natural, and moral evil. The first type of evil refers back to the ontological make-up of matter itself: it is because we are endowed with matter that we suffer the material infirmities we deem evil. Laying the groundwork for his subsequent discussion of divine omnipotence, Maimonides dismisses the obvious objection of why could not God have created ‘‘coming to be’’ without ‘‘passing away’’ with an ad hominem:

> He who wishes to be endowed with flesh and bones and at the same time not be subject to impressions and not to be attained by any of the concomitants of matter merely wishes, without being awareness of it, to combine two contraries, namely, to be subject to impressions, and not to be subject to them (Maimonides 1963, NI.12:443).

In other words, the very nature of ‘‘being a human being’’ requires essentially that we be subject to generation and corruption, and the latter carries with it all the pains and imperfections we associate with human life. Maimonides adumbrates the strain to be popularized by Leibniz, namely that this is the best of all possible worlds. God could not have created a matter with a more perfect nature: material stuff ‘‘is generated in the most possible way in which it is possible to be generated out of that specific matter’’ (Maimonides 1963, 111.12: 444). Mai-monides’ second category of evils we may term ‘‘social evils,’’ namely those pertaining to political upheaval or moral behavior. These two are relatively rare, in Maimon-ides’ mind.

It is the third category of evil, what we may call personal evils, that most concern Maimonides. Here we hear echoes of Maimonides the physician, admonishing his flock not to overindulge in eating, drinking, sexual licentiousness, etc., resulting in personal harm. Maimonides divides personal evils into evils we bring upon ourselves physically (diseases of the body), and those we introduce psychically (diseases of the mind). With respect to the first, it is clearly overindulgence that is to blame: reminiscent of Socrates’ exhortation in the Phaedo not to indulge in bodily pursuits, Maimonides reminds us that vice with respect to eating, drinking, and copulation are due to ‘‘excess in regard to quantity or irregularly or when the quality of the foodstuffs is bad’’ (Maimonides 1963, m.12: 445).

Diseases of the soul are a bit more complex. In the first place, overindulgence on the bodily side cannot help but affect our moral temperament, and so that is reason enough to exercise physical restraint. Furthermore, as a result of physical overindulgence, we tend to lust after items that will satisfy these physical desires: unlike the pursuit of items necessary to human survival, the desire for superfluous possessions is endless and leads to infinite desire, lust, and avarice. Interestingly enough, the ‘‘necessaries’’ such as air, water, and food, tend to be more accessible and cheaper, while the less necessary luxuries tend to be less accessible and hence more expensive. Were we to eliminate our desires for these luxuries, our soul would cease to suffer needless anxiety and the concomitant evils that accrue upon their pursuit. Hence, it is human will that introduces this third variety of evil.

But evil must be understood against the backdrop of divine providence, for it might be argued that a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent deity should and would be able subvert evil and suffering. Maimonides presents in chapters 111:15-22 a theory of divine providence according to which the Active Intellect watches over humans in the sublunar world as a result of a divine overflow with which human intellect is united. That a ship goes down at sea is the result of chance, but ‘‘the fact that the people in the ship went on board.. .is, according to our opinion, not due to chance, but to divine will in accordance with the deserts of those people as determined in his judgments’’ (Maimonides 1963, In.17: 472). In other words, providence is consequent upon the perfection of human intellect and reflects the causal and ontological grid whereby God orders reality: in order for God to permit a causal nexus according to which certain people board the ship and others not, God must know, as it were, whether or not they are deserving of providence.

Already commentators in Maimonides’ own time were aware of the apparent discrepancy in Maimonides’ position. Maimonides too was not unaware of the difficulties inherent in this position, as evidenced by his attempt once more at the end of the Guide to explain why it is that often the righteous (who ostensibly should be most firmly united with the divine overflow) nevertheless suffer. Claiming that divine providence is constantly watching Over those who have obtained the intellectual overflow from God, Maimonides argues in Guide III.51 that evil attends to those who withdraw their attentions from God: “providence withdraws from him during the time when he is occupied with something else’’ (Maimonides 1963, III.51:625). Prophets or excellent persons suffer evil only during times of distraction, the ‘‘greatness of the calamity being proportionate to the duration of the period of distraction or to the vileness of the matter with which he was occupied’’ (Ibid).