Independent from Peter’s Tractatus, William of Sherwood composed his Introductiones ad logicam about 1230-1240, before he devoted himself to theological studies (William of Sherwood, 1995). Peter of Spain’s Tractatus consists of separate treatises discussing the different subjects of logic, such as the properties of terms; William conceived his theory as a whole.
His definitions of the properties of terms, signification included, differ from those of Peter. William defines it as a presentation of a form to the intellect. On the basis of signification there is supposition, copulation, and appellation.
According to Sherwood, signification means that something is presented to the understanding. What is presented is a form, a universal nature. His definition of signification can be called ‘‘intensional.’’
Sherwood defines supposition as the ordering of some thought under another thought. His definition of supposition is different from that of Peter of Spain, who defined it as ‘‘acceptance.’’ Sherwood does not use ‘‘supponere’’ in the sense of ‘‘supponere pro.’’ His definition concerns actual supposition (not habitual supposition, which
I shall discuss below), when a predicate is joined to a subject. It reminds us of earlier grammatical theories.
Supposition is divided into material and formal. Material is when a word supposits for an expression as such, or for the word in combination with its signification, as he says (for instance, ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘man is monosyllabic’’).
Formal supposition is when a word supposits for its significate. It is subdivided into simple and personal. Simple supposition is when a word ‘‘supposits for its significate, and significatively.’’ This formula is also used by Ockham, but with this important difference that in his intensionalistic semantics Sherwood interprets the supposition of ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘man is a species’’ as simple supposition, but explains that the term supposits for its significate. Sherwood adds that personal supposition is when a term ‘‘supposits its significate,’’ that is, for some thing, for instance, ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘a man runs.’’
The primary notion in Sherwood’s semantics is appellation. He defines it as the property according to which the meaning of a term can be said of something by way of the verb ‘‘is.’’ So appellation is connected with the present tense. It may be ampliated or restricted. This use of appellation reminds us of the grammarians. Supposition is secondary, and is taken in a grammatical sense, like ‘‘putting as a grammatical subject.’’ It should be added that Sherwood takes ‘‘to supposit’’ transitively, and not intransitively (in the sense of ‘‘to supposit for,’’ as in, e. g., John Buridan).
The other two properties he discusses are copulation and appellation. He distinguishes between actual and habitual copulation. Actual copulation is a property of a term as predicate. Appellation is the property of a term when it denotes individual existing things that are present at the moment when the proposition is uttered.
William’s theory is characteristic in that, according to him, supposition stands for things in the present, and therefore takes the function of appellation. If one refers to other things, this is by way of adjuncts being added to a noun. Sherwood defines appellation as an extensio-nalistic counterpart of signification. In signification the extensionalistic aspect is implied, and appellation brings it to the fore (De Rijk 1982).
William distinguishes between habitual and actual supposition and, similarly, between habitual and actual copulation. Habitual supposition resembles Peter of Spain’s natural supposition. Though it is called ‘‘supposition,’’ it bears resemblance to signification. Habitual supposition is defined as belonging to a term as far as it can fulfill the function of subject term in a proposition. This habitual supposition is the signification of existing things in a context. But William does not say that this is a proposition. But what exactly is it?
De Rijk distinguishes between a depth structure of a term (its signification) and a surface structure (habitual supposition). Though this kind of supposition resembles Peter of Spain’s natural supposition, the point of difference is that in Sherwood the term stands for presently existing things. Habitual copulation is also a kind of signification, by which something is characterized as property (De Rijk 1982).
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