Piero Soderini assumed his office in November 1502 and held it for almost ten years. His decade of leadership was unprecedented: permanent tenure exposed him to a kind of visibility and scrutiny experienced by no other Florentine leader. Excepting only Savonarola, he was (and still is) the most controversial political figure in the republic’s history. Cosimo and Lorenzo exercised great power but held relatively few official positions; neither regularly assumed institutional responsibilities. By contrast, Soderini was in the thick of daily negotiation, argument, and policy-making, going from meetings of the Signoria to pratiche to the Great Council, regularly seen and heard on every issue.
Although, like the priors and all earlier two-month Standardbearers, he had only one vote in the Signoria, his permanent public role closely identified him with controversial policies. Both supporters and opponents held strong opinions about him, and he became a lightning rod for discontent, especially among the ottimati.611 Having supported the idea of a lifetime Standardbearer on the assumption that he would protect their interests, many ottimati turned against Soderini when he failed to do so. Some cooperated with him, but others, particularly Bernardo Rucellai, opposed him strenuously, refusing even to hold offices. Rucellai’s group wanted major constitutional overhaul: the council’s abolition if possible, or at least the creation of an aristocratic senate. A group led by the Salviati participated in government but gradually became alienated from Soderini, some because of his preference for large pratiche, which often involved hundreds of citizens and weakened ottimati voices, or his loyalty to France, his Pisan policy, choice of military captains, or the militia. But the most serious charge against Soderini was that he sought excessive power for himself and his family. Accusations that he harbored tyrannical ambitions surfaced particularly in connection with the militia; critics feared he would use it to strike at his enemies and increase his power, perhaps even make himself “signore” of Florence. Guicciardini complained that his relatives were too prominent in government, intimating that the family aimed at Medici-style dominance. In 1507, the Pisan ambassador to Emperor Maximilian, Francesco Del Lante, reported to his government that Soderini was trying to purchase an imperial vicariate, which could have been a stepping-stone to princely power.612 But it never materialized, and Guicciardini’s characterization of Del Lante in another context as a “perfidious enemy of ours whose purpose was to trick us” raises doubts about his trustworthiness.613 Whatever the truth of that rumor, there is no evidence that Soderini sought to augment the authority given him in 1502 or that he used the militia to protect himself or punish his enemies, not even in 1512 when domestic opponents collaborated with the Medici and foreign forces to bring him and the republic down.
Another cause of dissatisfaction with Soderini in certain circles was his support for religious and social policies inspired by Savonarola’s reform program. Although Soderini’s brother Paolantonio was a Savonarolan, Piero had steered clear of association with the frateschi. But as Standardbearer he successfully promoted a law allowing the Monte di Pieta to open more branches, attract endowments, and enjoy “an unprecedented period of prosperity.”614 He gave support in 1504 to new sumptuary legislation and in 1511 to a law instituting a 1,600-florin ceiling on dowries. None of this makes Soderini a fratesco; but he clearly shared some of their views and/or courted their support while cultivating a reputation as “religious, pious, and without vices.”615 Here perhaps was one reason behind his and his government’s appropriation of Michelangelo’s David to project an image of political and military strength confident of the Almighty’s favor. David was originally commissioned by the Cathedral Operai for the north tribune of the Duomo, but in 1504 its location became an issue of public debate. In a meeting, convened by the operai, of artists and architects (including Botticelli, Giuliano da Sangallo, Filippino Lippi, and Piero di Cosimo) to discuss the placement of the statue Florentines called “the giant,” a majority favored placing it in the loggia on the south side of the piazza of the priors.616 But an undocumented order, which could only have come from the Signoria and in all likelihood from Soderini himself, shifted the destination to the ringhiera (the platform from which the Signoria and chancellors addressed the public) in front of the palace.617 David dramatically combined Savonarola’s vision of Florence as the new Jerusalem with an image of muscular military preparedness, an ideal combination for a republic whose founding myth was divine approval of its popular constitution and whose most pressing objective was now the reconquest of Pisa.
Soderini survived in office for ten years owing to his considerable political skills, sound fiscal management, successes in foreign policy, and “concern to work within the law.”618 Some good fortune at the outset helped too. In 1503 the Borgia menace disappeared when Pope Alexander died and was replaced (after the one-month pontificate of Pius III) by Giuliano della Rovere, who, as Pope Julius II, made the ruin of Cesare Borgia his first objective: a task to which Soderini’s government happily contributed by having Borgia’s lieutenant and henchman, Don Miguel de Corella, known as don Michele, arrested and handed over to the pope. With Borgia removed, and Julius not yet the threat he later became, Soderini put the republic’s finances in order. In 1504 the council accepted his plan for a combination of direct taxes acceptable to both elite and popolo. Government expenditures were contained, receipts from indirect taxes grew (to almost 200,000 florins a year by 1508, a third more than before 1502), and the Monte resumed interest payments. Guicciardini grudgingly acknowledged that this was “in large part the result of [Soderini’s] diligence” and his close monitoring of public finances.619
Soderini’s major objective was the recapture of Pisa. So important was it that in 1503-4 the Signoria had the west wall of the council’s new “sala grande” decorated with paintings of Florentine military triumphs that were meant to inspire the republic in the war for Pisa. It commissioned Leonardo da Vinci to paint the Battle of Anghiari (the 1440 victory over Milan) and Michelangelo to depict the Battle of Cascina (a 1364 victory over Pisa).620 (Unfortunately, Leonardo left his scene incomplete, Michelangelo only got as far as doing the cartoon, and both artists left Florence in 1506.) But for several years the war was a dismal failure for Florence. Part of the problem was a complex command structure involving professional soldiers and Florentine civilians. Battlefield tactics were entrusted to a hired, generally nonFlorentine, captain with overall responsibility and several condottieri more or less at his orders. Their selection, moreover, could be a matter of contention among political factions. Early in 1504, when Soderini wanted as captain Fabrizio Colonna (immortalized fifteen years later as the chief speaker in Machiavelli’s Arte della guerra) and others preferred Giampaolo Baglioni, lord of Perugia, a compromise made Baglioni captain while Soderini got con-dottieri more to his liking. Strategy and coordination among the professional soldiers were in the hands of civilian commissioners selected by the Eighty. A frequent commissioner in these years was Antonio Giacomini, a Soderini ally, close to Machiavelli (who lauds him in the Discourses), and later the subject of admiring biographies by Jacopo Nardi and Jacopo Pitti. Policy was decided by the government, here too with complex and overlapping roles for the Standardbearer, Signoria, Dieci, Eighty, and the frequent pratiche. Every proposal received ample discussion, and military operations could be held hostage to quarrels between Soderini and his opponents, to rivalries among commanders in the field, and to the Great Council’s reluctance to approve needed taxes. The biggest problem, as the events of 1505 were to demonstrate, was the unreliability of captains and condottieri who could, and often did, pick up and leave when it suited them. Machiavelli, observing all this as second chancellor for dominion affairs and secretary to the Dieci, began to ponder the possibilities of a different kind of army and command structure.621
Under Giacomini’s supervision operations resumed in 1503 and 1504 with some successes. But a direct attack on Pisa was postponed and time and treasure lost in a failed attempt to divert the Arno from Pisa and cut off its supply route from the sea. The year 1505 began badly with a defeat, followed by Baglioni’s sudden decision not to continue as captain. In May a pratica met to discuss the military crisis, and as some speakers recommended candidates for the vacant captainship, others urged that the government rely more on its own infantry and increase their numbers. Machiavelli’s views on the need for a homegrown militia were presumably well known, at least in government circles, and it is possible that some speakers were echoing his opinions. But the idea of a citizen militia went back at least to the Savonarola years when the fratesco Domenico Cecchi proposed it in his Riforma sancta et pretiosa as the best way of defending the republic and bringing unity to the city and order to the contado.622 The idea was clearly in the air again, but it took another and disastrous defeat to persuade Soderini to promote it in the face of ottimati opposition. In August 1505 Giacomini and the new captain Ercole Bentivoglio of Bologna achieved a victory that seemed to open the door to a final assault on Pisa, but two defeats in early September crushed Florentine hopes and led to bitter scapegoating of Giacomini, Bentivoglio, and, not least, “our infantry,” accused by Guicciardini of cowardice. Once again a pratica debated military reform and heard more proposals for strengthening the republic’s forces. In December Soderini decided to test the waters and authorized Machiavelli to begin recruiting troops in the Mugello and Casentino. When, on February 15, 1506, Machiavelli mustered 400 of his new recruits in piazza Signoria, Luca Landucci wrote that “it was thought to be the finest thing ever organized by the city of Florence.”623
In fact, however, not everyone was pleased. Guicciardini says many ottimati recoiled at the idea of arming peasants who might turn their anger and weapons against the city and its ruling class. They also feared that Soderini might use the militia as his private army to establish a “tyranny,” and they became especially suspicious when Borgia’s former enforcer don Michele was hired to lead a contado police force. Guicciardini confused the militia and contado police and asserted that Soderini wanted don Michele in charge of the militia as part of the same “evil plan.” Don Michele did help train and discipline the militia, but he never commanded it. Cerretani speculated that ottimati objections to the militia were merely pretexts for attempts to undermine Soderini and his government: “some rejected the militia because they liked nothing Soderini did and feared he might make himself signore; others opposed it because they wanted to sow confusion to bring about the return of the Medici.”
Cerretani believed that those who wanted a “change of government,” whether to reinstate the Medici or install an aristocratic republic, tried to sabotage Soderini by denying him victory over Pisa and the means to achieve it and accusing him of using the militia to make himself “tyrant” of Florence.624
Over the protests, the militia was officially instituted in December 1506 with a law (written by Machiavelli) that placed it under a new civilian board, the Nine, in peacetime and under the Dieci in time of war. Machiavelli became the Nine’s chancellor and held the post (with his other two) until 1512. The militia was a permanent, but not a professional, force: soldiers trained in peacetime were called into action as needed and otherwise remained civilians. Battalions consisted of at least 300 men, and their commanders (“conestabili”) could not be from the same district; nor could they serve for more than a year with the same battalion, after which they were rotated to new commands.625 Machiavelli here applied a principle he later elaborated at great length in the Discourses, namely, that the loyalty of armies should not be to their commanders. When that happens, he argued, armies belong more to commanders than to the republic, thus becoming “private” and a threat to the state. His goal was 10,000 armed men; by May 1507, 3,000 were enlisted and by the end of the year 5,000, with some battalions already at Pisa. Cerretani commented that “the whole of Italy was keeping an eye on it,” especially the Venetians who sent observers.626
Pisa surrendered in 1509 after a siege that brought the population to the brink of starvation. Although it won no battles, Machiavelli’s militia played its part in tightening the stranglehold. Early in the year he directed operations himself until the Eighty sent commissioners, including Alamanno Salviati, to negotiate the surrender. Machiavelli was among the signatories to the submission on June 4 and entered Pisa with the commissioners four days later. From Florence his chancery colleague Agostino Vespucci wrote that “it is not possible to say with how much delight and jubilation and joy this entire people has received the news of the recapture of Pisa. Everyone is going mad with happiness.” Congratulating him for being “not the least part” of this “glory,” Vespucci compared Machiavelli to the legendary Roman hero Fabius Maximus the Temporizer: “if I didn’t think you might take excessive pride in it, I would dare to say that you conducted such a good operation with your battalions that, not by delaying but by hastening, you have restored the Florentine state.” Another colleague told him: “one can truly say that you are the reason for this victory.”627 Outside the chancery Soderini was the man of the hour. According to Cerretani, the whole city went to the palace to congratulate him and the Signoria. Addressing the council, Soderini enthused that, after fifteen years and three million ducats spent on the war, it was certainly a glorious moment. With some exaggeration he boasted that there was now no more powerful state in Italy than Florence (Venice had just lost its territorial dominions in a crushing defeat by Julius II’s League of Cambrai at the end of May). But he also issued a warning. “It is in your hands,” he admonished the council, “to make this republic and its territorial empire great, which can only be done through the observance of justice. We have many complaints that these territorial governors of yours and indeed the magistrates here in the city render no justice at all. This is a great error, and you must be very careful about electing and conferring these dignities on good and prudent persons who deserve them. If you do this, your liberty and dominion will be very great indeed.”628 If Cerretani’s account is accurate, here we have a glimpse of Soderini’s tendency to moralize and preach political virtue, even in a moment of triumph, to his fellow citizens, another reason perhaps why the ottimati resented him.
The republic’s prospects seemed promising. With the fourth wound now healed, the territorial integrity of its dominion was restored, and ottimati critics had one less thing to bemoan. Louis XII was still Florence’s protector, ruling Milan and apparently on good terms with his ally Julius II. Despite the costs of war, public finances and the economy had improved. But Soderini and the republic still had one enemy about whom they could do little: Cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici and his friends in Florence who waited for the opportunity to use his influence in Rome to topple the popular republic and its Standardbearer.
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