Concerning the translated parts of the Shifa, it is obvious that the psychological and the metaphysical parts had a major influence. They already play a significant role in the personal works of Gundissalinus, who, as stated, was involved in some of the translations. In these works the doctrines of Boethius and Avicenna are combined in such a way that one may speak of an Avicennized Boethianism (Fidora 2009:120). But in the first period of its reception, Avicenna’s De anima was of particular importance (Hasse 2000). It was used by John Blund and Michael Scot. Alexander Nequam and Alfred of Shareshill were also familiar with the work, although the former of the two maybe indirectly. Therefore, it may reasonably be stated that Avicenna’s De anima circulated outside Toledo, that is, in Paris and in Oxford, at the very beginning of the thirteenth century. Robert Grosseteste also quotes it, although only once. He refers, moreover, to Avicenna’s Metaphysics, Physics, and Canon, although in a limited way. A similar remark is valid with respect to Roland of Cremona, but he takes into account the Isagoge while omitting the Physics. Moreover, Roland several times mentions ‘‘Algazel’’ together with Avicenna, so that it is obvious that already at his time al-(GazalI was considered to be a scholar whose thought followed a line similar to Avicenna’s. William of Auvergne appears to be the first thinker who not only referred to both Avicenna’s De anima and Metaphysics, but also elaborated a synthesis inspired by Avicennian ideas. He may be considered as a representative of a Latin Avicennism, although this latter designation has to be understood rather vaguely, and certainly not as the expression of a very precise current of thought (Teske 2006:217-237). John of La Rochelle, in his turn, presented a different kind of synthesis. He dealt with both the Canon and the De anima. However, he is, above all, the first exponent of an Avicennized Augustinianism, which identifies the agent intellect with God. After 1260, Roger Bacon (in his later works), John Pecham, Roger Marston, and Vital du Four adhered to this kind of Avicennized Augustinianism (Hasse 2000:203-223).
Around the middle of the thirteenth century, we have to deal with three of the major figures of Scholastic thought: Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. Bacon held Avicenna in high esteem, since he qualifies him as praecipuus imitator et expositor Aristotelis, notwithstanding his clear rejection of some of Avicenna’s ideas. It is a well-known fact that he was familiar with the Preface to the Shifa’ as well as with Scot’s translation of the De animalibus. Moreover, it is remarkable that in his Moralis philosophia he pays special attention to the tenth book of Avicenna’s Metaphysics to which he attributes an independent title, that is, Radices moralium. Albert the Great deals with all Avicennian texts, sometimes accepting the views of Avicenna and other times rejecting them. As one might expect, he uses both the De anima and the
Metaphysics extensively. However, in addition to these works, he appears to be the only Scholastic author who refers in a systematic manner to the translations of the Isagoge, the Physics, and the Animals. His commentaries on these works exhibit a wide range of more or less literal quotations derived from the different chapters. He also refers to the Canon, book 1. Generally speaking, Albert cannot be considered as an Avicennizing thinker, but he is critically dealing with Avicenna’s writings in a most exemplary way. With respect to Thomas Aquinas, things become more complicated. He is not very systematic in quoting names, hence there can always be much greater influence of Avicenna than appears at first glance. Traditionally, scholars put an excessive emphasis on the essence-existence distinction, as ifAvicenna only influenced Thomas on this particular, although important, point. In fact, an Avicennian inspiration comes to the fore in other of Thomas’ doctrines, as for instance, his conception of evil (Steel 2002).
Two late thirteenth century authors who deserve special attention concerning the reception of Avicenna’s thought, are Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. Henry, in his two major works, that is, the Quodlibets and the Summa, quotes Avicenna’s Metaphysics, and no other works. He does this even in relation to typically psychological problems, as for example, the unity of the soul (Janssens 2006, XVI). More specifically, the number of quotations is not great, but they always have a major impact on Henry’s thought. Insofar as his major objective consists in offering a real integration of genuine Avicennian ideas within a profound Augustinian framework, he may be characterized as a follower of an Avicennized Augustinianism, although in a way clearly different from that of John of La Rochelle. As to Duns Scotus, Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics as being primarily an ontology, not a theology, formed an important source for his own view on metaphysics (Counet 2002). He also paid great attention to other elements of Avicenna’s thought, especially in the field of metaphysics, as for instance, Avicenna’s notion of the indifference of essences with respect to existence. But he is clearly not representing any kind of Avicennism. Avicenna’s Metaphysics has eclipsed in this period his De anima, although John Pecham, in his Tractatus de anima, and Witelo, in his treatise De natura daemonum, still make extensive use of the latter work.
From the fourteenth century on, a direct and systematic examination of Avicenna’s philosophical writings is at first glance missing. In this respect, one may note that the translations realized at the end of the thirteenth century only reached us in one single manuscript, that is, Vat. Urb. 186. Nevertheless, Avicenna’s thought undoubtedly remained influential, but now in a indirect way, that is, through the mediation of the works of the major Scholastics. Their interpretations of Avicenna’s doctrines were, however, not always unconditionally accepted. This is well illustrated by an author like Nicholas of Lyra, who rejected Duns Scotus’ understanding of Avicenna’s theory of the univocity of being (Brown 1991). Of special significance is Francis Exeimenis’ use of elements taken from Avicenna’s Metaphysics, X, in the elaboration of his own political theory (Lindgren 1980). In the fifteenth century, Avicenna constituted a major source of inspiration for Denys of Ryckel. Although Denys does not agree with all of Avicenna’s ideas, his system can be qualified as an Avicennized Dionysianism (Emery 1988). In Italy, there was still interest in Avicenna’s philosophical writings, especially in circles of physicians, as is demonstrated by a number of most valuable manuscripts of Italian origin and dated between the fourteenth century and the sixteenth century (Siraisi 1987; d’Alverny 1993, XVI). This tradition seems to have started already with Pietro d’Abano (d. c. 1316). As a physician, he wrote also a work on astronomy and astrology, that is, Lucidator dubitabilium astronomiae-astrologiae, which was largely inspired by several ideas derived from Avicenna’s Metaphysics. But, above all, Ugo Benzi (fifteenth century), who explicitly presented Avicenna’s doctrine of the internal senses as articulated in the De anima, and Andrea Cattani (sixteenth century), who many times, even in magical matters, evoked Avicenna’s authority, are major examples of this attitude (Zambelli 1985:203-204). To these names, one has undoubtedly to add that of Andreas Alpago, who translated both medical and philosophical treatises of Avicenna. However, also pure philosophers continued to study Avicenna’s works in sixteenth century Italy. In this respect, one may mention the names of Marsilio Ficino (especially on imagination) and Thomas of Vio (Cajetan) (especially on metaphysics).
The influence of the Avicenna Latinus on western philosophy has been extraordinary. Several of Avicenna’s ideas received major attention in western thought. Certainly, in the field of ethics, his thought had almost no impact, whereas in physics its influence was limited to few aspects, that is, a realist conception of time and the idea that the elements keep their substantial form when being part of a mixture. As to Avicenna’s logic, it played an important role in Albert the Great’s elaboration of the doctrine of the three states of the universal, that is, ante rem, in re, and post rem (De Libera 1996:253), which was extremely significant for the later discussions on the specific status of the universal. However, a major direct influence comes to the fore in the disciplines of
Psychology and metaphysics. With regard to psychology, this was the case with Avicenna’s conception of the inner senses, especially those of estimation and imagination, and with his theory of the intellect. Moreover, his treatment of the outer senses, and between them most eminently touch and vision, was highly influential. Finally, the famous Flying Man argument, by which he primarily wanted to demonstrate the existence of soul independently of the body, constituted an important object of critical examination. With regard to metaphysics, Avicenna’s famous essence-existence distinction, and, related to it, the idea of the indifference of the quiddity with respect to existence had a profound impact on Scholastic thought, and through it all later western metaphysical thought. Moreover, his conception of metaphysics as being essentially an ontology, but integrating at once a theology and an archeology, that is, the study of the principles of the sciences, had a deep impact. Nevetheless, other of his metaphysical ideas were strongly rejected. Following Averroes’ criticisms, many Scholastics considered that Avicenna had formulated the problematic idea of the accidentality of existence, and accused him also of having confused the numerical and the ontological ‘‘one.’’ Probably only Henry of Ghent among the Scholastics seriously questioned the validity of these criticisms. In his view, they result from a mistaken interpretation of Avicenna’s genuine thought. Of course, for all aspects of Avicenna’s thought one finds divergent interpretations among Latin thinkers. In any case, it is obvious that the Latin Scholasticism cannot be fully understood without the input of the Avicenna Latinus, and that Avicenna had an enduring influence on late medieval and Renaissance thought.
As shown above, the Latin translations of Avicenna’s philosophical treatises received not only the attention of professional philosophers, but also of physicians. Moreover, they were largely quoted by encyclopedists as, for example, Vincent of Beauvais and Henricus Bate, and, in at least one case, one also finds an influence in poetry. Indeed, in Piers Plowman’s famous B-text, his idea of the ymaginatif can be traced back to Avicenna’s De anima (Kaulbach 1993).
Finally, it is obvious that the Latin translations of Avicenna (and al-(Gazal!) gave rise to the creation of a new vocabulary. In some cases, for instance with regard to the notion of intentio, this even opened up an entirely new problematic in the history of western philosophy.
See also: > Albert the Great > Alchemy in the Latin World > Arabic Texts: Natural Philosophy, Latin Translations of
> Arabic Texts: Philosophy, Latin Translations of
> Arnaldus de Villanova > Denys the Carthusian
> Dominicus Gundissalinus > Essence and Existence
> al-(Gazal!’s Maqasid al-Falasifa, Latin Translation of
> Henry of Ghent > Ibn Rushd, Muhammad ibn Ahmad Al-Hafid (Averroes) > Ibn Sina, Abu ‘All (Avicenna)
> Intentionality > John Duns Scotus > John of La Rochelle > John Pecham > Medicine and Philosophy
> Metaphysics > Michael Scot > Robert Grosseteste
> Roger Bacon > Thomas Aquinas > Thomas of Vio (Cajetan) > William of Auvergne
World History
