Aristotle considered the relationships between language, thought and reality in his logical works, for example in his De interpretatione, Sophistical Refutations, and his Topics. In the De interpretatione, he deals with propositions, the constituents of syllogisms, in the Sophistical Refutations he examined the ways in which someone can be deceived by a certain way of speech or writing used by his opponent. In his Topics Aristotle explained on what kind of grounds an argument could be based. These works became known in Latin in western Europe around 1150, and were especially influential on medieval semantics.
Not only logic, but grammar also had language as its object. The authoritative works on grammar were those by Donatus (IVth c.) and Priscian (Vlth c.). From these authors the medievals learned the notions of ‘‘paronymy,’’ or “denominatives” (for instance, ‘‘white’’ from whiteness”), “homonymy” or ‘‘equivocation’’ (but equivocation is also a fallacy in the Sophistical Refutations) (for instance, in the case of ‘‘man,’’ when ‘‘man is a kind’’ is said in contradistinction to ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘man is white’’), and “univocation” (meaning of terms having a single definition, for instance ‘‘horse’’).
Further, they learned from the grammarians the notion of imposition, i. e., the way in which terms have been given meaning by being applied to things. Priscian taught that names have the function of signifying substance together with quality. In general, his grammar was semantically oriented.
Initially, logic and grammar could hardly be separated. From the eleventh century onward, the gap between logic and grammar widened. In general, one can say that the medievals distinguished very well between these two sciences.
Signification was the basic notion. In the earlier period, we see different definitions. In the Introductiones ad logicam, for instance, “signification” is identified with the presentation of some form to the intellect (De Rijk 1967a), or, in the Introductiones Parisienses as ‘‘that which is principally given by a term for understanding’’ (De Rijk 1967b).
Signification was distinguished in primary and secondary. For instance, in Anselm of Canterbury’s De grammatico (1033-1109), one finds a distinction between significare per se, i. e., the signification of a form and significare per aliud, which was also called appellare; in the latter case, the thing signified was meant (Gombocz 1992). This opposition comes back in various forms.
The early development of the notion of signification and the other properties can be followed in, for instance, the Introductiones Parisienses (De Rijk 1967b). After the definition ofsignification just given, the author defines the other properties of terms. Supposition is a property of a word, he says, because it signifies in the way of a substantive or as something existing, like a substantive term does. It is attributed both to the subject term and the predicate term. Copulation is a property of an adjective. Appellation is, according to him and as is usually said, the present belonging of something with another thing, or a property of a term because it signifies present things. Therefore, a word like ‘‘Antichrist’’ (an individual who is not alive now, though he will live in the future, according to faith) does not have appellation, though it has supposition and signification.
The Introductiones Parisienses contains accounts that bear resemblance to later tracts, though the definitions used are different. For instance, in an affirmative proposition in which a common term is subject, and the verb is of the present tense, the supposition is only for things of the present, for instance, of ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘a man can run,’’ and of ‘‘daisy’’ in ‘‘a daisy is considered to be a beautiful flower.’’ Further, the anonymous already seems to know the property of ampliation of a term, for instance, of ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘all man were.’’ Here ‘‘man’’ supposits for men in the present and in the past. In ampliation the extension of what the term stands for is widened.
In the Cum sit nostra, the property supposition is defined as the signification of an utterance that can function as the subject in a proposition (sermo subicibilis), as opposed to a predicate (De Rijk 1967b). Supposition here is ascribed to a subject term. It differs from signification, he says, for supposition means ‘‘to bring its content under other thing.’’
Supposition may be univocal or equivocal, he adds, depending on the term. ‘‘Man’’ is a univocal word, and ‘‘dog’’ is equivocal (it may stand for a barking animal, or a seadog, or a star). Univocal supposition is primary.
Supposition is further divided into simple and personal. Simple supposition is when a common term supposits for a common form, for instance in ‘‘man is the worthiest of all creatures.’’ Here the term stands for something common, which is on the one hand not exactly the form of a man, but on the other hand neither a logical notion, like ‘‘species.’’ This proposition is difficult to interpret and was frequently debated in the Middle Ages.
The anonymous asks what kind of supposition ‘‘man’’ has in ‘‘man is a species.’’ It is not a simple supposition, he says, like many would say in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He interprets it as discrete supposition, in the sense that ‘‘man’’ is the proper name of something incorporeal, viz., a logical notion.
Personal supposition is, he says, the supposition for something inferior, for instance ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘a man runs.’’ Here ‘‘man’’ supposits for this man and for that man (he explains it as if there is ampliation).
Appellation is defined as signification, without time, of a predicable term; ‘‘without time,’’ he says, to distinguish this property from that of a verb. He immediately adds another formulation, viz., that appellation is a property of a common term as far as it is compared with the singular things under it. He gives an example: ‘‘man is an animal’’ in which the subject term ‘‘man’’ is compared with the singulars under it. In the alternative formula, appellation apparently also belongs to a subject term.
Another property to be discussed is restriction. The anonymous says that in ‘‘a white man runs,’’ ‘‘man,’’ a common term, is restricted. In ‘‘all men can be,’’ ‘‘man’’ is ampliated, however. The difference with the Questiones Parisienses is clear in this respect.
The final property is copulation. In the Cum sit nostra, copulation is restricted to a verb. In the Introductiones Parisienses, it is connected to an adjective.
From this discussion, it is clear that there are differences between an English tract (viz., the Cum sit nostra) and a continental one, viz., the Introductiones Parisienses. De Rijk assumed a Paris-Oxford split (Peter of Spain 1972). To what extent this is correct and for which period are matters still open to discussion. It is generally conceded that apart from displaying differences, the two traditions also have a common ground and have influenced each other (De Libera 1982).
We may conclude that appellation is the notion that obtained prominence above and before supposition. The grammarians originally used it as the property according to which a term denotes all the things under it. In a proposition it was made clear which things the term for which the term stands. Originally appellation is the central notion, not supposition. This is especially evident in the Fallacie Parvipontane.
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