Throughout the history of logic and grammar, we gradually see that the list ofwords labelled as syncategorematic is expanded. While initially only conjunctives and prepositions were counted as such, the list ultimately came to include all the words that do not function as the subject or Predicate of a proposition, but nevertheless modify the expressions they are conjoined with and thus affect the interpretation of the entire proposition they occur in.
The lists of syncategorematic words continued to differ, because two distinct criteria (based upon an ambiguity in the notion of consignificare and dispositio) were used to discern categorematic from syncategorematic words. The more syntactic criterion identifies syncategorematic words as those that do not function as the subject or a predicate of a proposition but only modify the relationship between subject and predicate. The semantic criterion singles out syncategorematic words by their semantic function, as consignifying a disposition or circumstance of the ‘‘things’’ (res) indicated by the categorematic expressions they are conjoined with. The semantic criterion to distinguish the syncategoremata is initially the most dominant in the treatises of Robert (Roger?) Bacon, Nicholas of Paris and Henry of Ghent, whereas in John le Page’s, Peter of Spain’s and William of Sherwood’s treatises, the syntactic criterion prevails. However, even these two distinct criteria in themselves did not give a sufficient reason for labelling words as either categorematic or syncategorematic. Throughout their treatises, most authors in fact used both criteria to make the distinction, albeit to different extents. In treatises of English authors, we also find a distinction between the categorematic and syncate-gorematic use of certain expressions (for example ‘‘alone’’ (solus) and infinitely many (infinita)) (Braakhuis, 1979).
The words labelled syncategorematic came to include the following: the verb ‘‘is’’ used as a tertium adiacens (i. e., as part of an attribution), the negation ‘‘not,’’ the modal adverbs ‘‘necessarily’’ and ‘‘contingently,’’ the exclusives ‘‘only’’ and ‘‘alone,’’ the exceptives ‘‘except’’ and ‘‘unless’’ (preter, preterquam), the distributive signs ‘‘every’’ (omnis), ‘‘whole’’ (totum), ‘‘both’’ (uterque), ‘‘of whatever kind’’ (qualislibet), the consecutives ‘‘if’’ (si), ‘‘unless’’ (nisi), and ‘‘but that’’ (quin), the copulatives (like ‘‘and’’), the disjunctive ‘‘or’’ (vel, aut) the adverbs ‘‘whether’’ (an) and the verbs ‘‘begins’’ (incipit) and ‘‘ceases’’ (desinit). The Syncategoremata authors were inclined to say that syncategorematic words do not signify, But rather carry out what they indicate. In most syncategoremata treatises from the continent, the negation ‘‘not’’ was marked as the basic principle of all other syn-categorematic expressions, into which they could all be analysed. In the fourtheenth-century accounts of mental language, the focus on the function of syncategorematic expressions became predominant (Braakhuis 1979).
The emergence of treatises on syncategorematic terms in the Middle Ages has greatly contributed to the growth and development of medieval analyses of ambiguities, and Also helped people gain a better understanding of the distinction between material and formal elements of language. However, it was not only language itself the medi-evals were interested in: an author’s views on the function and application of specific syncategoremata in propositions can help us shed light on their position regarding ontological matters as well. For example, discussions of the syncategorema ‘‘to be’’ and ‘‘not’’ reveal differences of opinion regarding what kind of entities propositions are expressions of; the notion of being itself is under discussion in analyses of sophismata like ‘‘only one is’’ (tantum unum est); authors also have different views about what kinds of‘‘things’’ are to be reckoned as necessary and (im) possible, as is demonstrated in the way they deal with propositions containing the expression ‘‘of necessity’’ (necessario), as well as in their accounts of the logical rule ‘‘from the impossible anything follows.’’ Much of this kind of material can help us decide whether an author should be considered a realist or a conceptualist. Finally, expositions of propositions containing the verbs ‘‘begins’’ (incipit) and ‘‘ceases’’ (desinit) show what an author has to say about the notions of time and motion (Braakhuis 1979, 1999; Spruyt 1989, 1992, 1994).
World History
