Thought

Although Gazall did not call himself a philosopher, his writings contain much philosophically interesting material. Gazall’s observations regarding the philosophers’ theoretical edifice are illuminating, and his assaults on its weak spots incisive. (Because of the pithiness of his summaries, Gazall’s Intentions of the Philosophers became a widely used textbook in Latin and Hebrew circles. The scholastics only learned of Gazall’s anti-Avicennian polemics with the 1328 translation of Averroes’ response, The Incoherence of the Incoherence.) Because of his asserted independence from the various schools and refusal to accept anything on authority or taqltd (e. g., Deliverer, 10.21-11.7, 15.9-14; Frank 1991-1992), Gazall is also free to take his thoughts in striking new directions.

But for all the inherent interest in the notions he puts forward, Gazall has proved a notoriously slippery thinker. Ideas often remain underdeveloped, alluded to more than fleshed out, and it is sometimes unclear whether their implications have been worked out at all. Part of the problem lies in Gazall’s adaptable attitude toward terminology, which led to Averroes’ memorable complaint that ‘‘with the Ash'arites he was an Ash'arite, with the Sufis a Sufi, and with the philosophers a philosopher” (Fasl, 22.6-7; cp. Gazall, Deliverer, 10.10-20; on Gazall’s vocabulary see Lazarus-Yafeh 1975). Part of it stems from the 1095 rupture in Gazall’s career. Though Gazall never disowned his earlier work, there are discrepancies between the early legal and dogmatic works and the later spiritual ones that are not easily explained away. For instance, Gazailii early on subscribes to a divine commandment theory of ethics, which sits uneasily with the more naturalistic view of the good that the later works assume. Still, certain basic tenets carry throughout Gazall’s career.