Radulphus Brito (also called Raoul le Breton or Raoul Renaud), was a famous master of arts, born c. 1270 in the northwest of Brittany in the town of Ploudiry, which lies in the diocese of St-Pol-de-Leon. In the past, Brito has often been identified with the Parisian master of theology Radulphus de Hotot, but this conflation has now convincingly been proven to be mistaken. Brito studied at the faculty of arts in Paris and became a master of arts there no later than 1296. He began studying theology, also at Paris and probably around 1299, while continuing to teach in the arts faculty. Brito read Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, in the academic year 13081309 (at least book II and III) and his inception as a master of theology most likely took place in 1314 (although 1311/12 has also been suggested). Brito also held an administrative post at the university; he became the provisor - the administrative head - of the Sorbonne somewhere between 1312 and 1315 and held this post until at least 1319. He died c. 1320.
Brito commented extensively on Aristotle, but, unfortunately, most of his works remain either unedited or merely partially edited. Although he wrote commentaries on natural philosophy (Physics, On the Soul, Meteorology), on the first two books of the Metaphysics, and on the Ethics, the bulk of his commentaries concern logic and grammar: on the Ars vetus (Isagoge, Categories, and On Interpretation), including Boethius’ De differentiis topicis (On Topical Differences) and the anonymous De sex principiis (On Six Principles), as well as on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations. He also wrote a large commentary on Priscianus Minor en left a collection of mathematical works called Super parva mathematicalia. Probably best known now are his Sophismata. In theology Brito seems to have written far less; all we have are his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sententiae I-III, a Quodlibet, and his so-called Quaestiones in vesperiis (Evening Questions).
Brito’s logical works in particular were very influential, and they remained so, at least in Italy, well into the fifteenth century. For example, Gennadius Scholarios’ commentary on the Ars vetus, composed c. 1432-1435, is for a large part merely a translation and adaptation of several quaestiones written by Brito. After the fifteenth century, however, Brito fell into obscurity, and only his commentaries on the Ars vetus were ever printed.
Brito is considered to be the most important proponent of a particular position in semantics which is found in the later thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and to which, for example, also Simon of Faversham and Boethius of Dacia adhered. These philosophers are now known as the Modistae. What they had in common is that they paid great attention to the manner in which terms have different signification according to their grammatical function in a proposition; hence the name Modistae, after modus significandi, one of their central concepts. These Modistae were also convinced that there is a close symmetry between language, thought, and reality.
Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4, © Springer Science+Business Media B. V., 2011
One of the topics Brito is quite famous for concerns precisely this relation between thought, language, and reality, namely, his extensive discussions on the ontological and semantic status of first and second intentions. These discussions are quite detailed, but for a large part they rely on three basic distinctions. (1) First intentions - second intentions: when we grasp a thing in its proper being (secundum modum essendi proprium rei), for example, if we understand a man as a rational animal, we form a first intention (humanity). A second intention, in contrast, is formed when we understand the same thing in its common features (secundum modum essendi communem rei). For example, once we understand that humanity is found in many individuals (utest inpluribus), we form the second intentions of universality, genus, species, etc. Brito shares the common view in his time that these second intentions are the proper objects of the science of logic and he emphasizes that we always need to grasp the first intention of a thing prior to being able to grasp a second intention. However, he also emphasizes that this is not a causal priority (causaliter et effective). (2) Abstract intentions - concrete intentions: an abstract intention is defined by Brito as the ‘‘being informed’’ of the intellect, which enables it to tend toward something. This simply means that the abstract intention is a particular abstract concept in the mind of the knowing subject. A concrete intention, on the other hand, is something more than just the concept; it is composed of both the thing understood and the particular manner (ratio) of its being understood. More precisely, it is the object that is understood, exactly as being understood, and the concrete intention thus constitutes a firm connection between concepts and things. Both first and second intentions can be either abstract or concrete. (3) The three operations of the intellect: Brito takes over the common distinction between the first operation of the intellect which is forming concepts, the second operation of the intellect which is making a judgement, and its third operation which is reasoning. All three operations have their own sets of intentions. An example of a first intention of the second operation would be ‘‘Socrates is sitting,’’ whereas an example of a second intention would be ‘‘‘Socrates is sitting’ is a proposition.” One of the questions that is of special interest to Brito is whether second intentions fall under one of the Aristotelian categories, which means roughly: whether they refer to some mind-independent reality. He attempts to answer this question by looking at the causes of the various intentions. According to Brito, both the first and the second intentions of the first operation of the intellect are primarily caused by the thing understood (although, of course, the agent intellect also plays a causal role, as it does in any concept formation, since it abstracts our concepts from our phantasms). All intentions of the second and third operation ofthe intellect, on the other hand, are solely caused by the intellect. Brito’s view on the causal connection of second intentions with the things themselves is distinctive, for many philosophers before him had instead argued that these second intentions are caused by the intellect when it reflects upon its own acquired first intentions. Since the main cause in forming a second intention is the external thing, Brito consequently concludes that these second intentions of the first act of the intellect must fall under the categories and have just as much reality (entitas) in this respect as the first intentions.
As for the intentions of the other operations of the intellect, we can either claim that they do not fall under the categories because they are caused by the intellect alone and not by the thing understood, or we can claim that they also fall under the categories because they are caused by something - the intellect - that is just as real a thing as the causes of the intentions of the first operation. If we choose the latter option, however, we have to at least concede that the second intentions of the second and third operations have less being than those of the first operation. Otherwise logic would turn into a science that studies things that are just as real as, for example, the objects of physics, which seems absurd. Brito was heavily criticized for his views on intentions by, among others, Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Auriol, and John of Jandun.
Brito’s natural philosophy and metaphysics have still not been studied closely. His commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul is quite interesting and seems to anticipate some important discussions in the fourteenth century on, for example, the particular difficulty that pertains to the science of the soul. Just like Thomas Aquinas, Brito holds that there is but one substantial form in man, which is the intellect. However, Aquinas’ emphasis on the consequence of this position that the separated soul must be essentially incomplete without the body seems to be lacking in Brito.
See also: > Boethius of Dacia > Hervaeus Natalis > Intention, Primary and Secondary > John of Jandun > Peter Auriol > Simon of Faversham > Thomas Aquinas
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