Just as the princes of medieval Rus' were frequently engaged in intradynastic conflict, so the scholars who have studied them and the society they ruled have often become in embroiled in controversy over interpretations of events of the past. The preceding eleven chapters have presented one set of perspectives on the history of the states and society governed by the Riurikid princes from the reign of Prince Vladimir I the Saint (980—1015) through the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible (1533-84). Viewed from those perspectives, several themes and arguments were highlighted in the narrative. This chapter will review those themes, but will also offer direction to literature containing both supporting arguments and alternative interpretations of major developments in the history of medieval Rus' .
Five major themes have been developed in the preceding chapters. The first is implied by the definition of their subjects and the time span they cover. The subject matter, the development of the states and society of the lands of Rus', was examined from the reign of Prince Vladimir, who monopolized political power in the eastern Slav lands for his dynasty and converted his realm to Christianity, to the death of Ivan IV, who six hundred years later sealed the end of
This chapter contains references to numerous historians. Full citations of their works are located in the bibliography. In cases of multiple bibliographic entries for a single author, notes are provided with abbreviated titles as guides to the relevant bibliographic listings.
His dynasty’s rule. Inherent in these factors is the premise that it is both useful and informative to treat the eras of Kievan Rus', Mongol dominance, and Muscovy together.
Many scholars, including figures such as S. M. Solov'ev and V O. Kliuchevskii, who produced classic studies of Russian history, have treated the developments of Kievan Rus' , Vladimir-Suzdal' , and Muscovy in a sequence that comprised a single national history. Scholars who have accepted their overview, however, generally point to a dividing line that separated the era of Kievan Rus' from the later stages ofdevelopment centering around the principalities ofnorthern Rus' .
Most identify the Mongol invasion as the final act that ended the Kievan Rus' era and marked the beginning ofthe epoch that culminated in the rise of Muscovy. But, as discussed in chapter 4, Many also observed a decline in Kievan Rus' prior to that cataclysmic event. Scholars who follow Solov' ev and Kliuchevskii tend to regard Kievan Rus' as having already entered a state of decline and fragmentation by the time of the invasion. Soviet scholarship, represented by B. D. Grekov, V. T. Pashuto, and L. V. Cherepnin, labeled that fragmentation “feudalization.” In contrast, B. A. Rybakov, P. P. Tolochko, and Thomas Noonan, among others, have assembled evidence to suggest that Kiev was not in decline, but remained the most important city, politically and economically, in Kievan Rus' until it was destroyed by the Mongols.
Despite such variations, the adherents of this school of thought tend to agree that Kiev had been the center of a coherent polity and that, when it did decline, it was replaced first by Vladimir and then by Moscow. The development ofthe northern Rus' states is regarded as a new stage, even a new historical epoch, differentiated from the Kievan era not only by the geography of the new states, but also by their political organization, most significantly by the degree of power held by the grand prince. Thus, while considering them as stages in the history of one nation, this school also emphasizes the discontinuities between Kievan Rus' and its successors. Different conclusions were drawn by Mykhailo Hrushevs' kyi (Mykhailo Hrushevsky) and his followers. They have argued that the most direct heirs of Kievan Rus' were not Vladimir and Moscow, but its core, i. e., the southwestern principalities, which ultimately formed Ukraine.
Having accepted the “break” between Kievan Rus' and its northern successors, scholars have categorized the Muscovite state in a variety of terms, ranging from a unified patrimonial autocracy, as A. E. Presniakov understood it, to a centralized national monarchy built upon well-developed military and bureaucratic institutions, as Soviet scholars such as L. V. Cherepnin and A. A. Zimin described it.
A few characterizations of the lands of Rus' in the eras following the Mongol invasion, including those of Thomas Noonan and Charles Halperin,96 Have noted the significance of some elements derived from their Kievan Rus' heritage. Expanding upon the implications of their observations, the discussions in the preceding chapters have bypassed the framework of standard periodizations and categorizations, and have instead attempted to explore the political and social institutions whose internal dynamics drove the development of the lands of Rus'. The observations made from this perspective also stress the distinctions between the character and organization of Kievan Rus' and Muscovy. But they highlight as well the fact that two institutions established by Vladimir, the dynasty and the Church, transcended the barrier imposed by the Mongol invasion and bound the states and societies that developed in the post-invasion period tightly with Kievan Rus' . They reveal furthermore that it was the responses of those essentially Kievan Rus' institutions, the Riurikid dynasty and the Orthodox Church, to the political environment created in the aftermath of the Mongol invasion that fostered the political ascendancy of Moscow’s princes over an expanded territorial realm, enabled them to acquire legitimacy within it, and thus to carve out the state of Muscovy. The development of the dynasty during the era of Kievan Rus' and after the Mongol invasion, the role of the Mongols in its development, and the development and function of the Church thus form three more of the main themes considered in chapters i Through ii.
The Riurikid dynasty constituted one of the clearest and most direct links between Kievan Rus' and the polities of northern Rus'. Kievan Rus', as elaborated upon in chapters i tHrough 4, Was a political entity whose components were defined and bound together by their common recognition ofRiurikid rule, adoption ofChristianity and a religious culture introduced and nurtured by the Riurikids, and a shared popular material culture born of the mixture of the political,
Military, and legal influences exercised by the Riurikid princes, Christian influences disseminated by the clergy who were supported and defended by the princes and their retinues, and the social and economic traditions of the populace. After the Mongol invasion and the collapse of Kievan Rus', the dynasty continued to give the definition and identity to the lands of Rus' that distinguished them as related and associated principalities. The dynasty continued to be the exclusive provider oflegitimate rulers for the Rus' principalities. Subordination to another dynasty or acceptance of a non-Riurikid prince separated the affected principalities from the other lands of Rus', which retained a loose affiliation even when they were not tightly unified around a single center. Additionally, the dynasts of northern Rus' recalled the traditions that had been forged by their ancestors during the Kievan Rus' era and followed them in the selection of their rulers in the decades following the Mongol invasion. The enduring influence of those traditions accounts for many of the policies adopted by the Muscovite princes, who defied those traditions, as well as for the responses of other members of the dynasty to them.
Seniority within the dynasty became a central issue that affected relations among individual princes and dynastic branches. Throughout the Kievan Rus' era, the dynasty strove to fashion a mechanism to determine seniority and ensure smooth successions. But it was unable to anticipate the complexities that accompanied the enlargement of the dynasty and its territories. As a result, new sources of contention arose even as intradynastic conflicts led to the adoption of guidelines that resolved old ones. Nevertheless, the political development of the lands of northern Rus' and, ultimately, Muscovy proceeded in the context of the dynastic traditions established by the Kievan Rus' princes and of their successful violation by the Muscovite princes.
The transformation of the political structure of the lands of Rus' from a diffuse dynastic realm to a territorially unified and politically centralized monarchy proceeded against the background of the Kievan heritage. The tension between the Muscovite princes, who personified the deviation from Kievan norms, and other members of the dynasty whose efforts to perpetuate Kievan tradition cast them into opposition to Moscow’s rulers, contributed to the dynamics that propelled the development of the northern Rus' principalities into the state of Muscovy. The abandonment of Kievan dynastic traditions and political structures generated a need for the Muscovite princes to construct an alternative political order and to adopt new ideologies to legitimize it. The character of the Muscovite state was not a linear continuation of that of Kievan Rus', but it was shaped by the Muscovite princes’ rejection and replacement of Kievan patterns of organization and of exercising power. Although Muscovy’s political structures contrast sharply with those of Kievan Rus', an understanding oftheir nature and development is dependent upon a recognition of their relationship to their points of departure, the Kievan institutions and traditions. In this sense, Kievan Rus' and Muscovy were inextricably, if paradoxically, linked.
The issues of the role of the dynasty during the Kievan Rus' era and the continuing influence of its traditions after the Mongol invasion have also received other scholarly interpretations. Many scholars have recognized that the dynasty’s pattern of succession was lateral within the senior generation and accepted the notion that a rota or “ladder” system, thought to have been introduced by laroslav the Wise, was in operation. This system, discussed in chapter 2, Incorporated principles oflateral succession within the dynasty’s eldest generation. It was described initially by S. M. Solov'ev and V. O. Kliuchevskii, whose views were essentially adopted by George Vernadsky and presented in his Kievan Russia. Nancy Shields Kollmann is among the more recent scholars who generally subscribe to this view. Her treatment of the succession system in Kievan Rus' may be found in “Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus'.”
Martin Dimnik offered a variant description of the succession system in his article, “The ‘Testament’ of laroslav ‘the Wise’” and his book, The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054-1146. Although he too observed a pattern of lateral succession for the throne of Kiev, he qualified the findings of others who share that view by refuting the corollary that other towns of Kievan Rus' were ordered in a hierarchy and that heirs to the throne, as they replaced deceased elder brothers, progressed toward the position of prince of Kiev by rotating into and ruling those towns in turn, i. e., by moving up the ladder toward Kiev. He argued instead that Prince laroslav had divided the territories of his realm and issued them to his sons in the form of permanent hereditary domains. Thus, Sviatoslav received Chernigov and Vsevolod acquired Pereiaslavl'. Iziaslav and his direct heirs, Dimnik proposed, gained possession of Turov. Furthermore, Novgorod, which Dimnik maintained had no special status but was treated just like other major principalities by laroslav, was assigned to his son Vladimir (d. 1052), whose young son Rostislav inherited his father’s position, but never personally took the throne. While the eldest three sons shared access to Kiev, each dynastic branch ruled its own domain and no rotation occurred across dynastic lines. From Dimnik’s perspective, the Liubech conference reestablished laroslav’s original intent, which had been violated by his older sons, who seized territory from their younger brothers, and by his grandsons, who tried to take possession of Chernigov from Sviatoslav’s descendants.
Among those who favor the view that a lateral system of succession was functioning in Kievan Rus', some reached conclusions that are not inconsistent with those expressed in this volume. They have also tended to emphasize, as discussed in chapter 4, The system’s failure to function smoothly and its breakdown during the twelfth century. In his article “Kievan Rus' and Sixteenth-Seventeenth Century Ukraine,” for example, Omeljan Pritsak noted a continuing inclination among the princes of Kievan Rus' to regard themselves as members of a single ruling family. But he also remarked on their difficulty in effectuating orderly peaceful successions. He attributed their problems to the growth of their family and the consequent multiplication of claimants, each of whom enjoyed the loyalty of their “subclans,” to the central Kievan throne. In The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200—1304, J. L. I. Fennell similarly recognized the tendency among the heirs of laroslav the Wise to accept a principle of generational seniority and to be guided by that principle in their successions both to the grand princely throne at Kiev and to the thrones of their own principalities. Yet he, like Pritsak, concluded that, as the Riurikid dynasty grew in size, its ability to function waned. Fennell blamed the dynasty’s difficulties on the greed of junior princes. The wars they generated, coupled with the disintegration of Kievan Rus' that, in his view, resulted from the loss of eligibility for the Kievan throne by one branch of the expanding dynasty after another, were counterproductive. Rather than providing the princes a means ofrul-ing their domain, the dynastic succession principles deprived Kievan Rus' of central authority and an effective government. A. A. Gorskii, however, argued in his book Russkie zemli v XIII-XIV vekakh. Puti politicheskogo razvitiia (The Russian lands in the XIII-XIV centuries. Paths of political development) that it was their princes’ involvement in “all-Rus'” affairs that kept the various principalities, which were on the verge offorming independent states, within the framework of Kievan Rus'. Kollmann, furthermore, noted that the conflicts among the dynasts reflected an impatience on the part of some princes with the rules of succession, not an absence of such rules. Few who have presented these interpretations of the history of Kievan Rus' and Muscovy, however, have traced the role and significance of the dynastic patterns as surviving beyond the Kievan Rus' era. Whether they characterize dynastic rule and the politics of succession as a binding or dividing force for Kievan Rus', most scholars consider the effects of the fractious Kievan dynastic politics and conflicts to have ceased with the fall of Kiev and with their replacement by the structurally simpler, centralized Muscovite regime.
But other scholars have interpreted interprincely relations within the dynasty, hence the strength and enduring nature of the dynasty’s traditions, differently. They have argued that the dynasty lacked organizational cohesiveness or that at a particular time dynastic unity gave way to mayhem and the political unity of Kievan Rus' to fragmentation. Adopting the position of A. E. Presniakov,97 The most extreme have rejected the entire notion of a lateral or “rota” system of succession. A statement of their position was articulated by A. D. Stokes in “The System of Succession to the Thrones of Russia, 1054-1113.” He argued that “there was no generally recognized and accepted principle of succession to the senior throne of Kiev” before the reign of laroslav, doubted that “such an impractical system [as the rota system] could possibly have been conceived by the ‘wise’ and undoubtedly ruthless and realistic [I]aroslav,” and concluded, therefore, that laroslav “instituted no system of succession.” Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, who describe the succession struggle following the death of Vladimir as a “fraternal free-for-all” in their book, The Emergence of Rus 750—1200, tend to agree.
The discussions in chapters i Through 4 Maintained that a system of lateral succession did evolve in Kievan Rus'. It did not guarantee peaceful transfers of power. Not infrequently disputes over interpretations of the “rules” were resolved only by resorting to warfare. In some cases, seemingly legitimate heirs were bypassed. Prince laroslav’s arrest and confinement of his youngest and only surviving brother Sudislav (d. 1065) helped to secure the succession for his own sons in 1054. Again, the succession from Vladimir Monomakh to his son Mstislav in 1125 took place even though two sons of the late Prince Sviatopolk, Monomakh’s cousin, were still alive. Nancy Shields Kollmann commented on these two princes, Iziaslav and
Briacheslav, in her article, “Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus',” and P. P. Tolochko included them on the dynastic chart accompanying his book, Drevniaia Rus'. But the chronicles contain little information about them other than the dates of their deaths (1128 and 1127, respectively); as a result, there is little basis for interpreting the significance of their experience in the evolution of the dynastic succession system. Another exception, noted in chapter 4, Is the failure of Vsevolod of Vladimir-Suzdal' to assume the Kievan throne after he had become and was acknowledged as the senior prince of the dynasty. And Mstislav Romanovich, a grandson of Prince Rostislav Mstislavich of the Smolensk branch of the dynasty, ruled as grand prince of Kiev (1212-23) despite the fact that his father had not held that position.
It has been argued above that, despite the conflicts and exceptions, the Riurikid princes produced a well-defined set of principles that guided succession to the princely throne of Kiev. A related argument holds that the traditions guiding the dynasty’s succession system were so strong that they exerted a compelling influence on the Riurikid princes long after the Mongols had invaded, Kievan Rus' had collapsed, and the separation of the northern and southwestern Rus' principalities had been completed. With the endorsement of their new overlords, the northern princes honored the principles of succession inherited from Kievan Rus' for almost a century after the invasion. Those principles dictated that the sons of laroslav Vsevolodich would attain primacy in the second halfofthe thirteenth century, while others, such as the princes of Rostov, the descendants of Konstantin, would function in more peripheral roles. The only difference was that the center of their realm was Vladimir, not Kiev.
Those traditions also continued to define political relations, including the interprincely conflicts, among the princes of northern Rus'. As during the Kievan era, disputes arose among the princes when attempts were made to violate the established pattern of succession. This factor was central to the clashes, discussed in chapters 5 And 6, between the brothers Andrei and Alexander Nevsky and between Alexander’s sons, Dmitry and Andrei, in the thirteenth century and, most significantly, between Mikhail of Tver' and Iurii of Moscow during the first quarter of the fourteenth century.
It was also because the Kievan traditions continued to retain such force that the princes of Moscow, the descendants of Daniil, met sustained domestic opposition when they attempted to acquire and hold the grand princely throne during the fourteenth century. On the basis of the “rules” derived from their Kievan heritage, the Danii-lovichi had no legitimate claim to the grand princely seat of Vladimir. As a result, even though they gained the support of the Mongol khans and replaced the princes of Tver' as grand prince of Vladimir from the second quarter of the fourteenth century, representatives of other branches of the dynasty repeatedly protested the appointment of members of the Muscovite line to the grand princely throne of Vladimir.
The Riurikid dynasty survived the devastation wrought by the Mongol invasion. Likewise, the dynastic traditions that defined seniority and determined grand princely succession continued to mold the politics of the northern Rus' principalities long after the collapse of Kievan Rus'. Thus, the attainment of the grand princely throne by the Muscovite princes, who lacked traditional dynastic legitimacy, did not occur without serious repercussions. It was in part because of their lack of legitimacy that the Daniilovichi depended so heavily on their Mongol suzerains. It was, furthermore, to consolidate their political power and, especially after the Golden Horde began to weaken, to develop new substitute domestic sources oflegit-imacy that they adopted the policies that ultimately transformed the dynastic realm of the lands of Rus' into the centralized monarchy of Muscovy.
Those policies resulted in the subordination of previously autonomous principalities to Moscow, in the formation of a central grand princely court and administration, in the conversion of other princes of the dynasty as well as their privileged but untitled advisers and military commanders into servicemen of the grand prince, and in the replacement of the practice of lateral generational succession with a system of vertical succession that ultimately transferred the grand princely throne exclusively from father to eldest son. The new pattern of succession, accompanied by the related reduction in status, power, and independence of other branches and members of the dynasty, was clarified by the dynastic wars of Vasily II and by the succession crisis surrounding the heir of Ivan III. Yet traces of the former lateral system continued to be perceptible during the lengthy childless period of the reign of Vasily III and resurfaced once again during the illness of Ivan IV in 1553, when some of his boyars expressed their reluctance to endorse the succession of his infant son.
Despite the tenacious quality of the patterns rooted in Kievan tradition, the Muscovite princes were successful. Their reordering of dynastic rule, however, led to the breakdown of political order. The removal of potential lateral heirs limited the princes eligible for succession to the sons of Ivan IV. When his son and heir Fedor died in 1598, Riurikid rule over the lands of Rus' came to an end.
Other scholars, implicitly discounting the influence of Kievan tradition, have cited different factors to account for Moscow’s ascendancy over the other northern Rus' principalities (Kliuchevskii, Tikhomirov, Semenchenko).98 AS mentioned in chapter 6, The general factors identified as favoring Moscow have included its geographic location, particularly Moscow’s proximity to lucrative rivers that served as trade routes; the unusual personal qualities of the Moscow princes; and their rare ability to avoid the subdivisions of their own domain and the related internal family conflicts that plagued and weakened other northeastern Rus' principalities in the fourteenth century.
Recent scholarship has focused as well on the internal operations and structural arrangement ofthe Muscovite government. The accumulation of power by the grand prince and the formation of a highly centralized government apparatus have been regarded as the marks of the Muscovite political system. The failure of any group in Muscovite society, most particularly the boyars, to curb the accumulation of autocratic authority and their efforts, on the contrary, to actively promote his image as a powerful figure, even during the period of Ivan IV’s minority, have occasioned scholarly comment and inquiry.99 S. B. Veselovskii, A. A. Zimin, S. O. Shmidt, Gustave Alef, Ann M. Kleimola, and Nancy Shields Kollmann have all investigated Moscow’s boyars. Advancing beyond early studies, e. g., Kliuchevskii’s Boiarskaia duma, they have probed into the identity of the boyars, their family backgrounds, careers, and their roles in the political and governing processes. Alef and Kleimola have offered explanations for the failure of this group, despite its influential position within the political system, to form a counterweight to the grand prince. In “The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy,” Alef explored the competitive nature of the relations among the boyar families and proposed that their rivalries prevented them from coalescing into an aristocratic stratum with common interests and power. Kleimola with Horace Dewey emphasized as well the elite’s dependency upon the grand prince, who alone held the power both to grant high status and privilege and also, importantly, to punish and withdraw those privileges. The Muscovite rulers’ practice, well developed by the sixteenth century, of punishing disloyalty with retributions against a servitor’s relatives reinforced other pressures on boyars as well as lower-ranking servicemen to obey the grand prince rather than attempt to limit his power (Alef, Backus, Dewey and Kleimola, and Kleimola).100 Richard Hellie, generalizing on this theme, argued that the boyars, just as the service princes, the Church, and towns, were unable to impose any institutional restraints on the tsar.101
In her study Kinship and Politics, Kollmann offered an alternative interpretation. She too observed competition for power and influence among the boyars, but suggested that their goals were achieved as much through forging marital ties and kin relationships as through the performance of military and administrative services. She proposed furthermore that their rivalries generated a common interest in preserving stability within the court and balance among their own families. Boyars thus engaged in collective efforts to prevent any single family from gaining too much power. Their preference for stability merged with a similar goal ofthe grand prince, resulting in a political system in which the sovereign and the political elite tended to function in a cooperative rather than an adversarial manner. Marshall Poe has provided additional insight into this relationship. Observing that Muscovite boyars actively conveyed images of their ruler as a powerful autocrat to foreign diplomats and other visitors and portrayed themselves as his humble servants, he has proposed that the tsar’s subjects had accepted the legitimizing principles, rooted in religious concepts, which had been developing from the fifteenth century. Envisioning the Muscovite ruler as God’s divinely appointed agent, charged with protecting them and guiding Muscovite society toward salvation, they accordingly willingly submitted to him and, thereby, contributed to the enhancement of their sovereign’s powers.102
Other potential sources of alternative power, the central administration, and the vehicles of central Muscovite authority have also been subjects of scholarly investigation. Some (e. g., Keep, Nosov, Kashtanov)103 Have delved into methods employed by the Muscovite regime to govern the principalities it annexed, reforms that altered the nature ofprovincial government, and the relationship ofthe provinces to the center. Within this group some have considered specifically the role and functions of provincial governors (e. g., Veselovskii, Dewey, Zimin, Zimin and Khoroshkevich, Alef, Davies).104 Others have concentrated on the treasury at the court of Moscow, its fiscal policies and activities (Hellie, Zlotnik, Alef),105 106 And the development of the bureaucratic offices that grew out of it (Zimin, Kleimola, Brown, Shmidt, Rasmussen, Alef).11 Other factors that had the hypothetical potential to limit the power of the grand princes, but functioned to enhance it have attracted the attention of scholars as well. They include the military (Hellie, Alef),107 The legal system (Kaiser, Dewey, Kleimola, Zimin),108 aNd the zemskie sobory (Cherepnin, Brown, Hellie).109 The results of these and other studies, which offer insight into the nature and functional capacity of Muscovite administrative and social institutions, have been incorporated into the discussions of chapters 8, 9, And ii. Those chapters additionally explored the development of those institutions in the context of a line of princes seeking the means to consolidate their power in the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy.
Interwoven with the development of the dynasty and the Rus' political systems is an exploration of the role played by the Mongols in the achievement of power by the Muscovite princes. But the degree and nature of Mongol influence on the development of the lands of Rus' after their invasion have posed problems for historians, who have on this issue as well as so many others formed a variety of conclusions. At one extreme, scholars ranging from S. M. Solov'ev and V. O. Kliuchevskii to Nicholas Riasanovsky have found very little evidence of lasting Mongol influence in Russia. To account for the features of Muscovy that so distinguished it from Kievan Rus' , some, such as Dimitri Obolensky,110 hAve turned to Byzantine models. Michael Cherniavsky’s article, “Khan or Basileus,” also explored that issue. Others, such as Gustave Alefin “The Origins ofthe Muscovite Autocracy” and lu. V. Krivosheev in Rus' i Mongoly (Rus' and the Mongols), explained Muscovy’s development in terms of internal factors rather than external influences.
At the other end ofthe spectrum are those who consider the Mongols to have had a profound impact on the Rus' lands. Within that group, some stress aspects of Mongol influence that are judged to be negative. They include the initial devastation, the strain on Russian economic resources, and even the introduction of an “Oriental despotism” into northern Rus' political concepts and norms. Karl A. Wittfogel made the case for the last position in an article entitled “Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast.”
Others placed greater weight on factors considered to be positive or constructive. The Eurasian school of thought, represented by George Vernadsky, fits into this category. It observed a limited sphere of direct Mongol influence on Rus' society. But it noted as well the dramatic change that took place in the political structure of the Rus' principalities during the period ofMongol domination over them and concluded that Mongol influence contributed in significant ways to the transformation of the northern Rus' principalities into a state unified around Moscow, whose autocratic ruler assumed powers equivalent to those exercised by the Golden Horde khans or tsars. Vernadsky presented his argument in The Mongols and Russia.
A. N. Nasonov and J. L. I. FennelL111 Also associated the rise of Muscovy with the Mongols. They attributed the achievement of grand princely status by the Daniilovich line, however, to Mongol manipulation. They explained the khans’ decisions to issue the grand princely patents to Moscow princes in terms of the Mongols’ own overriding concern to maintain a balance of power among the Rus' principalities and prevent any single one of them from becoming too strong. Disturbed in the first decades of the fourteenth century by the growing might of Tver', the khan shifted his support to Moscow with the intention of keeping the Rus' principalities weak and divided, submissive and obedient. N. S. Borisov also attributed the success of the Moscow princes in the first half of the fourteenth century to a Mongol reaction against the Tver' princes. In his study, however, he argued that the Moscow princes did not seek the position of grand prince of Vladimir. Content to play a secondary role, they pursued policies of compromise and peaceful expansion of their patrimonial principality. Only when there were no longer any alternatives did Ivan I Kalita reluctantly assume the position and the responsibilities associated with it. A. A. Gorskii, while agreeing that Mongol support contributed to the growth ofMuscovy into the most important northeastern Russian principality, assigned a much more active role to the Muscovite princes in their pursuit of that goal. Tracing the changing relationship between Moscow and the Golden Horde in detail, he argued as well that until the reign of Ivan III the Muscovite rulers reciprocated by remaining loyal to their overlords, the Mongol khans.112
Other scholars have suggested, more specifically, that the Golden Horde and the Tatar khanates that succeeded it provided models for particular political institutions that developed in Muscovy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In “State and Society in Muscovite Russia and the Mongol-Turkic System in the Sixteenth Century,” Jaroslaw Pelenski observed the roots of the Muscovite zemskii sobor in the Mongol-Turkic assembly, the quriltai; he similarly found a parallel for the pomest'e system in a land tenure system employed in Kazan'. Donald Ostrowski argued further that the entire organization of the Muscovite court and administrative apparatus was virtually copied from Tatar models. Charles Halperin, who has challenged Ostrowski’s hypotheses, tried to explain the dilemma faced by modern historians by demonstrating that the Russian chroniclers themselves placed a veil over the actual nature of Russo-Tatar relations and thereby concealed or distorted some aspects of their interaction.18
The position taken in this text falls squarely in the category of those who recognize a significant Mongol influence on the development of the northern Rus' principalities, especially Moscow. The advent of the Mongols created the political conditions in which the Muscovite princes were able to gain preeminence. But some of the effects of the Mongol presence were indirect, even unintentional. In contrast to the conclusions of Nasonov and Fennell, the discussion in chapter 5, Reinforced by arguments and evidence presented by Vernadsky, Halperin, Fedorov-Davydov, Morgan, and Gorskii among others, made the point that the primary focus of the Golden Horde was not its Russian subjects, but other components of the larger Mongol Empire. To help support themselves and facilitate their ventures, the Golden Horde khans demanded that the Rus' principalities provide a steady, reliable stream of resources, which were supplied in the form of tribute, gifts, and commercial items.
This set of circumstances created an opportunity for those princes who displayed an outstanding ability to deliver the required goods and personnel to the Horde to gain favor and rewards from the khans. Chief among those rewards was the patent to rule as grand prince of Vladimir. The Moscow princes, who had no claim to the grand princely throne on the basis of domestic dynastic tradition, benefited most from the opportunity created by the establishment of Mongol suzerainty over the lands of Rus'. By demonstrating their reliability and effectiveness, they gained the support ofthe Mongol khans and, after 1331, the grand princely throne. They did so despite protests from the legitimately eligible princes from Tver' and later from coalitions ofprinces who attempted to restore, in some form, the dynastic traditions.
Their dependency on Mongol support in lieu of dynastic legitimacy obliged the Moscow princes to serve their suzerains obediently. That factor defined many of their actions and policies, including, as discussed in chapters 6 And 7, Their determination to collect and
Ostrowski, “TheMongol Origins ofMuscovite Political Institutions” and Muscovy and the Mongols; Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, “Russia in the Mongol Empire,” and “Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century.”
Deliver tribute to the Mongol khan. The achievement of that objective, in turn, required the Muscovite princes to dominate Novgorod and extend their authority over an ever-increasing number of Rus' principalities. But the policies they pursued, as obedient servants of the Mongols, also began a process of gathering and developing the means, including a larger fiscal base, administrative apparatus, and military force, which ultimately enabled them to dominate the other northern Rus' principalities and overpower their Tatar neighbors.
Viewed from this perspective, specific events in the relations between the Rus' and the Tatars are subject to reinterpretation as well. One significant example is the Battle of Kulikovo. The victory of Dmitry Donskoi demonstrated both Muscovy’s ability to muster an impressive army drawn from a multitude of principalities and the Tatars’ vulnerability. It has thus frequently been regarded as a symbol ofMuscovite leadership, which then directed a sustained and concentrated effort to unite the lands of Rus' and mobilize their resources to throw off the Tatar yoke. The Battle of Kulikovo, despite the fact that the Tatars under Tokhtamysh soon afterward defeated the Rus' again, has thus been regarded as a turning point in the history of the Rus' lands and Muscovy. This characterization, which was set forth by S. M. Solov'ev, has been widely disseminated.
The examination of Mongol—Muscovite relations presented in chapter 7 Yields a different interpretation: the Battle of Kulikovo was a confrontation between one Tatar commander Mamai, who was preoccupied with a power struggle with other Tatar leaders, and his protege, Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich, over timely delivery of tribute payments, not sovereignty. This conclusion is reinforced by evidence, presented by Charles Halperin, N. S. Borisov, and V. A. Kuchkin among others,113 That dates the texts in which the battle is placed in the context of a nationally unified campaign for independence from Mongol suzerainty no earlier than the fifteenth century.
The view that Muscovite-Mongol relations were characterized by a willingness on the part of the Muscovite princes to cooperate and benefit from their Mongol overlords rather than a determined drive to unite the lands of Rus' in order to overthrow the Tatar yoke also affects perceptions of Muscovite relations with the Tatar khanates in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These relations, which were discussed in chapters io And ii, Have also been subject to competing interpretations. The most prevalent argues that Moscow’s commitment to unifying the Rus' lands and the willingness of other Riurikid princes to subordinate themselves to its leadership were generated by a nationalistic determination to overthrow Tatar hegemony. Having accomplished that goal at the pivotal confrontation on the Ugra River in 1480, Moscow persistently went on to assert a dominating influence over its implacable enemy, the Khanate of Kazan', and ultimately to annex it. The Khanate of Astrakhan' then quickly fell to the Muscovite tsar as well, as did the Khanate of Sibir' a few decades later. Only the Crimean Khanate, protected by the Ottoman Turks, managed to withstand the overpowering might of the Muscovite state. Such views have been expressed by a range of scholars, including K. V. Bazilevich, L. V. Cherepnin, Henry Huttenbach, and lu. G. Alekseev.114
Although many scholars directly or indirectly acknowledge the Muscovite-Crimean Tatar alliance of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (e. g., Vernadsky, Fennell, Lemercier-Quelquejay, Zimin, Halperin, Alef),115 tHe most common characterization of Muscovy’s relations with its Tatar neighbors has remained one of hostility. Cordial relations with the Crimean Khanate were sought, it is explained, because Muscovy’s main objective in its foreign affairs was the reunification of the western and southwestern Rus' principalities with its own northern possessions. When contemplating war with Lithuania in pursuit of that goal, Muscovite officials negotiated an alliance with the Crimean Khanate, but when relations with Lithuania improved, e. g., after the truce of 1494, Muscovite-Crimean contacts fell off. Similarly, Muscovy’s posture toward Kazan' has been described as a response to that khanate’s repeated acts of aggression against the lands of Rus'. In order to accomplish its goals in the west, Muscovy was compelled to neutralize its eastern enemy. Contributors to and adherents of this view include I. I. Smirnov, K. V. Bazilevich, George Vernadsky, J. L. I. Fennell, and A. A. Zimin.116
An alternative interpretation, made by Edward Keenan, Charles Halperin, and A. A. Gorskii,117 Argued that the Muscovite princes accepted the authority of the Mongol khans well into the fifteenth century. Both Vasily II and his uncle and challenger Iurii Dmitr'evich recognized that authority when they appealed to Khan Ulu-Muhammed to settle their dispute over the Muscovite throne. Keenan as well as Ihor Sevcenko and Alexandre Bennigsen and Chan-tal Lemercier-QuelquejaY118 Are among those who have added that, as the Golden Horde decayed, its successor states formed a community of polities. Along with the Tatar khanates, Muscovy was one of the members of that community, all of whom remained involved with one another even as they all simultaneously competed for power and attempted to establish a new equilibrium in the region. It was in this context that Vasily II, who regained his throne with the aid of Tatars from Ulu-Muhammed’s Horde after 1445, continued to regard Tatar involvement in internal Muscovite affairs as normal and even desirable, and that Ivan III, reversing the pattern, interfered in the domestic affairs of Kazan' . But Ivan’s intrusion into Kazan’s succession crisis had little to do with conquest; rather he undertook his campaigns in close cooperation with his ally, the khan of the Crimean Khanate.
The growth of Muscovy shifted the balance of power within the post-Golden Horde community in its favor, but Muscovy did not apply its increasing strength to implement a consistent policy aimed at incorporating its Tatar neighbors. Its goal was to reestablish a regional stability, weighted in Muscovy’s favor, to replace the equilibrium that had previously been maintained by the Golden Horde but had decayed when the Horde fragmented. In this context Muscovy opposed the Great Horde, most memorably at the Ugra in 1480. But, while this confrontation was occurring, Muscovy was also allied with the Crimean Khanate. Muscovite policy was not uniformly hostile toward all its Tatar neighbors; nor did the Ugra confrontation, as
Keenan observed, constitute a significant turning point in Muscovite-Tatar relations. Through the middle of the sixteenth century, the central focus of Muscovy’s foreign policy concerns, as described by Charles Halperin,119 Remained the other members of the post-Golden Horde. Only in the middle of the sixteenth century did Muscovy’s approaches to implementing its policy, which had included forging alliances and compromising with the khanates, shift to one of conquest and annexation.
The Golden Horde thus had profound effects on the development of the northern Rus' principalities. By extending its suzerainty over those principalities, the Golden Horde drew them into its own political and economic sphere. The princes ofnorthern Rus' became participants in the Horde’s political and military affairs. Their involvement in that sphere survived the collapse of the Golden Horde and shaped the direction of Muscovite foreign policy, which placed a priority on relations with its Tatar neighbors until at least the 1550s.
More fundamentally, the establishment of Tatar suzerainty over the Riurikids created conditions in which centuries-old dynastic traditions could be abandoned; the Muscovite branch of the dynasty successfully took advantage of the opportunity to achieve prominence and power. Lacking legitimacy derived from domestic sources, the Muscovite princes relied on the khans, who had appointed them, to maintain them in their positions as the grand princes of Vladimir. But when the Golden Horde itself weakened and fragmented, the Muscovite grand princes’ need for domestic sources of support became vitally important. The Church played a critical role in supplying theories that were used to legitimize the preeminence of the Muscovite princes.
Like the dynasty, the Church had developed during the Kievan Rus' era and formed a link between that period and the later stages in the history of northern Rus'. It was also closely related to the dynasty, particularly in its function ofproviding cohesiveness to the realm and stature to its princes. Various issues concerning the Church, beginning with its initial establishment in the lands of Rus' and continuing with its nature as well as its role in Rus' political and social affairs, have been subjects of lengthy discussion and debate among scholars. The circumstances and timing of the conversion of the lands of
Rus' to Christianity, which were discussed in chapter i, form one area of controversy. Similarly, the status of the new Church has been debated. M. D. Priselkov postulated that the hierarchs of the Kievan Church were under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian patriarch. Other theories suggested they were subject to Rome. And George Vernadsky proposed that the Rus' Church was autocephalous until i037.26
The location of the original center of the metropolitan’s see has also been a subject of discussion. Vernadsky placed the original center of the Rus' Church at Tmutorokan'. A. D. Stokes argued in his article, “The Status of the Russian Church, 988-1037,” that the first metropolis was Pereiaslavl', which had previously been the site of an ancient pagan temple. The selection of Pereiaslavl' as the home of the new Church and the relocation of the town itself to a new site symbolized, in his view, the abandonment of the old gods in favor of Christianity. Later, after laroslav became the sole ruler of Kievan Rus' and transferred the metropolitan’s seat to Kiev, chroniclers edited out this information, which detracted from the image of Kiev as the secular and ecclesiastical capital of the realm and laroslav as its virtuous ruler. Most scholars, however, have accepted the views, enunciated by Dimitri Obolensky, Andrzej Poppe, and la. N. Shchapov among others, that Kiev was the original center of the Church in the lands of Rus' , and that the Church from the time of its establishment was under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. la. N. Shchapov, however, proposed that during the third quarter of the eleventh century there were three Rus' metropolitanates: one centered at Kiev, a second at Chernigov, and the third at Pereiaslavl'.120 121
By providing a uniform religion, introducing cultural standards for architecture, painting, and literature, and by strengthening Kievan ties to Byzantium, the Church generally bolstered the authority and prestige of the Riurikid dynasty. It also added a layer to the identity of Kievan Rus' , whose society was distinguished from its neighbors not only by recognition of Riurikid rule but also by the eastern Christian religion and culture.
The adoption of Christianity nevertheless had its costs. Prince Vladimir I pledged a tithe of his revenue to the Church. Andrzej PoppE122 Argued that the assignment was designated particularly for the Church of the Tithe (Holy Virgin), which he regarded as Vladimir’s royal chapel. His view disputed the more commonly held notion that the tithe was intended to provide financial support for the whole institution of the Orthodox Church in Rus'. This conception is derived from the understanding, expressed for example by Tolochko,123 That the Church of the Tithe was the first cathedral of the metropolitan; donations for its maintenance implicitly constituted contributions for the support of the Church in its entirety. Through the Church statutes, which were issued by the Riurikid princes and have been discussed by la. N. Shchapov, Daniel Kaiser, and N. S. Borisov,124 the princes also transferred jurisdiction and responsibility for matters concerning norms for social and family relationships as well as for Church personnel to the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The princes thus shared the power and revenue derived from settling disputes with the Church.
Like the dynasty, the Church survived the Mongol invasion. It gained the right to locate a bishopric at Sarai and enjoyed an array of privileges and tax exemptions under Mongol rule. But unlike the political realm of Kievan Rus', which under the impact of the Mongol invasion split into its northeastern and southwestern components and then subdivided further, the ecclesiastical realm remained intact longer and, as Thomas Noonan pointed out in his article “Medieval Russia, the Mongols, and the West,” provided bonds that, despite the absence of political unity, held the Orthodox lands of Rus' together as a cohesive unit. It was not until the end of the thirteenth century that Metropolitan Maksim moved his residence from Kiev to the northeast. And it was only during the fourteenth century, under pressures from their new Polish and Lithuanian secular rulers, that the bishoprics of southwestern Rus' were fashioned into a succession of metropolitanates. At that time an ecclesiastical fissure, parallel to that of the secular, political division of the lands of Rus', began to form in the metropolitanate of Kiev and all Rus' . Other scholars have similarly noted that the Rus' Church was not divided until well after the Mongol invasion; indeed, Robert Crummey,125 fOr example, placed the division in 1458, when a permanent metropolitanate was created for the Orthodox population in Lithuania.
But the Rus' ecclesiastical see remained unified only as long as the Golden Horde dominated the lands that had made up Kievan Rus'. During that period all the Rus' principalities, despite their political subdivision, recognized the spiritual authority of the same metropolitan. But when the Golden Horde’s power receded and was replaced in the southwestern portions of the Rus' lands by that of Poland and Lithuania, their new rulers secured the patriarch’s cooperation in detaching the Orthodox population in their lands from the Russian see. The first efforts to separate the western bishoprics from the Rus' metropolitanate, described in chapters 6 And 7, Achieved only temporary success. But they were nevertheless disturbing enough to the Rus' ecclesiastical leadership to prompt a response. Thus, if the final political division ofthe southwestern and northern principalities was a direct consequence of the Mongol invasion, the division of the metropolitanate of Kiev and all Rus' a century later may be considered an indirect result of the contraction of Mongol power. And, just as the political development of the northern Rus' principalities was shaped by the dynasty’s reactions to the Mongol presence, so ecclesiastical policies were fashioned in response to the consequences of the Mongol retreat from the southwestern Rus' . The policy adopted by at least some hierarchs and spiritual leaders of the Russian Church was to reunite the Orthodox population of the lands of Rus' into a single see.
The Church’s interest in reunifying the Russian lands is commonly perceived in a secular political context and understood as one way in which the Church expressed its undeviating support for the Moscow princes, who during the fourteenth century were not only establishing themselves as grand princes of Vladimir, but also were steadily subordinating and unifying the northern Rus' lands. The strength generated by the amalgamation of principalities contributed by 1380 to Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich’s ability to defy Mongol authority and defeat Mamai at the Battle of Kulikovo.
A. E. PresniakoV126 Presented the case for a close identification between metropolitans and Muscovite princes. He traced their relationships from the beginning of the fourteenth century when Petr, favored by Moscow’s Prince lurii, prevailed over Gerontii, the candidate of Grand Prince Mikhail, to become metropolitan and subsequently clashed with the grand prince. Petr’s successor Feognost bolstered the position of Moscow’s princes by driving Grand Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich from the Rus' lands after the Tver' uprising of 1327, thereby clearing the way for Ivan I Kalita to take his place. He, furthermore, depicted Metropolitan Aleksei as an ally, supporter, and close adviser to Grand Prince Dmitry Donskoi. This overview has been generally accepted by a range of scholars, including George Vernadsky, L. A. Dmitriev, Dimitri Obolensky, Omeljan Pritsak, and J. L. I. Fennell.127
An alternative version places the forging of tight, mutually supportive relations between the Church and the Muscovite grand princes at a later date. Expressed by N. S. BorisoV128 Among others, it stresses the character of the Church as a landowning institution whose possessions were expanding through the fourteenth century. As the metropolitans, bishops, and monasteries became wealthy landowners, whose powers over their estates and the inhabitants who dwelled on them approached those of appanage princes, they entered into an inherent conflict of interest with the Muscovite princes who during the same period were intent upon subordinating autonomous local authorities. The issue became overt late in the fifteenth century, when Ivan III confiscated Church lands in Novgorod. It was resolved and a Church-state alliance formed only in the early sixteenth century, when Ivan III cast his support behind the “possessor” camp in the Church controversy against the “non-possessors.” In return, the victors within the Church pledged their loyalty, manifested in part by the formulation ofideologies that enhanced his powers, to the grand prince and his successors.
Other scholars, however, have questioned the validity of various facets of the image of a tight bond between the Church hierarchs and spiritual leaders on the one hand, and the princes ofMoscow on the other. Some (e. g., Meyendorff, Dmitriev) have pointed out that the descriptions and characterizations of close, supportive relations between Church leaders and Moscow’s princes during the fourteenth century were composed in the fifteenth century. David Miller,129 examining specifically the signs of support accorded Dmitry Donskoi by Sergei of Radonezh, discussed doubts that have been raised concerning their historicity. He concluded that the accounts of Sergei’s “blessing,” bestowed on Dmitry and his army on the eve of the Battle of Kulikovo, were among those composed decades later, in the fifteenth century. They should be understood as reflections of the Church’s interests at that time.
N. S. Borisov,130 Furthermore, explained that Metropolitan Petr’s conduct was prompted by the hostility he encountered from the grand prince, who came from Tver', not by his personal preference for Moscow’s princes. Borisov similarly attributed Feognost’s treatment of Grand Prince Aleksandr to the metropolitan’s obligation to carry out the will of the khan of the Golden Horde, not to his unambiguous support for Aleksandr’s rival, Ivan of Moscow. He also cited other examples of Feognost’s official acts, which imply lack of support for the Muscovite princes: his refusal to give his blessing to the third marriage of Grand Prince Semen, which took place in 1347, despite the fact that this match with Aleksandr’s daughter Mariia improved the status of the grand prince; his lack of participation in the construction of churches or the compilation of literary texts that glorified Moscow and its princes; and his secondary role, in contrast to that of Ivan I Kalita, in the 1339 canonization of Petr, who had been so closely associated with Moscow. The image of a longstanding and consistently supportive relationship between the Church and the Muscovite princes is undermined further by the recollection that Bishop Iona, the leading hierarch of the Church in the absence of a metropolitan, was reluctant to support Grand Prince Vasily II in his contest against his uncle. Finally, the argument that the Church’s policy culminated in the sixteenth century with an exchange of Church support for virtually autocratic powers for the grand prince in return for property rights for its own institutions has also been cast into doubt by Donald Ostrowski.131
The latter set of arguments substantiates the concept, presented in chapter 6, That the interests of the grand prince and the Church did not coincide. The metropolitans of the fourteenth century were preoccupied with maintaining or restoring the unity of their see. The Muscovite grand princes were concerned primarily with holding their positions of power and, to serve that goal, with extending their control over territories in northern Rus', collecting tribute, and satisfying the demands of their Mongol suzerains. Thus, at moments critical to the successful achievement of Daniilovich goals, influential Church leaders were frequently absent or neutral. Some examples were noted above. Another, discussed in chapter 7, Revolves around the succession of Dmitry Ivanovich to the grand princely throne. Metropolitan Aleksei, who was being held in Lithuania where he had gone on a mission to rejoin the southwestern bishoprics with his see, was not in Moscow guiding the young prince, who lost his throne almost immediately after ascending it. The lack of uniformity of secular and ecclesiastical interests became apparent again when Dmitry supported Mitiai, then Pimen, to replace Metropolitan Aleksei. But it was Kiprian, who had been named metropolitan in Lithuania (1375) and who was identified with the cause of reunifying the Orthodox community into a single see, who was named Aleksei’s successor. Not only did Donskoi oppose him, he humiliated him when he came to Moscow to claim his ecclesiastical throne and ejected him from the city. Donskoi, despite his image as the hero of Kulikovo and unifier of the lands of Rus', did not support the Church’s policy of reunifying the metropolitanate of Kiev and all Rus'; under the circumstances of the late fourteenth century, he could not have implemented the concomitant secular policy of uniting the lands of the Orthodox peoples into a single political realm.
World History
