Thought

By the middle of the twelfth century, Proclus’ philosophy was considered to be a source of heresies. Nicholas’ treatise illuminates the nature of the conflict between pagan and Christian Hellenism (Michael Psellos, John Italos). A “refutation” was quite new in the Byzantine intellectual world since John Philoponus’ De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum. Contrary to other critics ofProclus (Theodore Prodromos, George Tornikes) who rejected Proclus’ theory in general, Nicholas analyzes Proclus’ propositions in detail, in the light of Orthodox Christian dogmas. He argues that the contemporary interest in Proclus and Platonic arguments threatens the concept of Trinity.

The refutation represents a philosophical genre that was used against pagan philosophy, and especially against admiration for Proclus’ work as the epitome of human wisdom. The aim of the work is to protect the doctrines of the Church from the infiltration of Neoplatonic philosophy (Benakis 1987). The treatise contains important theological issues which were relevant in connection with the influence of Neoplatonism on the thinking of Bogomils. He is probably the author of the anti-Bogomil work The Dialogue Concerning Demons, which used to be attributed to Michael Psellos. Similar criticism also appears in Nicholas’ other treatises in which he rejects the heresy of Soterichos Panteugenos (Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, pp. 321-359). Nicholas objected to heretical doctrines in accordance with the anathemata contained in the Synodikon Orthodoxiae, claiming that heretics draw their ideas from Proclus. His treatise is similar to older criticisms of Proclus, especially those dealing with the issue of the eternity of the world (Philoponus); as to his method of argumentation, he often appealed to the authority of the Church Fathers, for instance Pseudo-Dionysios Areopagita and Gregory of Nazianzus (Draseke 1892). Nicholas’ Refutation is written as a confrontation between Areopagita and Proclus, in which Proclus is portrayed as an unorthodox pupil of Areopagita.

Nicholas does not refute Proclus’ doctrine in general but he deals with the propositions of The Elements of

Theology chapter by chapter. The treatise can be seen from two angles: in comparison with conceptual consistency and in relation to Christian dogmas (Tatakis 1949). His criticism of Proclus is pointed not only against cosmology and polytheism but also against specific philosophical terms which prove Proclus’ discrepancy with Christian teachings. Nicholas discusses the most basic of Proclus’ triads: remaining, procession, and reversion (mone, proodos, epistrophe) and unparticipated, participated, and participating (amethektos, methektos,

Metechon). He adopts the first one (mone, proodos, epistrophe): all things are pre-contained in God, are unfolded from him into creation, and return to him as their end (Terezis 1995). Nicholas accepts the triple existence but not the multitude of creators, since it is only one creator from which everything derives. He refuses to attribute the creative power to anything apart from God. Nicholas also criticizes Proclus’ concept of participation. He understands that God is both participated (methektos) and unparticipated (amethektos), in the sense that a term that is directly unparticipated (amethektos) can be indirectly participating (metechon) by means of the participated things (metechomena), which it creates. Nicholas adopts the phrase unparticipated participated things (amethektos metechomena) from Pseudo-Dionysios Areopagita. The division of the participated intelligence into terrestrial and celestial sphere is according to Nicholas a fallacy, and it is unacceptable because it leads to polytheism (Niarchos 1983-1984).

The only source and cause of the existence of every being is God, the supra-intelligence (hypernoun). All beings derive their existence from God, who is the only unparticipated, for everything unparticipated subsists prior to the participated. The perfection of God does not depend on the participation of others in him. Nicholas states that the divine substance (ousia) remains ineffable and incognoscible. God by his own act gives substantiality to all other intelligences. Nicholas understands the intelligences as mediators between God and all other beings (Refutation, pp. 115-116). He argues that not every intelligence knows everything nor creates everything. This is the attribute of the Intellect (nous), which, being itself unparticipated, knows and creates everything. All its acts are directed toward all beings and things in general. The Primal Intellect is identified with God, while all other intelligences are subordinate, close to One, and divine and perfect due to the participation in the Primal Intellect (Refutation, pp. 143-144).

According to Nicholas, the first six propositions of the first group of The Elements of Theology are against the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. According to him,

Proclus deals unsuccessfully with theological matters, mainly with intelligible concepts, which he drags down to the corporeal sphere. Nicholas attempts to demonstrate the contradictions in Proclus’ conclusions and he makes extensive comments on the ambiguities of The Elements of Theology. He is persuaded that Proclus blended together metaphysical and logical conclusions, a mistake that led him to a series of contradictions. The first proposition of The Elements of Theology (Every manifold in some way participates unity) is set against other propositions (for instance, proposition 5 or proposition 24) to prove that Proclus refuted himself when he stated that the One is simultaneously participated and unparticipated; in doing so, he made the One to be at the same time many. Also, Proclus states that the unparticipated Intelligence is superior and has primal existence (propositions 23 and 24), while at another place he accepts both; namely, that it is an unparticipated and participateD intelligence and the latter is participated either by celestial or by terrestrial souls (proposition 166).

Moreover, Nicholas refutes Proclus’ statement that the cause of all things (the intelligence) must be motionless, since, if it moved, it would be imperfect (for all motion is an imperfect activity); and it would be subject to time, although it is the cause of time. He also criticized Proclus’ statement that emanative creation is timeless, which is in contrast to the Christian doctrine of deliberate creation in time (Refutation, pp. 152-153). Nicholas argues that if intellection is creation, then, since each intelligence has intellection of itself and its priors, each intelligence must create itself and its priors, which is aBsolutely absurd.

Nicholas also finds Proclus’ proposition that ‘‘all that participates in time, but which has perpetuity of movement, is measured by periods,’’ unacceptable, because according to him, the soul cannot have an eternal and a temporal movement simultaneously. Whatever participates in time can never be eternal, nor can that which is eternal be at the same time temporal, for beings are Divided into those that participate in time and those that are eternal (Refutation, pp. 174, 3-6).

Nicholas rejects Proclus’ proposition that ‘‘all things are in all things but in each thing according to its proper nature’’ by putting the argument that the prior and the Great cannot be in the posterior and the small (Refutation, pp. 99-101). For Nicholas it is only the Intellect that remains indivisible, being itself incorporeal, without magnitude and possessing all kinds of plurality. Even its activity is single in itself but dispersed to many things (Refutation, p. 110).

Nicholas’ treatise is an important testimony of the Byzantine interest in Proclus’ thought, for it seems that he was inspired by numerous refutations of Proclus. However, the influence of his thought is still not well examined.

See also: > John Philoponus > Proclus, Arabic > Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite