Olivi’s questions on Peter Lombard’s Sentences contain a comprehensive philosophical psychology developed within the general context of the Aristotelian faculty psychology dominant at the time. In building this system, Olivi rarely puts forward strong claims. It is interesting to see, however, that he did not think of consciousness as a distinctive human capacity despite the strong claim that the strong kind of self-reflexivity needed for freedom is strictly limited to humans in distinction to other animals.
A certain kind of self-reflexivity is to be found already at the level of touch, the most basic of all the senses. Touch, as Olivi tentatively defines it, is a sense by which an animal feels its own body in relation to health, welfare, and success in action. It is not, thus, a sense defined through proper sensibles like heat and hardness. In a way, even the simplest animals thus have the capacity for reflexive perception of themselves as bodily entities. Olivi also mentions the Classical Stoic example of a dog sacrificing its leg to save the head, thus showing awareness of the respective values of the different parts of the body.
Animals are not, however, capable of self-reflection in the spiritual manner typical for humans. Olivi appears to think that an animal has an image of its own body, a kind of self-image, but it cannot understand itself as the per-ceiver of this image. This is limited to humans. Olivi seems to accept, but not emphasize, the traditional Aristotelian idea that humans differ from other animals through the power of understanding universally. Rather, Olivi’s understanding of the human distinction emphasizes self-reflexivity and free self-control. This distinction is, for him, the distinctive human capacity, and the foundation of human dignity.
See also: > Bonaventure > Consciousness > John Duns Scotus > Matthew of Aquasparta > Peter Auriol > Peter Lombard > Poverty > William of Ockham
World History
