Within the context of natural morality, Ockham joins the many medievals who, following Aristotle, thought of ethics as being a practical science where man pursues the fulfillment of his nature that brings happiness. Motivation, however, also plays a major part in his moral philosophy. In his question On the Connection of the Virtues, William stresses that no one acts virtuously if he does not act with knowledge and freedom. The basic virtuous act is one where ‘‘the intellect dictates that a particular just work should be done at such a place and time for the sake of the intrinsic worth of the deed or for the sake of peace or some such thing, and the will elicits an act of willing such deeds in conformity with the dictates of the intellect’’ (Opera theologica VIII, 335). William judges that one would deserve more respect if beyond this basic expectation one were to do this act when it costs a price, e. g., death in honor for one’s country, which right reason would tell us we should be willing to pay. An even higher level of respect is due when one acts for no other motive than that right reason demands it. Taking into account theological motives, there can be even higher motives, e. g., doing something for the love of God. Motives are important for Ockham’s doctrine of morality, but they are not the only determinants of morality. Ockham’s theological considerations will also deal with further dimensions of the moral life - going beyond what human nature demands. This leads him into discussions of obedience in regard to the divine laws revealed in the Bible and theological discussions of merit, which consider the conditions necessary for moral actions to be also meritorious actions, i. e., worthy of eternal beatitude.