During the early part of the period under review, and despite a renewed wave of determined Tartar assaults from 1297-1327, sultans Alauddin Khalji (1296-1316) and Mohammed ibn Tughluq (1325-51) succeeded in subduing and annexing virtually the whole of the Indian sub-continent, welding it into a single, albeit shortlived, Moslem empire. Indeed, Mohammed ibn Tughluq was called ‘the Second Alexander’ by some of his contemporaries, pushing the frontiers of the sultanate as far as the Deccan, an achievement that was unequalled thereafter until the rise of the Moghul dynasty in the 16th century. However, even before his death the sultanate had started to disintegrate into a plethora of lesser kingdoms (Bengal regained its independence following a revolt in 1337-38, and the Bahmani kingdom seceded in 1347), disintegrating entirely under his cousin and successor Firuz Shah (1351-88), with Khandesh, Malwa, Jaunpur and Gujarat all seceding between 1382-96. Of the sultanate’s successor states the Bahmani kingdom, by far the most important, itself broke up c. 1490 into the ‘Five Deccan Sultanates’ of Ahmadnagar, Berar, Bidar, Golkonda and Bijapur.
The Tughluqids established a military system which persisted even after the demise of their dynasty, and we are lucky enough to have been left with fairly comprehensive details of its organisation in a 14th century work by Shihab al-Din al-’Umari (d. 1348). This tells us that under Mohammed ibn Tughluq the army comprised an improbable 900,000 horsemen, ‘some of whom are stationed near the prince, while the rest are distributed in the various provinces of the empire.’ He adds that ‘they consist of Turks, Khitans, Persians and Indians, and people from certain other countries’, which tallies closely with a description of the army of his predecessor Ghiyath-ud-Din Tughluq (1320-25) as comprising Ghuzz, Turks, Tartars, Persians, Tajiks, Hindus, Russians and Greeks (the last two doubtless in the capacity of mamluks). Those posted in Delhi itself, paid from the royal exchequer, were called the hashm-i-qalb, comprised of the khasah-khail or household troops, including the royal mamluks (Mohammed had 20,000 Turkish mamluks) and guards like the Silahdars and Sar-i-Jahandar (the sultan’s bodyguard, 2,000-strong at this date) and the afwaj-i-qalb. The provincial troops, posted in garrisons throughout the empire, were called the hashm-i-atraf. Administration was in the hands of a minister called the ’arid-i-mamalik (called the sahib-i-'ard or ’arid-i-jaysh by the Bahmanis), who kept a descriptive roll (huliya) of the men and was responsible for pay, the commissariat, and the division of booty (in the army commander’s presence). In addition he inspected the troops at least once a year, and selected those who were to participate in a particular campaign, though the sultan himself selected the commander. Under the Bahmanis the army commander was called the amir-ul-umara and customarily had a troop of 1,500 cavalry at his disposal.
The provincial troops were maintained in traditional Moslem fashion by the distribution of large iqta’at (usually called jagirs) amongst the nobility, who were thereby obliged, when called upon, to provide specific numbers of men at their own expense according to their rank. The highest in rank was the khan, who was to maintain 10,000 or more sawars, i. e. cavalry soldiers with one horse (al-’Umari says that Mohammed had 80 khans in his service); next came the malik, commanding 1,000 sawars; then the amir with 100 sawars; the isfahla or sipah-salar (a title that had once denoted the commander-in-chief) with less than 100; and finally the sepoy. A somewhat different list is provided for the late-13th century by Bughra Khan, second son of Sultan Balban (1265-87), who makes the lowest rank that of sar-i-khail, commanding 10 cavalrymen; he then makes the sipah-salar commander of 10 sar-i-khails, the amir commander of 10 sipah-salars, the malik commander of 10 amirs, and the khan commander of 10 maliks (therefore by inference 100,000 men). In practice, however, amirs tended to command 50-1,000 men, and maliks at least 1,000, while the Mongol term tuman was frequently used for a khan’s unit in the 14th century (hardly surprising when one realises that many noblemen under the Tughluqids were of Mongol origin). Bahmani armies were similarly organised, though they had units of 500 too, subdivided into 5 units of 100, and according to the 16th century chronicler Ferishta their highest rank was that of a commander of 2,000, reserved for the kingdom’s provincial governors (who, we are told elsewhere, were nevertheless each expected to field 10,000 men). Much later, in the mid-16th century, Islamshah Sur reorganised the army into units of 50, 150, 200 and 500.
As has already been mentioned, al-’Umari claims that Mohammed ibn Tughluq’s army consisted of 900,000 (9 lac) sawars. This is fairly certainly an exaggeration for 90,000, since his successor Firuz Shah is recorded leading precisely that number of cavalry in his first expedition against Bengal in 1354 (where he was confronted by 10,000 cavalry, 200,000 infantry and 50 elephants), and against Sind in 1362. The contemporary chronicler Barani similarly records that ‘in the reign of Firuz Shah there was an army of
80,000 and sometimes 90,000 horse, exclusive of slaves’. In his second expedition to Bengal in 1359-60 Firuz Shah’s army comprised 70,000 cavalry, ‘innumerable’ infantry, 470 elephants, 180 (or 980) standards, and ‘84 ass-loads of drums and trumpets’. These campaigns, however, were launched during the apogee of the sultanate’s military power, before Firuz Shah’s weak government had brought about a decline in the army’s effectiveness. He discontinued the traditional annual inspections and abandoned the huliya, allowing substitutes to appear at musters. Barani records how ‘horses of little value were often brought to the diwan and were passed as serviceable. Such stories often reached the sultan’s ears, but he acted as if he had never heard them.’ As a result bribery and corruption became rife; many soldiers indulged in commercial enterprises and failed to even appear at musters when they were still held. It is no surprise, therefore, that the sultanate could muster only 10-12,000 cavalry and 20-40,000 infantry to confront Tamerlane before Delhi in 1398.
World History
