CYPRUS

The kingdom of Cyprus reached the height of its prestige and power early in this period under Hugh IV (1324-59) and Peter I (1359-69), even establishing a foothold on the mainland under the latter by the cession of Corycus by the Cilician Armenians in 1360 (lost 1448) and the capture of Adalia, modern Antalya, in 1361 (lost 1373). However, the murder of the crusading king Peter I by dissident barons led in 1373 to his widow supporting a Genoese invasion of the island that tore out its heart and crippled it financially. As a result of the treaty signed in 1374 the Cypriot exchequer ended up virtually footing the bill for the Genoese expedition and paying for the maintenance thereafter of Genoa’s forces stationed on the island, in addition to which Famagusta had to be handed over to the republic. Abortive attempts to evict the Genoese, often in alliance with their traditional enemies the Venetians, resulted only in even more burdensome conditions being imposed, and the Genoese stranglehold on Cyprus was only finally ended with the recapture of Famagusta by James II (1460-73) in 1464. In the meantime the faction-ridden island had undergone an invasion by the Mamluks of Egypt in 1426, in retaliation for ill-advised Cypriot raids on the Syrian coast the previous year (and on many earlier occasions, right back to Peter I’s raids on Alexandria in 1365 and on Tripoli and Tortosa in 1367). Receiving no aid from the Genoese, King Janus (1398-1432) was captured by the Mamluks in the Battle of Khirokitia, and was only released on payment of a huge ransom and acknowledgement of Mamluk suzerainty. It was therefore in Cypriot ports that the Mamluk fleet was

Revictualled before its attacks on Rhodes in 1440 and 1443, and from 1460-64 Mamluk troops supported James II’s claim to the throne, fighting against the legitimate queen, Charlotte (1458-64). Under James II Venetian influence steadily increased to fill the power vacuum left by the displacement of the Genoese, and following his premature death the republic effectively ruled the kingdom through his Venetian widow, who in 1489 officially handed over to them the government of the island, which thereby became a Venetian colony.

Although the core of Cyprus’ military strength comprised the contingents of the feudal nobility as in Western Europe, other elements of the army reflected the island’s cosmopolitan population. The infantry were provided chiefly by the native Greek-speaking peasantry, both parici (serfs) and francomati (freemen), plus Cypriot and Western European Franks, particularly in the role of crossbowmen (who constituted the nucleus of Cypriot infantry). In addition Cilician Armenians were often hired, as by King Peter II (1369-82) in 1373, and after the fall of their own kingdom many more fled to Cyprus, so that at the Battle of Khirokitia many of the Cypriot infantry were Armenians and the dead there included at least two Armenian knights. The forces at this battle also included Karamanli Turks (‘especially employed as mercenaries’ since 1415), while al-’Aini records Catalans and Rhodians (i. e. Hospitallers) being there. In the war of 1373-74 against the Genoese even Bulgarians are recorded; there were about 2,000 of them — all ex-slaves, and apparently including some Romanian Greeks and Tartars — gathered together to fight as mercenaries, initially for the Genoese but later for the king’s forces, apparently in the role of light cavalry skirmishers against the Genoese lines of communication, often being recorded fighting in, or guarding, mountain passes and defiles. Other mercenaries during the 14th-15th centuries included native turcopoles (see Armies and Enemies of the Crusades, figure 14) and Frankish knights, predominantly from France and to a lesser extent Italy and Germany. Under the Venetians stradiots were also introduced (see figure 68), 600 raised in Albania and the Greek islands being sent to Cyprus in 1474 along with 2,000 mercenary Italian infantry.

No records of Cyprus’ total military potential seem to have survived for this period prior to the Venetian takeover, but there were probably about 1,000 knights available to the crown, at least in the 14th century; these the king had to pay if he required their service. In addition an arriere-ban of all able-bodied men over 15 years of age could be called on in emergencies, as it was to defend Nicosia in 1373. It would seem that in all up to 10,000 men were available to the king under ordinary circumstances — Peter I led 7,000 men in his raid on Syria in 1367, while in 1373 we read of the Constable of Cyprus placing 1,000 men in Famagusta and appointing 300 more as coastguards, while the Prince of Antioch and Peter II led 1,000 and 2,000-2,500 respectively from Nicosia, in addition to which there were large garrison forces and the 2,000 Bulgarians mentioned above. The largest Cypriot army on record for the 15th century was that defeated at Khirokitia, which is recorded as 1,600 knights and 4,000 infantry by Leontios Makhairas (who was present); 2,000 cavalry and about 8,000 infantry by al-’Aini; and 2,000 cavalry and a ‘large number’ of infantry by Sanudo. Khalil al-Dhahiri put the cavalry element at 2,300. Perhaps the lower figures do not include the vanguard detachment, which according to Monstrelet comprised 300 Hospitaller and Frankish cavalry and ‘many’ infantry. Two Moslem sources record the Cypriot losses in the battle as 6,000 or more men, though another (Taghribirdi) says 2,000 were killed in the battle and more in the ensuing rout. Makhairas gives one or two other interesting details of the Cypriot army on this occasion, recording that it was organised in units of 100 and 50 men*, the infantry being drawn up with ‘each man close up to the next so as to be like a wall. And they had prepared a hundred pavesia [pavises, apparently for the troops guarding the king] . . . and all the army like a wall.’

Military command was in the hands of the Constable of Cyprus and the Constable of Jerusalem (usually brothers of the king), and the Marshal and Seneschal, all of these, together with the Butler and Chamberlain, being ‘officers of the kingdom’, their posts generally being held for life; in addition there were the Admiral and the Turcopolier, who were among the so-called ‘officers of Cyprus’, which differed in being impermanent posts that might be held for a short time only. After the island passed to Venice its forces became the responsibility of a Captain, often called ‘Captain of Cyprus’, who was commander-in-chief in peacetime but was often subordinated to a specially appointed Proweditore-General in wartime. A Venetian attempt in 1489 to change the feudal service of the nobility so that they served at their own expense met with such strong protest that from 1490 the old practice of paid service was restored. At the very end of this period, in 1500, Venetian troops on Cyprus comprised 800 (‘good and bad’) in Famagusta and 150 in Kyrenia (Kerynia), plus 340 stradiots and 150 turcopoles.

Gunpowder artillery made its first appearance on the island in the war of 1404-6, in the first year of which ‘This is how Dawkins translates the passage. Hill, however, says units of 150 men.

Both the king and the Genoese purchased cannon from Venice, for the siege and defence respectively of Famagusta. Though references to artillery steadily increase thereafter it seems that its role remained limited to siegework and castle defence. It may even then have been in somewhat short supply, since we read that the Mamluks sent 2 guns to James II during his struggle against the Genoese in 1461 (though it was the latter who ended up getting them).