Suarez’ historical survey of this distinction, while perhaps misleading at times, is nevertheless helpful in that he brings a critical eye to the long tradition that has preceded him. In ending his survey, he points to what he sees as a critical ambiguity that has haunted the dispute as far back as Avicenna. For him, this ambiguity lies in the notion of essence and its status as an independent reality (res), a proper existence, or the being of an essence (esse essentiae). Suarez argues that in any conception of the distinction between essence and existence, an essence can be seen both as an actuality and as a mere potentiality. However, it is extremely important to be aware of which perspective one takes. He argues that any real distinction, either between two things or a thing and its mode, is simply nonsensical when essence is considered as actual. What else can we mean by an actual essence accept that it is in existence? Thus, there is no distinction in this case. But if essence or the esse essentiae is conceived as the mere potentiality of some actual essence, then clearly actual existence need not be involved. However, in this case, Suarez insists that we are not talking about some reality or a thing, but about no-thing (DM 31, II, 1). In this way, he can explain away what has always been one of the most critical arguments on behalf of the real distinction since Aquinas first raised it: namely, that it appears that we can think of an essence apart from its existence. Suarez will gladly admit this, yet he will point out that what is being thought of in this case is not the actual essence of some reality, but a potentiality or mere possibility that is distinct from existence. Moreover, this possibility cannot be attributed to some existing essence. Rather, the possibility belongs to the potency within the cause of the actual essence, not the essence itself. In the case of creatures, the possibility of an actual essence lies in the potency of God to make such a reality exist (DM 31, II, 2). In this light, the affirmative existence (esse existentia) becomes, for Suarez, a superfluous entity. It can bear no relation to the nonentity of a potential essence, nor is it needed to accompany an actual essence, for such an entity, simply by being actual, already exists.
In this final analysis, Suarez draws out what has been a central tension of this controversy almost from its inception. He draws attention to the fact that the problem of essence and existence is really a problem about the nature of possibility and reality. It is a dispute that asks about the ontological status of possibilities. It asks: how can such possibilities be known scientifically if they do not first have some ontological weight? It is equally a question about the source of possibility. If possibility is a feature of language and derived from the actual world, then in what sense can the world be said to be contingent? If possibility retains its own independent status, does this allow for contingency, but at the same time limit the range of God’s power? But if possIbility is identified with God’s power absolutely, then is there any sense in which possibility can be understood Scientifically, and does this render God’s actions altogether inscrutable and ultimately arbitrary? The dispute over essence and existence, therefore, forms the metaphysical backbone of nearly every other issue important to medieval thinkers. Thus, it is only appropriate that Aquinas begins his treatise on essence and existence with the saying of the Philosopher: ‘‘a small error in the beginning leads to a large error in the end.’’ It is undoubtedly the scholastics’ deep appreciation of this point that motivates their tireless investigation of essence and existence and the metaphysical subtleties that follow.
See also: > Being > Boethius > Giles of Rome > Henry of Ghent > Ibn Sina, Abu 'All (Avicenna) > John Duns Scotus > Thomas Aquinas
World History
