The tactical revolution of the tenth century

The treatises on strategy and tactics of the middle and later tenth century show that substantial changes in tactics had occurred by the 960s and 970s. These changes reflected primarily the much more offensive character of imperial policy, especially in the eastern theatre, the need to recruit more professional soldiers, and the need to operate effectively and aggressively on campaigns which required more than merely seasonally available forces. They are realized in two ways. First, the revival of a corps of disciplined, effective line-of-battle infantry which could confront enemy infantry and cavalry, support their own cavalry, march long distances and function as garrison troops away from their home territory on a permanent basis. Second, the introduction of a corps of heavily-armoured lancers which could operate in conjunction with the infantry, which would add weight to the Byzantine attack, and which would substantially increase the aggressive power of the Byzantine cavalry. Whereas the evolution of tactics in the period from the later sixth to the early tenth centuries has received very little attention, these developments have been the subject of several excellent studies, the results of which can be summarized here.

The first evidence for a change in tactical formations comes from the midtenth-century treatise known as the Sylloge taktikon, the “Recapitulation of Tactics”. In this tract, which includes also substantial extracts or summaries from ancient authorities as well as paraphrases from the Tactica of Leo VI, there appears a new formation of infantry soldiers, equipped with a thick-stocked, long-necked javelin or pike called a menavlion, probably similar in form to the Roman legionary pilum.86 Their task is to engage and repulse enemy heavy cavalry—cataphract—attacks. According to the Sylloge, there are to be some 300 such menavlatoi who are drawn up in the intervals between the various infantry platoons making up the main line, from which position they are to venture forth and form a line or wedge and break up the enemy attack. By the time of the Praecepta, in contrast, in which the infantry had been reorganized into taxiarchies of up to 1,000 soldiers, there were 400 spearmen, 300 archers, 200 light infantry (with slings and javelins) and 100 menaulatoi in each such unit, but the task allotted the last group was the same as in the Sylloge.87

It is quite clear that a major change in the role of infantry had been stimulated by the changed political-military situation of the tenth century. In marked contrast to the late sixth-century Strategikon, which deals with the infantry as an afterthought, the Praecepta dedicates its first two chapters to the infantry formations. It is also clear from the figures given for a major field army that the importance of infantry was well acknowledged, and that they were numerically a crucial element of the army, far more central to the sort of campaigning strategy and battlefield tactics practised in the later tenth century than they had been in the nearly three centuries preceding. Not only did infantry form a major element, but in contrast again to the period of cavalry dominance which lasted until the tenth century they outnumbered the latter by 2:1 or more. They were divided by weapon in each taxiarchy, as already noted, and the exact instructions set out by the Praecepta testifies to the greatly improved discipline and training which such troops were expected to display. Historians of the second half of the tenth century praise both Nikephros II and John I Tzimiskes for their training and the rigorous discipline they enforced, while the Praecepta sets out the stages of training through which individual soldiers, units and then the whole army should be put. The new prominence of infantry in the warfare of the period is emphasized by the fact that the whole infantry force was placed under the command of a single senior officer, the hoplitarches (or archegetes), who was responsible below the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force for their training, field discipline and effectiveness in battle—a post not dissimilar to that of the original magister militum peditum of the reforms of Constantine I over six centuries earlier.88

Yet the weaknesses of infantry, especially when facing heavy cavalry, were recognized and understood: the basic formation for the battle line was a hollow square or rectangle—the precise shape depended on the terrain— intended to deal with encircling attacks from enemy cavalry, as a refuge for the Byzantine cavalry should their attack be thrown back, and—importantly— as a means of preventing the infantry themselves from turning to flight.89 As we have seen in Chapter 5 above, it has been shown that this was a fairly recent development, perhaps dating from the second quarter of the tenth century during the first great offensive campaigns of the period. That the Byzantine texts themselves make this clear illustrates the fact that the infantry had usually been, as surmised above, drawn up in a deep line, and with only a limited offensive role in battle. More importantly, in spite of their new role, the treatises of the 950s and 960s make it fairly apparent that the cavalry were still regarded as the main offensive arm in battle—the infantry remained as a refuge, as a mobile base for the mounted units and as follow-up troops in the event of the enemy being put to flight. This is, in itself, good indirect evidence of the pre-eminence of cavalry and the very reduced role of infantry in the preceding centuries.90

Although Roman and Hellenistic treatises describe square formations, especially for contexts when the enemy might employ an encircling tactic, it is clear that this tenth-century Byzantine formation was something relatively new. It is mentioned briefly in the Tactica of Leo as a formation for dismounted cavalry who have been repulsed or defeated, used to protect the baggage and mounts as the army withdraws in order from a superior enemy force. But this is clearly a particular case.91 From the description given in the Praecepta of Nikephros, it appears to be very similar to the basic layout of the standard marching camp, suggesting that the increased demand for heavy infantry formations in the offensive warfare of the period had been met by taking a traditionally somewhat unreliable force and employing an essentially defensive field formation which provided both solidity and security in defence or on the march, which could serve as a mobile base and a refuge for lighter troops and cavalry, and yet which could also be transformed by a few simple manoeuvres into a solid attacking formation.

This development appears to reflect Byzantine commanders intelligently applying tactically flexible measures to the materials that were at their disposal. Under good leadership, and increasingly as a tradition of discipline combined with effective field actions takes hold, we may assume that Byzantine infantry units, especially those made up of more or less full-time soldiers, recovered some of their former “Roman” attributes: good morale, tactical cohesion, esprit de corps and battlefield discipline. The evidence mentioned already, especially from the accounts of the wars of the 950s to the 970s, makes this much clear. At the same time, this is a reflection of the recruitment of good infantry from among certain warlike peoples within the empire, notably Armenians (although Slavs, Lycaonians and Isaurians also seem to provide infantry units). Infantry always remained lower in status than cavalry, and their equipment always seems to have been relatively poor. Yet the warfare of the tenth century demanded at the least a uniformity in respect of function as well as tactical specialism, so that in general we may say that the Byzantine heavy and light infantry formations of this period would have acted and been employed in battle and on campaign much more like the regular infantry units of the late Roman era than their predecessors of the ninth or eighth centuries. Thereafter, and well into the eleventh century, Armenian infantry seem to have represented the best foot soldiers in the imperial armies.92

As well as this transformation in the role of infantry (if not all, then certainly those core elements regularly called up for campaign or recruited from mercenary sources), a major change also took place within the cavalry forces of the empire. In addition to the presence of heavy and light cavalry on the battlefield and on campaign, a new arm now appears, the heavily armed klibanarios or kataphraktos, a heavy cavalry trooper armed from head to foot in lamellar, mail and quilting, whose horse was likewise protected—face, neck, flanks and forequarters were all to be covered with armour to prevent enemy missiles and blows from injuring the cavalryman’s mount. Such cavalry were the elite of the army, and were, of course, extremely expensive. They formed up in a broad-nosed wedge, and their primary function was, supported by the regular lancers and other cavalry, to smash through the enemy’s heavy cavalry or infantry line, break up his formation, and permit the supporting horse to turn the flanks of the severed lines. But they were very few in number: the Praecepta specifies a maximum formation of just over 500 for a large wedge, only two-thirds of whom would be real klibanarioi/kataphraktoi, the rest consisting of more lightly armed mounted archers. Since this description is intended to apply to the main field army operating in the east at any given time, this provides some perspective on the numbers involved (see Figure 6.3).93

A number of sources, both Byzantine and Arab, attest to the impressive effects of this formation on enemy troops—one Arab writer remarks that the horses were armoured so that they appeared to advance without legs. The wedge formation may have been a particular innovation of Nikephros Phocas, although this is not certain. But the renewed emphasis on both regular infantry and upon heavily armoured cavalry units certainly predates him by at least half a generation—the Arab poet referred to above was describing a battle fought in 954, for example, while the Sylloge was compiled in the late 940s or early 950s and already attests to some of the changes. The reintroduction of a corps of very heavily armoured cavalry, or at least their greater prominence in

(c) first line heavy cavalry (2 units) (g) third line, or rearguard (saka)

(a) light infantry  screen (b) cataphract wedge

(e) outflankers  (f) second line heavy cavalry (4 units)

(i) remounts  (j) baggage

Figure 6.3 Tactical deployment of a combined infantry and cavalry force army, including cataphract wedge, c. 960.

(d) flankguard

(h) heavy infantry square

The cavalry line of battle, may again date to the campaigns of the general John Kourkouas along the eastern fTont in the 920s, 930s and 940s.

The transformation in the performance of the Byzantine army seems to date from the last years of Constantine VII when, in response to his own disappointment at the defeats the army was suffering at the hands of the Hamdanid emirs of Aleppo and some forthright criticism from the general Nikephros Phocas (later emperor), he dismissed the latter’s father as commander-in-chief in the east, replacing him with his own son. Nikephros appears immediately to have instigated a major programme of training and drilling the troops in an effort to re-establish a disciplined fighting force with high morale and good battlefield skills. His success, reflected partly in the treatise ascribed to his hand, the Praecepta, and in the successful warfare of the next 50 or so years, is evident. It also illustrates the relatively poor levels of training and tactical discipline of the Byzantine armies up to that point (however well they may otherwise have compared with the armies of the Bulgars, for example), with the exception perhaps of the elite tagmata and when a particularly able commander was at their head, such as John Kourkouas.94

Tactical cohesion and order, always a key element in Byzantine ideas on successful battlefield performance, were among the foremost concerns of the commander. Infantry and cavalry forces in the main battle lines were ordered to keep an eye on their unit and divisional standards, and to maintain the line evenly and unbroken, advancing at the same pace. No individuals should leave the line to attack the enemy until the general advance was sounded; even soldiers who charged the enemy successfully were to be punished if they abandoned their position, for this directly endangered the cohesion and therefore the strength and solidarity of the line. While as we have seen these remained standard practice throughout the Byzantine period, the tenth-century historians’ accounts agree with the treatises of the period in stressing these aspects. The order and cohesion of the Roman forces is mentioned by several writers, as in the battle before Tarsos in 965, between the well-ordered battle line of the Roman forces under Isaac I Komnenos in 1059 and the Pechenegs (Psellos remarks on the Pechenegs’ dismay at the unbroken line of Roman shields facing their assault), or the battles fought by Romanos IV against the Turks in 1070 (where, in spite of the criticisms of poor generalship and lack of discipline among the troops made by the contemporary eyewitness Michael Attaleiates, Roman units seem still to have fought and marched with order and cohesion). The harsh tactical discipline imposed on his forces by Basil II was singled out for praise by the slightly later writer Michael Psellos, but was only exceptional in its rigour. Alexios I imposed a similar order on his battle line, in which no one was to advance in front of the line as it moved and where cohesion and solidarity were the key elements.95

The increased degree of specialization which these developments reflect illustrates the nature of the Byzantine offensive in the west as well as, and especially, in the east. Combined with an effective screen of light cavalry who could both harass enemy forces on the move and cover the advance of the heavy cavalry and protective infantry formations, the Byzantine armies proved their effectiveness in the long series of victories lasting through the second half of the tenth century and into the eleventh. There were, of course, defeats too, sometimes the result of the incompetence or inexperience of the commander, sometimes of the greater tactical skill of the opposing commander or the better morale of his troops.

Yet no sooner had the military expansionism of the tenth century achieved its immediate strategic aims than a change in strategy at the local level can also be observed. With the conquest and absorption of Bulgaria and the Balkans up to the Danube, the empire met with the newly stabilized power of the Magyars to the north and west, while in the east, the growing power of the Fatimids on land and at sea meant similarly the need to stabilize the frontier. This was initially done under Basil II by the creation of buffer states around the empire’s borders and by the attempt to establish recognized spheres of interest. In this new context, offensive warfare involving the crushing of major enemy field armies was no longer the focus. Instead, raiding across the frontier, patrols to check hostile activity and the establishment of well-fortified garrison posts became the priorities. In the Balkans in particular, controlling routes of access, maintaining internal security and political control, and garrisoning strongpoints and administrative and strategic centres rendered the expensive heavy cavalry squadrons redundant. Regular heavy cavalry continued to be a key element in the Byzantine forces, of course. At the battle of Troina in Sicily, in 1040, the Byzantine heavy cavalry fought alongside a contingent of Norman and other heavy cavalry (all apparently sent by their lords at the behest of the commanding general George Maniakes). Whether the Byzantine cavalry were as heavily armed as the klibanophoroi is unknown, but the source which recounts the battle stresses the impact of the Roman charge, which demolished the Arab battle line at the first attack. Shortly after, when Constantine IX celebrated his victory over George Maniakes in 1043, the elite heavy cavalry—described as kataphraktoi—took part in the triumph. The extent to which a lay witness such as Psellos knew how to differentiate between the klibanophoroi and regular heavy cavalry is unclear. The special heavy cavalry who made up the shock-delivering wedge of the treatise ascribed to Nikephros Phocas disappear from the sources after they are mentioned in the treatise of Nikephros Ouranos, thus during the middle years of the reign of Basil II, although there is no reason to think, in the context of Basil’s wars, that they were disbanded at that time. But they may well have been stood down during the middle years of the eleventh century— possibly during the reign of Constantine X (1059—67), whom Attaleiates blames for many of the problems faced by Romanos IV—with the result that when heavily armoured cavalry were needed later in the century they were recruited mostly from mercenary sources, in particular from the Normans of southern Italy—whose tactics may themselves originally have derived from the Byzantine model.96

The tactics of the imperial forces during the eleventh century evolved out of this late tenth-century context. Warfare against the Saracens of southern Italy, against the Pechenegs and Uzes (Turks) in the Balkans and, after 1071 and the defeat at Mantzikert, the Seljuks in Anatolia demanded for the most part lightly armed cavalry to track and harass and eventually bring the enemy to battle, and infantry to control key strategic points and refuges. Increasingly, as the government preferred to rely upon mercenary forces both foreign and indigenous, the uniformity of the forces must have given way to a diversity of ethnic fighting styles and armaments. This is not to say that diversity was new: on the contrary, the tenth-century field armies had been remarkable for the great number of races which composed them, as Arab commentators noted: the poet al-Mutanabbi commented upon this facet of the Byzantine armies, and noted that there were so many languages in the ranks that interpreters were needed to transmit the commanders’ orders.97 By the same token, footsoldiers remained an important and active element in the imperial forces. The infantry corps formed an important section of the campaign army in Cilicia in 1137, while heavy infantry are mentioned on many occasions as key elements in the Byzantine battle line: infantry formed a substantial part of the army which recovered Corfu from the Sicilian Normans in 1148. At a battle with the Hungarian army in 1167 the outcome was decided by the decisive charge of the Roman infantry division, and the vanguard which forced its way through the Turkish forces at Myriokephalon was of infantry. The renewed significance of infantry reflects the changes which took place in the tenth century, and the need to have a solid bulwark which could resist enemy heavy cavalry attacks and form a solid battlefield base from which the Roman cavalry could retaliate. Such changes were not confined to the Byzantine world alone, of course: western and Muslim armies were also part of the process. Not only did Crusader armies include substantial numbers of infantry spearmen and footsoldiers of varying levels of competence and training, but an important proportion of the foreign mercenaries recruited into the Byzantine forces during the twelfth century were also of infantry.98

The drilling, training and exercising of the troops were the factors that had forged such an effective war-machine, a process which, as noted above, seems to have been instigated in the mid—950s, when Nikephros Phocas was appointed to reform and command the armies in the east. All the treatises place great emphasis upon exercising and drilling the troops in a variety of field manoeuvres and in developing their endurance, an emphasis which the narrative histories of the time corroborate, and to which they attribute numerous victories. Michael Psellos remarks on the superb discipline of Bardas Skleros’ cavalry, who were able even under heavy attack and while withdrawing to wheel about, counter-charge and drive their enemies from the field.99 Without such drilling, without the regular discipline imposed by proper military exercises, the tactical competence of the field armies could not last long. Under able commanders such as George Maniakes and Katakalon Kekaumenos in the 1030s and 1040s, an army of foreign and indigenous mercenaries and some provincial levies could still achieve victories over a variety of enemies: the battle order employed by Romanos IV in his campaign in 1070 involved the traditional two battle lines divided into several smaller divisions with flanking and outflanking units in support, while all the sources refer regularly to the Byzantine forces organized into three main divisions with rearguard and vanguard.100 The advantage held by the Roman infantry was, until the later eleventh century and possibly into the twelfth, in their better tactical training: Michael Psellos notes with some contempt that the emperor Romanos III thought numbers counted for more than skill and discipline; Choniates and Kinnamos refer on several occasions, as do the historians of the eleventh and tenth centuries, to the training and exercising of the troops in field tactics and fighting skills which may have given them a slight advantage, when well led, over their enemies.101 But financial cuts, the fiscalization of military service and the reduction in the military budget, together with the increasing dominance of foreign mercenaries, all took their toll. Attaleiates, who as a leading official concerned with military affairs during the reign of Romanos IV accompanied the emperor on several campaigns, was particularly scathing about the results of fiscal stringency for the readiness, morale and equipment of the imperial armies, as well as the competence and ability of many of the leading officers. The military failures of the period were, for him, directly attributable to such administrative parsimony and short-sightedness.102