This heritage is adopted and systematized by the authors of late Antiquity, and in particular by those active around the school of Alexandria, chief center for the teaching of traditional ancient Greek philosophy. One of the characteristics of this school is that medicine and philosophy are frequently, if not systematically, associated during the sixth and the seventh century. In this school is born a figure destined to remain in the Arab and Byzantine world, the iatrosophist, a doctor-philosopher capable of providing care as well as mastering grammar and dialectic. The thought of Galen is linked by the Alexandrians more strictly, and often more inaccurately, to the great philosophical systems of Antiquity. To justify their reasoning, the iatrosophists rely on the statements of Aristotle, who insists in his On Sense and Sensible Objects on the necessary link existing between the philosophy of nature and medicine: ‘‘Most natural philosophers, and those physicians who take a scientific interest in their art, have this in common: the former end by studying medicine, and the latter base their medical theories on the principles of natural science’’ (On Sense and Sensible Objects, 1,436a19-436b2). The Alexandrians go even further, attributing to Aristotle many definitions that depict medicine as a ‘‘philosophy of the body’’ or the ‘‘sister of philosophy.’’ The echo of these Alexandrine’s conceptions is found in the encyclopedist Isidore of Seville (d. in 636). In his Etymologiae (IV, XIII 5), he asserts that medicine deals with the whole human body, and therefore is rightly called a ‘‘second philosophy,’’ in the image of the first, which pertains to the soul. Though the Latin medicine of the time is in full intellectual decline, this mention reveals the influence of conceptions developed by the last heirs of ancient philosophical teachings. However, integrating the two domains of knowledge in a single system is not without important difficulties. On many points, Galen and Aristotle are in clear opposition. The most famous example of these conflicts involves the organic origin of the functions of the soul. For Aristotle, the heart is their unique seat; but Galen, thanks to vivisections, notices that brain or nerve lesions can cause paralysis, and logically places the seat of sensation in the brain. Thus, Galen favors a return to the platonic conception of the tripartite soul, whose functions are placed in the heart, the brain, and the liver. Another famous case is the role attributed to the woman in generation: for Aristotle, she has the passive role of providing matter, while Galen credits her also, as he does the man, with the active role of giving the embryo’s form. Embarrassed by these contradictions, Alexandrian thinkers prefer to sidestep these problems or to approach them indirectly. Thus, on the question of the existence of a neutral state between health and sickness, stated by Galen at the beginning of Medical Art and contradicted by Aristotle who affirms in the Categories that these two terms are an example of contraries that admit no intermediate, Agnellus of Ravenna (sixth century) avoids citing explicitly Aristotle but answers objections from anonymous critics - plainly Aristotelian - by relying on other passages from the Stagirite. Stephanus of Athens, iatrosophist from the sixth century, is equally cautious in his commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognostics when he addresses the question of the origin of sensation: enumerating the reasons that lead some to place it in the brain, and those that lead others to place it in the heart, he concludes his presentation of opposing arguments by a simple sentence: ‘‘The question remains unresolved up until now, whether the governing principle is situated in the brain or heart.’’ In this way, the authors of late Antiquity had provided a framework to the relation between philosophy and medicine, but without answering the essential problems the relation raises.
By conquering the principal intellectual centers of Late Antiquity, like Alexandria, the Arabs integrated a large part of Greek science, in particular through translations carried out in the eighth and ninth centuries. Hence, it is not surprising that we find, in the first medical texts written in the language of the Qur’an, the same categories and the same problems, than those that had preoccupied the iatrosophists. Thus, Yulianna ibn Masawayh (l. 777857), in the eighth aphorism of his Medical Axioms, declares that ‘‘when Galen and Aristotle agree upon something, it is true; when they are in disagreement, it is exceedingly difficult for the mind to determine the truth of the matter.’’ Al-Majtis! (d. at the end of the tenth century) represents the synthesis of these Alexandrine teachings revisited by the Arabic authors. In his al-Kitab al-Malakt (Royal Book), he takes up again the distinction between theory and practice, by specifying that the first is a science, that is, a true knowledge necessary for action. This science divides, in turn, into things that are natural, those that are nonnatural and those that are against nature. Though al-Majtis! does not point it out, he is certain that this scientific part of medicine must tackle the problems posed by the correspondence between the two disciplines. For the rest, when he treats certain questions concerning the connection between medicine and philosophy, he prefers to suspend judgment: thus, when he wonders if the soul that we find in the brain is the soul itself or if it is merely its instrument, since the soul is not a body, he prefers not to argue the point stating that it ‘‘belongs to philosophy more than to medical art.’’
World History
