Metaphysics

Having already broached the subject of the active intellect and supra-lunar souls, some remarks on cosmology are now in order. Whereas the majority of issues discussed so far are clearly indebted to the Aristotelian tradition, this aspect of Avicenna’s philosophy is heavily influenced by his Neoplatonic predecessors as well as by al-Farabl. Although from a modern point of view this type of speculation might seem strange, it is nevertheless a cornerstone of his thought, as it connects ontology with epistemology and provides the basis from which to argue for the cognizability of the world. It furthermore explains the traditional claim that man strives for knowledge for his specific good, and develops a philosophical standpoint with respect to the afterlife.

Highest in the cosmological hierarchy, according to Avicenna, is the necessary existent (wajib al-wujud), or God, who is unique and simple. This necessary existent, moreover, must be the first cause of all other existing things. However, because the first thing proceeding from the first cause must be one in number (owing to the first principle’s simplicity), it is impossible to conceive of an act of causation according to which the necessary existent would have immediately created a multiplicitous reality such as we have: ‘‘For you have known that from the one inasmuch as it is one, only one proceeds’’ (Metaphysics, IX iv:405; Lat.:481.51-52; trans. Avicenna 2005:330.2-3). Consequently, its coming into being must be otherwise explained. In this connection, Avicenna falls back upon the cosmological schema al-FarabI developed in his Perfect State (Mabadi’ ara’ ahl al-madlna al-fadila). Accordingly, he interprets the necessary existent as a purely intellectual being, possessing no material attributes. As a result, that which is brought into existence from it is itself a pure intellect, which emerges as the first separate intellect in a whole sequence of separate intellects. For this intellect performs, as it were, three activities: first, it contemplates that necessary being - an action marking the inception of a second separate intellect. Second, it contemplates itself as potential and, third, as necessary, thus effecting the emergence of the outermost celestial sphere (sphere of day and night) and its perfection, which is the first celestial soul.

This process is then repeated: the second separate intellect contemplates both the necessary being and itself (both as potential and necessary), thereby producing a further separate intellect and another celestial sphere (sphere of the fixed stars) with a second celestial soul. The third intellect, in its turn, reflects upon the first cause and itself, and so forth, until we reach the level of the tenth separate intellect ‘‘that governs our selves’’ (Metaphysics, IX iv:407; Lat.:484.99; trans. Avicenna 2005:331.22). There is no essential reason why this process should stop here; however, because to Avicenna and his contemporaries, there are no more than nine celestial spheres (the ninth coming into being parallel to the tenth separate intellect), it evidently does end here. Nevertheless, the tenth separate intellect and the sphere of the moon along with its soul, also have their activities: it is this intellect which is the bestower of the forms of reality (the so-called wajib al-suwar, dator formarum) and is also the active intellect, and hence the source of the influx of universal concepts (which neatly correspond to the forms ofreality) into the human intellect. Furthermore, it is by virtue of the activities of the cosmological intellects and souls that some men have foreknowledge of future contingents (infused into their imaginative faculty, e. g., through dreams), or an extraordinary capacity for coming into contact with the active intellect and intelligizing (i. e., finding the middle-terms of syllogisms, cf. Avicenna’s theory of prophecy).

Despite its comprehensiveness, Avicenna’s cosmology has certain implications which bring it into conflict with Islamic doctrine, and which were consequently rejected by the majority of his successors. First, there is the problem that, according to his theory, God, i. e., the necessary existent, does not create reality all at once, but only brings forth the first intellect by means of which all further coming into being is realized. Moreover, this process of coming into being is something which evolves of necessity and is eternal. This however conflicts with the Islamic conviction that God can arbitrarily intervene in his creation, and contradicts the Islamic rejection of the eternity of the world. A further point concerns the relation of body and soul, and the afterlife of man. For, according to Avicenna, the human soul comes into being precisely at the same time as the body to which it corresponds, and remains connected throughout one’s lifetime. In contrast to the body, however, the soul does not perish with bodily death but continues to exist. Not so for the body: in Avicenna’s theory there is no place for bodily resurrection in the hereafter, which is instead populated exclusively by souls, enduring either pain or happiness, depending upon their former life.

At this point, however, it might be in order to return to an aspect touched upon previously and examine it more closely. This is Avicenna’s famous distinction between essence and existence, which underlies the concept of the necessary existent. Although, according to Avicenna, metaphysics culminates in theology and, hence, in an Inquiry into the nature of God as first principle, it must be addressed as an ontology. For, according to him, the subject matter of metaphysics is the existent insofar as it is existent (al-mawjud min haithu huwa mawjud), whereas its species (the categories), properties (the universal-particular, oneness-multiplicity, the necessary-the possi-ble-the impossible), and ultimate principles and causes (the four Aristotelian causes and God) are the things which are sought (Bertolacci 2006:111-211). In this connection, the first book of his Metaphysics is of particular interest, as it programmatically introduces the subject matter, and discusses its relation to extensionally cognate notions such as the thing, or the necessary - all of which, according to him, are primary concepts. It is in this part of the work that he introduces the distinction between essence and existence, which gained notoriety in the Middle Ages (Metaphysics, I v).

The starting point of his considerations is the concept of the existent, which he had already singled out as the subject matter of metaphysics in previous chapters (particularly Metaphysics, I ii). Existence (wujud), says Avicenna, may be divided into affirmative existence and proper existence. The latter can be identified with the true nature (haqtqa) of things, or their essence (mahiyya). Affirmative existence, by contrast, refers to the fact that a thing exists. On this basis he turns toward the distinction between thing and existent. Although these notions turn out to be co-extensive, they have different intentions: for if we speak of a thing, explains our author, we wish to emphasize what it is; if we speak of an existent, however, we wish to emphasize that it is. Though he does not specify the term, from the way in which he uses ‘‘existent’’ here, it becomes clear that he is referring to affirmative existence and not to proper existence. Proper existence, or essence, is by contrast involved in his attempt to clarify the proper meaning of ‘‘thing.’’ According to the above, the linguistic expression ‘‘thing’’ emphasizes the ‘‘what-ness’’ (mahiyya) of an existent. However, this does not mean that a thing is an essence. Rather it means that it is an existent which has an essence, or put otherwise: every thing has both an essence and exists: ‘‘... each thing has a reality (haqtqa) proper to it - namely, its quiddity (mahiyya). [...]. The necessary concomitance of the meaning of existence (ma‘na l-wujud) never separates from it at all [...]. If (this) were not the case, it would not be a thing’’ (Metaphysics, I v:31-32; Lat.:35.63-64 and 36.79-80; trans. Avicenna 2005:24.25-26 and 25.10-14).

What might appear as a word-game, in reality reflects a peculiarity present in most of Avicenna’s writings, namely his careful distinction of an ontological and epistemological perspective of the same phenomena. Accordingly, he sharply distinguishes between the ways in which things can exist and the manner in which these things can be considered (e. g., in the sciences). For things can exist either in extra-mental reality (ft a‘yan al-ashya’) or intra-mentally as concepts (fl l-tasawwur). However they may be considered as particular things partaking of accidents (physics), conceptions of things under abstraction of certain accidents (mathematics), or as things in themselves, that is to say, essences (mahiyya), regarded independently of their mode of existence or accidents (metaphysics). These distinctions are crucial not only because of the subtle connection that Avicenna thus establishes between ontology and noetics, but also because they underlie his theory of universals (see particularly Metaphysics, V i-ii). For on these grounds he is able to claim that, e. g., ‘‘horseness inasmuch as it is horseness’’ (and therefore as an object of metaphysics) is neither particular nor universal, but one single (and simple) meaning (ma‘na, intentio). Hence, it is something to which universality or particularity may attach extrinsically: ‘‘For ‘horseness’ has a definition that is in no need of the definition of universality, but is (something) to which universality accidentally occurs’’ (Metaphysics, V i:196; Lat.:228.31-32; trans. Avicenna 2005:149.19-21). In this connection he leaves no doubt whatsoever that, ontologically speaking, universals such as ‘‘horseness’’ do not exist at all, except along with accidents (e. g., existence, oneness). As such, however, they belong properly to the realm of noetics and hence to the sphere of consideration.

Let us however return to Avicenna’s notion of ‘‘thing’’ and his distinction between the ontological and epistemological perspectives. Although the distinctions between thing-existent, and essence-existence are related, they do not precisely correspond (for a different view see Wisnovsky 2005:105-113): whereas the linguistic expressions ‘‘essence’’ and ‘‘existence’’ are epistemological notions referring to conceptions that we as ‘‘scientists’’ use to analyze things; ‘‘thing’’ and ‘‘existent’’ are ontological notions referring to things. Both things and existents have an essence and exist; however, as introduced above, we use the linguistic expressions ‘‘thing’’ and ‘‘existent’’ in order to evoke different aspects, namely, the essence ofthe respective entity in the first instance, and its existence in the second. These fundamental distinctions are at the basis of some of Avicenna’s central concepts, to which we may only allude here: e. g., the distinction between the necessary existent in itself, the necessary existent through another, and the possible existent in itself (which is at the basis of his metaphysical proof of the existence of God); and his determination of the respective subject matters of logic and the theoretical sciences of philosophy.