To understand Ockham’s semantics, one should be aware of his ontological presuppositions. Reality consists of individual substances and individual properties. Mental concepts are important as guides for interpreting conventional signs. This is, in short, Ockham’s nominalism.
The concepts themselves are constructions of the mind, produced by abstraction following the direct cognition of individual things, existing inside or outside the knower. He opposes any form of reification of names in logic and grammar. Words signify what they signify in different ways. His semantics is connected with his theory of knowledge.
The mental concepts are signs. Signs have become the central notion in fourteenth-century logic. In comparison with Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood, Ockham is much more interested in signification. Logic is about signs, and Ockham clearly distinguishes logic from,
E. g., physics, a “real” science. ‘‘Real science’’ is about concepts related to things (the medievals called these ‘‘first intentions’’); logic is a ‘‘rational’’ science and about second intentions (which are concepts denoting concepts, so concepts on a higher level).
Concepts are fundamental in order to be able to talk and write successfully. These are for all men the same, French or English, and are a kind of universal language, having a sort of universal grammar.
Language is essential in Ockham’s philosophy for Ockham, because thought is performed in language (mental, spoken, or written). Signification is a central notion for Ockham, referring to Augustine. It is defined in the first part of his Summa logicae (Guillelmi de Ockham Summa logicae, 1972). In chap. 26-37 he gives a kind of philosophical dictionary, which students should learn in the pursuit of truth.
Ockham takes signification in many ways. He favors the second sense. Signification is not linked to the present, like Bacon said, and is not influenced by change or destruction of something. This mode of signification shows an omnitemporal range. Signification can be called ‘‘omnitemporal denotation.” He takes it extensionally.
The key word in Ockham’s semantics is supposition. It is a property by virtue of which a term, be it a subject or predicate term, stands for something. A propositional context is required for this two-name theory of reference. Prior to its having supposition, a term has signification. A general term signifies all those things of which it can be truly said (Read 2006).
Ockham distinguishes between three kinds of supposition: personal, simple, or material. Personal supposition (which together with simple supposition is called formal supposition, just like in Sherwood) is primary. In this way, a term supposits for its significate. For example, in ‘‘every man is an animal,’’ ‘‘man’’ supposits for things in the outside world, of which it is true to say that it is an animal. In ‘‘every vocal noun is a part of speech’’, ‘‘noun’’ supposits for words. In ‘‘every species is a universal,’’ ‘‘species’’ supposits for particular species, for instance horse. A term may also supposit for imaginable things. Ockham does not give an example; perhaps he only means that the list is not complete.
Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention in the mind, e. g., in ‘‘man is a species’’; here ‘‘man’’ supposits for the logical construct ‘‘man.’’ Material supposition is said to occur when a term supposits for a spoken or written word and is not taken significatively, e. g., in ‘‘man is a noun,’’ ‘‘man’’ supposits for the material or written entity. Whether material supposition also occurs on the mental level is still a matter of discussion among scholars. It seems to be the case in some respects, and that means that there is equivocity in mental language. Ockham rejects ampliation.
There are several problems connected with this division. Firstly, one should note that, according to Ockham, personal supposition is primary. It is what is called ‘‘in virtue of speech’’ that every term in a proposition should be taken according to this kind of supposition. When a term is taken in personal supposition, it stands for things it signifies naturally, e. g., ‘‘man’’ signifies individual men, ‘‘noun’’ signifies words, etc. Ockham expresses this as follows: ‘‘every man is an animal, therefore this man is an animal and that man is an animal,’’ etc. Thus there is no reference to some distributive entity in the sense of Plato, which does not exist. In this analysis, the antecedent is extensionally equivalent with the consequent.
Ockham explicitly says that in personal supposition a term does not stand for a thing, but to its significate. Here he criticizes Sherwood, it seems, who speaks about the signification of things. In simple supposition a term does not stand for its significate, Ockham says. He criticizes among others Peter of Spain. According to Ockham, a term having simple supposition supposits for an act of the mind. This corresponds to his conception of universals.
Simple supposition seems to be connected with material supposition rather than to personal supposition. This last form does not seem to belong to the same genus.
Ockham also deals with the expression ‘‘man’’ in ‘‘man is the worthiest of creatures.’’ Some realist philosophers taught that ‘‘man’’ here has simple supposition, for it is false, they say, that this man or that man is the most worthy among creatures. The proposition is therefore false, Ockham says, when ‘‘man’’ is taken in personal supposition. However, one should pay attention to the author’s intention in that he clearly wanted to distinguish man from all other corporeal creatures. One should therefore not take every proposition ‘‘in virtue of speech’’ as Ockham sees it. He is not a radical empiricist.
World History
