The next major treatment of heresy and heretics was by William of Ockham in Part 1 of his Dialogus. In this work, Ockham does not speak in his own person, but it is generally possible to recognize which positions he recommends, and for brevity, I will summarize the argument as if it were directly presented. The interpretation can be confirmed from other works not in dialogue form, notably Contra loannem and Contra Benedictum, in which Ockham speaks directly in his own person. The whole of Part 1 of the Dialogus is concerned with heresy and heretics, but in this article we will restrict our attention to the first four books.
In 1 Dial. 1 Ockham argues that the topics of heresy and heretics belong primarily to theologians. In the prologue to his Summa aurea the canonist Hostiensis claims that the science of canon law is the ‘‘science of sciences,’’ comprehending both all law and theology. ‘‘All ought to be led by it and not by their own understanding.” (On this claim, and on the rivalry between canonists and theologians, see Scott.) Ockham rejects such claims. Canon law is a collection of Bible texts, texts of the fathers, imperial laws, and statutes and determinations of councils and popes, touching on theological and moral matters (c. 8). The canonical science is subalternated to theology and moral philosophy (c. 10). Canonists may have better memory of the canon law texts, but the theologians can understand them more deeply. It is for theologians, not canonists, to decide what is heresy and how to determine whether an individual is a heretic. Canonists are experts on the legal processes, but ‘‘it pertains to theologians to judge by universal rules whether the ecclesiastical laws about punishing heretics in certain ways and about the way of proceeding against them are contrary to the divine scriptures, because if such laws were opposed to sacred scripture they should not in any way be tolerated’’ (c. 15).
In 1 Dial. 2 the question is, What counts as catholic truth and what as heresy? In early times opponents of heresy referred to ‘‘the rule of faith’’ as the measure against which orthodoxy is to be tested. Sometimes the rule of faith seems to be a summary of leading doctrines that candidates for baptism were expected to know, sometimes the general purport of the Christian tradition (Kelly:39, 40, 43). Canonists sometimes seemed to think that heresy was any disagreement with or disobedience to the pope, yet at other times they acknowledged that a pope might become a heretic. For some (Marsilius, and later the Protestants) the rule of faith is the Bible. For Ockham, the rule of faith is what it was also for Thomas Aquinas, namely ‘‘sacred scripture and the teaching of the whole church, which cannot err’’ (CI, 72.34-5). This rule is twofold: it may be difficult to ascertain what is the teaching of the whole church, but someone who has access to the Bible will, in some cases, be able to find a sure answer in its text. ‘‘Concerning many questions of faith those learned in sacred letters can be certain of catholic truth, notwithstanding the question or doubt of anyone else whomsoever’’ (CB, 250.4-6).
Ockham tries to clarify the notion of catholic truth by listing five classes of truths that catholics (members of the universal church) are obliged to believe (1 Dial. 2.2, 5), namely: (1) anything contained in the Bible, either explicitly or by necessary implication; (2) anything handed down, outside the canonical scriptures, from the Apostles; (3) factual information in chronicles, histories, etc., that are worthy of trust; (4) anything necessarily implied by the Bible and tradition together, or by either in conjunction with chronicles etc.; (5) new undoubted revelations made by God to the church. Corresponding to the five kinds of truths that catholics are obliged to believe are five kinds of ‘‘deadly errors’’ (1 Dial. 2.17). However, these truths and errors are not equivalent to catholic truths and heresies respectively. What makes something catholic truth is revelation by God to the church in one or other of the modes corresponding to (1), (2), and (5).
To identify apostolic tradition or post-Apostolic revelation (categories (2) and (5)) would require historical research, but there is a short cut. Ockham interprets Matthew 28:20, ‘‘I am with you all days, even unto the end of the world,’’ as a promise that error will never prevail in the church (1 Dial. 2.3, etc.). If at some period (e. g., in the recent past) catholics all held that some proposition is a truth of faith, then it is indeed a truth of faith: even if we cannot find any basis for it in the Bible, even if we Cannot trace the process by which this belief was handed down from the Apostles, even if we have no evidence of a post-Apostolic revelation, we can be sure that it is a truth of faith that came to the Church in one or other of these three ways.
In 1 Dial. 3 the question is, What makes a person a catholic, and what makes a person a heretic? A person is a catholic if he or she has been baptized and holds the whole of the catholic faith; a heretic is anyone who has been baptized (or presents himself as such) who pertinaciously rejects or doubts any catholic truth whatsoever (1 Dial. 3.3). To explain how it is possible to hold the whole of the catholic faith, Ockham draws on Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between explicit faith and implicit faith. To believe a truth implicitly means (a) to believe explicitly some other truth in which it is implied and (b) not to believe pertinaciously anything inconsistent with it (1 Dial. 3.1). (Thomas Aquinas perhaps supposed the second point but did not make it explicitly.) Catholics must have explicit belief in some catholic truths (CI, 45.35-40; cf. 2.1 Dial. 11.13-23), but it is enough to believe the others implicitly - that is, to have explicit belief in a something that implies the rest, namely that whatever is contained in the Bible and the teaching of the church is true (CI, 46.20-22). Thus, someone who believes that everything in the Bible is true implicitly believes that Bilhah was the mother of Dan even though he has never read Genesis 30:5-6, unless for some reason he believes pertinaciously that Bilhah was not the mother of Dan. People who regard themselves as orthodox catholics may be heretics without knowing it, if they hold pertinaciously some belief (even on some minor matter) that is really inconsistent with something they have never realized was a catholic truth (1 Dial. 4.2, 4; 2.1 Dial. 11.106ff).
According to Thomas Aquinas, it belongs especially to the pope to draw up formulations of the articles of faith. Ockham agrees: it is especially the function of the pope, aided when that is appropriate by a council, to settle doubts about the faith (1 Dial. 2.14). However, according to Ockham a pope may become a heretic (as the canonists and even papalist theologians also generally acknowledged (see Tierney 1955:57-67; McGrade 1994:148ff.). Neither pope nor council nor any part of the church is infallible. Christ’s promise to be with his church all days does not guarantee that any part of the church will never err. ‘‘What is promised to the whole and not to any part ought not to be attributed to any part, even to a more principal part’’ (1 Dial. 5.22). What Christ’s promise does guarantee is that there will be somewhere in the church at least one person who speaks out against a false doctrine being presented as catholic truth (1 Dial. 5.28). If a pope or council asserts that some doctrine is catholic truth and some catholics, even a few illiterate lay people, contradict that assertion, the deniers may be right - they may be witnesses to the truth, speaking out against false doctrine being asserted as catholic truth.
In 1 Dial. 4 the question is, what is pertinacity and how can it be established? In 1 Dial. 4.5-34 Ockham discusses 20 possible ways of recognizing that a person is pertinacious and a heretic. According to the fourth way, for example, if a person denies any catholic truth that is widely disseminated as catholic among all catholics, including those with whom he has been living, he is immediately, without further examination, to be judged a heretic - though he can be excused if he can prove (e. g., merely by oath, if he is an uneducated person) that he did not know that this truth was catholic (1 Dial. 4.11). Another way is the seventh, the way of “legitimate correction,’’ according to which a person can be adjudged pertinacious if he does not change his mind when shown from the Bible or otherwise that his opinion is not catholic truth (cf. CI, 52.2-6; see McGrade 1974:48ff). Even an illiterate is not obliged to change his mind just at the behest ofsome prelate; such a person may defend a heresy a thousand times before the pope without being pertinacious or a heretic. Before he can be judged pertinacious, it must be shown to him, in a way suited to his education and understanding, that his opinion is heresy (1 Dial. 4.15-24). On the other hand, according to the eighth way, anyone, including a pope, who tries to impose a heresy as catholic truth on others by commands, threats, punishments, promises, oaths, etc., is to be judged pertinacious without examination to see whether he is ready to be corrected - the attempt to impose his erroneous opinion on others is sufficient proof of pertinacity (1 Dial. 4.25). Like a simple person, a pope or other prelate can put forward and defend a heretical opinion without being a heretic as long as he does not attempt to impose it on others: as soon as he tries to impose it by authority he can be adjudged pertinacious. Ockham’s discussion of the ways of proving pertinacity amounts to a defense of freedom of discussion within the church. Concerning the Inquisition, he remarks: ‘‘Some people say that inquisitors and some prelates often proceed unfairly and unjustly. For they say that many are unlearned and simple men blinded by greed and avarice who try to condemn those accused of heresy in order to acquire their goods. And therefore no assertion should be based on their practice’’ (1 Dial. 4.21).
Ockham had the same conception of the rule of faith as Thomas Aquinas had and a very similar view of implicit faith and of pertinacity. Ockham perhaps puts less emphasis on the distinction between articles of faith and the secondary objects of faith, though Thomas also held that there can be heresy in the pertinacious rejection of any detail of the Bible. Ockham’s discussion of how pertinacity is recognized was an original contribution. According to Thomas, the fact that Augustine and Jerome never defended their opinions against the authority of the pope showed that they were not heretics, whereas according to Ockham even an illiterate might defend a heresy before the pope ‘‘a thousand times’’ without being a heretic.
Dialogus was copied and studied, for example by Peter of Ailly who made an abbreviatio of the work, and in the fifteenth century it was printed twice. Ockham’s ideas on the fallibility of pope and councils and on the role of individual dissenters in witnessing to catholic truth were not adopted by later theologians or canonists. His 20 ways of proving pertinacity were taken over by Turrecremata in his Summa de ecclesia, lib. IV pt. 2 c. 16 (according to a communication from Thomas Izbicki to A. S. McGrade).
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