When Augustine wrote The City of God, he built on several centuries of discussion regarding the status of war and of military service among Christians. For example, Tertullian (d. 220) wrote that Christ had ‘‘unbelted’’ every soldier, and that Christians participating in the Roman army would in all likelihood find it impossible to retain their faith. In a slightly different vein, Origen of Alexandria (d. 254) responded to charges of Christian irresponsibility, arguing that believers who refused induction into the military nevertheless provided valuable service by praying that God send the heavenly hosts to fight against those invisible, yet powerful forces assisting the emperor’s enemies. More generally, authors like Lactantius (d. 320) decried the wastefulness and tragedy of war.
At the same time, the Roman army included Christians, at least from the late second century forward. And once the status of Christianity began to change in the early part of the fourth century, even an author like Lactantius changed his tune, saying that some wars, at least, might be legitimate from a Christian point of view. By the time of
Ambrose, bishop of Milan (d. 397), a Christian leader could see his authority as complementary to that of the state. Even the partly legendary refusal of communion to the Emperior Theodosius following the massacre of 7,000 in Thessalonica - punishment decreed by the emperor for the murder of a Roman commander in that city - should be seen in this regard. Ambrose understood his role as bishop to include the giving of moral advice, and even the imposition of moral discipline, just as he saw the duty of the emperor and other officials as a matter of carrying out the guidance provided by the church.
As Ambrose’s De officiis indicates, Christian discourse on war in this period could be cast as a transformation of the Roman bellum iustum. Indeed, the very title of Ambrose’s work suggests this, as it reflects his use of Cicero’s similarly named treatise. In Cicero’s account, the Roman way of war suggests that military force is governed by norms of justice. For example, war must be declared by publicly authorized officials; it cannot be a matter of private or personal revenge. Then, too, resort to war should take place only when disputes cannot be resolved through discussion. The justification for going to war involves securing the peace of Roman society. When fighting, soldiers should conduct themselves with honor. When war is over, the victors should be magnanimous to the vanquished, since the point is to persuade the enemy not to repeat its offense, and to deter others from similarly threatening the peace of the Roman state. Ambrose took these notions of public, honorable, and thus just war, and connected them with Christian notions of neighbor-love and obedience to God. With respect to the former, the bishop’s argument was that the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself might in certain contexts be fulfilled by protecting the weak from aggressors. Indeed, Ambrose took the example of Moses in Exodus 2:11-15 as an indication that anyone who is able to prevent an injury, but fails to do so, might be judged as complicit in injustice. Defense of a neighbor is distinguished from defense of oneself, however. The latter might be judged as an expression of inordinate self-love and a denial of faith in the providence of God. But the former is required, as a matter of obedience to God’s command. In that connection, too, Ambrose found a way of tying Christian notions of war to the fighting described in Joshua and other books of the Old Testament. For Ambrose, war commanded by God is a distinct species of just war. In some particulars (e. g., the total destruction of the enemy described in Joshua), such war differs from the more ordinary fighting by which military action relates to purposes of state. Nevertheless, in its moral species, war commanded by God should be seen as a type of bellum iustum; in fact, it is the prototype ofsuch fighting, since God, the author ofjustice, can never command believers to do an unjust act.
Augustine built on these insights of Ambrose, which explains his response to Faustus, or more generally to the challenge presented by those who saw in the Old Testament a contradiction to the New Testament. As Augustine had it, the fighting of the people of Israel was an expression of obedience rather than of brutality. In commanding such wars, God assigned punishments that were just. The real evil of war, after all, is not that some people are killed, since all mortals must die. Rather, the desire to inflict harm or to dominate others exemplifies aspects of war, as more generally of human behavior, that should be condemned.
For Augustine, war is related to the condition of fallen and therefore sinful humanity. In one sense, war results from sin. Hence, aggressive fighting is an expression of evils like those already mentioned. In another sense, however, war provides a remedy for sin. In fighting just wars, a wise person does what is necessary, even if in some sense the conditions that impose and legitimate his or her actions are regrettable. It is important, of course, that in waging war the wise person resist sinful dispositions. Thus, just wars are characterized by limits. Authorized by public authorities, such wars are not an occasion for private vengeance. Fought for legitimate public purposes, they are not to be waged for purposes of aggrandizement. Soldiers must punish aggressors, and in turn must take care to distinguish the innocent from the guilty. And, while a number of tactics involving (ostensible) deception (ambush, for example) are legitimate, one must never violate a promise to one’s enemy, or engage in massacre.
As with Ambrose, Augustine’s writing suggests that bellum iustum is a category that includes wars of several types. Most significantly, the category includes wars undertaken by God’s command, as well as at the command of legitimate (i. e., public) authority. With respect to the latter, the limits and norms connected with honor and neighbor-love apply. With respect to the former, the command of God may direct fighting in ways that seem to violate such limits. The qualification is important, however. Fighting commanded by God may, as in the book of Joshua, appear to violate the limits of justice. Nevertheless, it does not or cannot do so, since by definition God is just, and God’s commands are correspondingly expressive or even constitutive of justice. Faced with this proviso, some interpreters have wondered whether Augustine considered such a command an actual possibility, or whether his comments on this matter are rather dictated by theological interests. That is certainly an interesting, if eminently controversial question. As further developments would show, however,
The notion that bellum iustum might include wars authorized by God, or derivatively, by religious authorities, came to be an important feature of Christian reasoning about military force.
World History
