De Valera was outraged at the signing, as were the more zealous republicans in the cabinet, Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack. Some have argued that de Valera opposed the treaty in order to keep the zealots in his camp, hoping at the last moment to gain British acceptance of his external association concept as an alternative to the resumption of war. Even if accepted, it would scarcely have given Ireland the status of an autonomous republic. However, events over the next several months saw de Valera, a sphinx-type figure, become more and more the prisoner rather than the leader of the republican zealots he had tried to keep in line behind a formula that was less than republican.
The major proponents of the treaty were Collins, Griffith, Cosgrave, and, increasingly, Kevin O'Higgins. They argued, in essence, that the negotiators, whose credentials as Irish patriots were unquestioned, could not have gotten anything better. Collins, for instance, acted on the basis of his awareness of the weakened military position of the IRA. What they did get was as great a measure of self-government as Ireland had ever had. The only limitations on sovereignty were a required oath by Irish legislators to the king as head of the association of nations to which Ireland was a member; its legislature was to be summoned and dissolved by the king's agent, the lord lieutenant (but advised by the Irish government); limitations on the Irish military in per capita proportion to that of Britain; continued British maintenance of certain naval facilities in Ireland; and Irish fiscal obligations to its proportionate share of the imperial debt at the time.
The treaty also gave the parliament of Northern Ireland the opportunity to withdraw from the new government of Ireland, which would be called the Irish Free State. However, if it did so, a boundary commission would be formed to adjust the boundary according to popular wishes and economic and geographic considerations.
The debate on the treaty in the Bail fiireann, which lasted December 14 through January 7, with a lengthy Christmas recess, was an embittered one, featuring degrading personal attacks made on the negotiators. However, the treaty was narrowly approved by a vote of 64 to 57. De Valera then resigned his presidency of the Bail fiireann and Griffith was elected to replace him.
In keeping with the concept of constitutionality, the British, even in the treaty, never recognized the revolutionary assembly, the Bail fiireann, and its government. Instead, the treaty required that approval to it be given by the elected parliament of Southern Ireland, that is, the parliament elected the previous June, but nearly all of whose unopposed members had refused to attend the opening session, as they regarded themselves as having been elected to the second Bail fiireann. To comply with the treaty the parliament of Southern Ireland then met, or at least those who approved of the treaty, which also included the four independents elected from Trinity College. That body approved the treaty and elected, as the treaty required, a Provisional Government of Ireland, under whom the implementation of the treaty and the drafting and acceptance of a constitution for the Irish Free State would take place. The chairman of the Provisional Government was Michael Collins. While the Provisional Government was considered the real governing authority in Ireland, the Bail fiireann continued as a concession to the scruples of purist Irish republicans.
The cabinet of the Provisional Government included, in addition to Collins, Buggan, O'Higgins, Mulcahy, Cosgrave, Joseph McGrath, Patrick Hogan, and Fionan Lynch. The government had two major strategic objectives: first, to comply with the British expectations of formulating a regime that would conform to the treaty, that is, to establish a dominion government and acknowledge the position of the king, in return for which British forces would be withdrawn from Ireland and the agencies of government would be turned over to dominion bodies of government. Second, to try to secure the acquiescence of the anti-treaty elements within the Sinn Fein Party and the IRA to something short of the ideal of an independent republic. The fact that many full units in the IRA continued to give allegiance only to the Bail fiireann and not to the Provisional Government made the task all the more difficult.
Within Sinn Fein, at a convention, or Ard-Fheis, held in February, the rival factions agreed to postpone a confrontation for three months, at which point an election would be held on the merits of the constitution being prepared for the Free State. It was different with the IRA, as a military convention was held in March against the specific order given by the minister for defense, Mulcahy. Attended primarily by anti-treaty members, it was dominated by the more militant, particularly the likings of Rory O'Connor, Liam Lynch, Liam Mellows, and Ernie O'Malley. O'Connor had even admitted that a military dictatorship might be preferable to an election. De Valera himself had engaged in inflammatory rhetoric about the need to battle other Irish in seeking independence.
A few weeks later, O'Connor and anti-treaty forces of the IRA seized control of the judicial center in Dublin, the Four Courts. The government continued to play for time as Mulcahy began to recruit a national army that would replace
Election propaganda posters for Eamon de Valera, 1923 (Mary Evans Picture Library)
The IRA. Its members included pro-treaty IRA members, but also a significant number of Irishmen who had served in the British forces and who had military experience. The IRA itself had increased significantly in numbers during the truce, when membership was less risky and it became fashionable for young men to join.
Many in the British government, especially Winston Churchill, were apprehensive of the true commitment of the Provisional Government to comply with the treaty, especially in view of its tolerance of the open activity of the IRA militants. They became especially cynical when Collins and de Valera entered an electoral pact on May 20 in which both factions agreed not to contest against each other in the forthcoming election, but rather to run exactly the same number of candidates for Bail seats as each side had in the outgoing Bail. The election, like the 1921 elections for the northern and southern Irish parliaments, was to be conducted on a single transferable vote (STV) proportional representation system with multiple members elected from each constituency. The outcome, if the electorate complied, would result in a parliament that would duplicate the outgoing second Bail. The factions would then agree to form a coalition government in which several of the ministers would not be willing to comply with the treaty. A complicating factor was the readiness of other political factions, including the Labour Party, the Farmers Party, and a number of independents, to enter the contest.
Shortly before the election, Provisional Government representatives agreed to substantial revisions in a nearly republican constitution that a committee had drafted for the Free State in order to meet British objections. Collins then urged his electoral supporters to vote as they saw fit when completing their ballots, which was an invitation to disregard the pact suggestion that they vote for both pro-treaty and anti-treaty Sinn Feiners, and cast votes for pro-treaty Sinn Fein-ers and various others. The results were a significant downgrading of anti-treaty Sinn Fein strength (36 seats) while pro-treaty Sinn Fein proponents secured 58, Labour 17, Farmers 7, and independents 10.
On June 22 the retired field marshall Henry Wilson was assassinated by IRA members, increasing British discomfort at the Provisional Government's continued tolerance of the activities of the IRA. When the anti-treaty group at the Four Courts kidnapped a pro-treaty general on June 27, the Provisional Government attacked the Four Courts the next day, beginning the civil war.