Thought

Most of Barlaam’s philosophical ideas should be gathered from his theological and scientific works, the only purely philosophical work among his indisputably genuine writings being the short Solutions to the Questions Addressed by George Lapithes (c. 1334).

Barlaam regarded religion and philosophy as two distinct yet compatible ways (i. e., faith and reasoning) of reaching the same end, that is, truth. Placing reason side by side with revelation amounted to a revival of the Early Christian doctrine of ‘‘seminal reasons.’’ Since, however, this clashed with the established Byzantine stereotype that ‘‘Hellenism’’ (i. e., fervently studying and ranking ancient Greek philosophy high) was an attitude incompatible with Christianity, Barlaam was presented by Palamas as a ‘‘crypto-pagan.’’ Still, Barlaam explained that most of the ancient philosophical schools failed to raise themselves above the realm of the sensibles. Only Platonism did it; thus, it is the only philosophy compatible with Christianity. Neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean attendants of St. Paul’s speech in Athens converted to Christianity, but only Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, whom Barlaam regarded as a Platonist in view of the corpus Dionysiacum. The close affinities of this corpus with Proclus made Barlaam feel free to integrate into his writings numerous terms and doctrines from several Proclean works (Elements of Theology, Platonic Theology, Commentaries on Alcibiades, Parmenides, Timaeus et al.) and eclectically combine them with Christianity. Barlaam did the same with Plato’s texts (e. g., Euthyphro, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Republic) as well as with those by many other Neoplatonists (Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Olympiodorus), along with some Byzantine Neoplatonizing authors (Michael Psellos, Michael of Ephesus, Eustratios of Nicaea).

Doing philosophy has two prerequisites. (1) One must purify one’s soul by ‘‘mortifying its passions.’’ This is necessary, because the human soul is impeded on the one hand by the bodily needs, which tend to turn it into a slave of theirs, and on the other, by the senses, which provide it with data which can show to the right direction only if carefully used. (2) One must get rid of the prejudices inserted into one’s soul by the social environment and scrutinize one’s mature views lest one mistakes a false statement for true. Barlaam presents Socrates as the ideal of living philosophically and adopts verbatim Proclus’ elaboration of this ideal (firmly believing in one’s own wisdom leads one astray from truth more than just lacking any belief at all, since it amounts to a ‘‘double ignorance,’’ i. e., ignorance both of truth and of one’s own ignorance). Discerning truth from falsehood can be achieved by using Aristotle’s ‘‘dialectic,’’ that is, by carefully evaluating the opposite doctrines on any matter. This, however, is a hard task, because falsehood often takes the appearance of truth. This results from one’s own desires, which cause wishful thinking, as well as from a basic feature of reality, that is, its being divided into an intelligible and a sensible realm, the latter being a foggy reflection of the former. Man participates in both, ‘‘phantastikon’’ being the ‘‘mediator’’ between the intellect and the bodily senses.

True knowledge results from ‘‘direct acquaintance.’’ Since, however, most men’s knowledge derives either ex auditu or inferentially, error lurks everywhere. Still, although he states that detecting truth on intelligible realities, such as God’s triunity, by means of syllogisms is impossible, because premises are meaningful only inasmuch as they describe things known by acquaintance, he did not share the radical skepticism of Gregoras; he only wanted to qualify what is accessible to humans (and how) and what not.

Aristotle’s philosophy is in the main compatible with Platonism. Aristotle’s logic is an indispensable tool for any high human activity (philosophical, scientific, theological, and political). Aristotle’s categories (which regard meaningful words) apply only to the realm of sensibles; using words to describe the intelligible realm can be only metaphorical (yet not fully univocal). Demonstration by syllogisms regards philosophical and scientific (strictly speaking, only mathematical and, probably, astronomical) statements. ‘‘Dialectical’’ conclusions regard natural science; as Plato says, any theory of nature is, in the best case, just a ‘‘plausible description,’’ because, in contrast with mathematics, where deduction is possible, natural science uses induction. The remaining branches of Aristotle’s philosophy are compatible with Platonism and Christianity; for most of Aristotle’s statements regard the sensible beings and cannot, therefore, clash with Plato’s tenets on what lies beyond sense experience and above discursive thought.

Knowledge consists in grasping the ‘‘reasons of beings,’’ that is, the species of beings, the sensible reality consists of as well as the regular activities of these beings. In this respect, Barlaam adheres to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the ‘‘universals’’ as preexisting in God’s mind, inhering in the sensible beings, and grasped by means of philosophy and science. This knowledge is a sort of knowledge of God, inasmuch as it shows that the rationality of the creature reflects the wisdom of its Creator (‘‘natural theology’’; I Cor. 1, 21). Barlaam looks indecisive on whether the mind extracts the ‘‘reasons of beings’’ from the sensibles (Aristotle) or sense experience just ‘‘awakes’’ or ‘‘digs out’’ (i. e., renders conscious) what is innately yet implicitly present in the soul (Plato, Proclus).

Barlaam knew that Proclus and some of the contemporary ‘‘hesychasts’’ accepted a higher (non-discursive) knowledge, ‘‘enthusiasm’’ or ‘‘ecstasy,’’ but he rejected it; for he adhered to Synesius of Cyrene’s idea that ‘‘Hellenic philosophy’’ differs from ‘‘barbaric philosophy’’ (i. e., Christian monasticism) inasmuch as the former deems knowledge as a quality of the pars intelligibilis of the human soul, whereas the latter naively claims that purifying the pars passibilis affords humans (even uncultivated humans) direct access to the things divine.

A Latin Ethica secundum Stoicos is of doubtful authenticity. If genuine, it must have been written after 1342, probably in the context of Barlaam’s contact with Petrarch, whose moral thought is Stoically coloured. Its main point is that the most important virtue is not scientia (which is left out from the prerequisites of happiness) but constantia (the Latin equivalent of the Greek eupatheia), which is attainable only through ‘‘extirpating’’ (not just ‘‘moderating’’) passions.

See also: > Gregory Palamas > Nikephoros Gregoras > Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite