Because Thomism recognized the autonomous authority of reason, a good deal of Jesuit thinking about morality could be in largely secular terms, for natural law (which is the substance of such argument) does not even presuppose the existence of God, but is predicated upon ‘‘the nature of things’’; that is, the conditions and requirements of human social existence. Subscription to natural law is a precondition for a law to bind in conscience, and it thus imposes limitations on the power of rulers, including prelates. Moreover, although the law of nations (ius gentium) had been opaquely related to natural law ever since Roman law, it was clear that there was some relationship (worked out with great sophistication by Suarez), and this too restricted the authority of rulers and their freedom of action, at least in principle. Again, natural law (generically ius naturale) reasoning did not distinguish sharply between law and rights, and liberty and equality were held to be natural rights, right by nature (in that no one is naturally the slave of anyone else). This allowed some Jesuits to assume the mantle of Bartolome de las Casas as protectors of the ‘‘Indians,’’ and opponents of slavery. The natural right of self-defence, and of due process, could justify both disobedience to persons in authority and defiance of law, for example the laws of property in times of dearth or starvation, or the authority of ‘‘heretics’’ and their laws prohibiting Catholic worship and publication. Jesuits (as has been seen) normally accommodated themselves easily to prevailing custom and practice, but equally have always exhibited a streak of radicalism. Thus, although Jesuit theologians (notably Martin del Rio) were counted among the most important proponents of witch-hunting, virulent at this time, it was also Jesuits (especially Friedrich von Spee and Adam Tanner) who at great personal risk opposed the practice.
See also: > Political Philosophy > Thomas Aquinas, Political Thought of
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