In a broad sense, Thomism denotes a form of philosophical and theological thought which draws its main inspiration from the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. Despite differences in historical context and philosophical emphasis, all forms of Thomism purport to follow Aquinas’ teaching in its principles, methodology, and conclusions in order to defend, develop, or comment on it. In its original form, Aquinas’ teaching is embedded in a specific institutional milieu determined on the one hand by the University and on the other by the Dominican order. The schools modeled Thomism in a twofold way: through the reception of classical philosophy, especially Neoplatonism and Aristotle, and through their methodology, exemplified in the scholastic exercise of dialectical inquiry of authoritative sources toward the solution of doctrinal questions. In this context, Thomism represents the solution determined by Aquinas in opposition to other possible solutions advanced by other masters. Its adherents were normally, but not always, members of the Dominican order. Their institutional affiliation to Aquinas’ doctrine did not exclude a selective use of Tho-mist sources, conflicting interpretations, or in some cases even the influence of rival forms of scholasticism, such as that represented by Duns Scotus.
The reception of Aquinas’ teaching throughout the Middle Ages was thus subject to differences in emphasis and orientation which escape a systematic development. What follows is an attempt to trace the historical evolution of Aquinas’ doctrine taking into account its multiple, and sometimes conflicting, expressions. The chief features of Thomist philosophy will be presented as they are brought to the foreground of the debate at each stage of its evolution.
The development of Thomism during the period running from the end of the thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth century can be traced in four main stages: (1) a first stage, roughly from Aquinas’ death in 1274 to the end of the thirteenth century, is marked by the Dominican defense of Thomist teaching in face of external opposition arising from Church authorities and the Franciscan order; (2) on a second stage, from the beginning of the fourteenth century to Aquinas’ canonization in 1323, Thomist teaching is increasingly institutionalized as it is declared the official doctrine ofthe Dominican order in an effort to dissipate internal opposition and reaffirm its doctrinal credibility after the 1277 condemnation; (3) on a third stage, from Aquinas’ full rehabilitation in 1325 to the end of the fourteenth century, Thomist doctrine is promoted as a theological authority, despite the persistence of opposition in some quarters; (4) finally, after a period of relative recession as a result of Dominican unpopularity during the Immaculate Conception controversy, the fifteenth century witnesses a gradual revival of Thomism extending well into the sixteenth. Thomism becomes increasingly systematized and divorced from the dialectical character it owed to its scholastic origins.
(1) A first manifestation of Thomism takes place toward the end of the 1270s and all throughout the 1280s, as a group of Oxford and Paris Dominicans rally in defense of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. The ensuing controversy formed part of a wider conflict concerning the reception of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, which had culminated in the 1277 condemnation issued by the bishop of Paris Stephen Tempier. Bishop Tempier and his commission of theologians were responding to a wave of ‘‘radical Aristotelianism’’ at the University of Paris, in which some philosophers (notably Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia) were boasting an autonomous use of natural reason and propagating views not dissimilar to those of Averroes, Aristotle’s Arabic commentator. Although not directly targeted, Aquinas’ teaching was indirectly compromised insofar as a number of the condemned errors bore manifest affinity with Thomist theses.
Soon after the condemnation, on March 18, 1277, Robert Kilwardby, archbishop of Canterbury and a Dominican, issued a prohibition at Oxford involving 30 suspect propositions in the domains of logic, grammar, and natural philosophy. The latter included the Thomist thesis of the unicity of the substantial form, only implicit in Tempier’s condemnation. Against the established explanation of the gradual composition of the embryo, Aquinas’ thesis advanced an interpretation of Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory, whereby the generation of a substance takes place by the disappearance of a previous form and the succession of a radically new substantial form. In this view, it is not possible for a composite substance to coexist with other forms, on the principle that the existence of one composite is due to the presence of one form. Underlying this position is Aquinas’ belief that in all corporeal beings, apart from composition of matter and form, there is composition of essence and existence (esse). Esse actualizes only one form, such that the composition of esse with several forms would necessarily entail several substantial forms, and hence a plurality of actually existing beings. Consequently, in human beings the vegetative and the sensitive souls must disappear at the arrival of the intellectual soul, divinely infused. Aquinas’ ontology is thus incompatible with any model requiring the presence of previous forms within the composite. In this light, rather than an anti-Thomist bias, Kilwardby’s intervention manifests the reaction of the scientific establishment, still attached to the old physics of the elements away from the new challenges of Aristotelian ontology.
Otherwise for the Franciscans William of la Mare and John Pecham, for whom Aquinas’ theory entailed serious theological dangers to do notably with the numerical identity of Christ’s body living and dead. Indeed, if the body is what it is wholly by virtue of the soul and matter has no disposition of its own, then, at the separation of body and soul, Christ’s dead body would cease to be identified with his living body. At the sight of such problems, William felt encouraged to issue a ‘‘corrective’’ of Aquinas’ teaching. Composed toward 1278, the Correctorium fratris Thomae presents a list of 118 ‘‘erroneous and dangerous’’ propositions extracted from Aquinas’ works. Among them, some 13 had already been condemned by Tempier in 1277 - a parallel which William hastens to point out in order to strengthen his case.
William’s Correctorium was endorsed by the 1282 Franciscan general chapter in Strasbourg, thus becoming the order’s official view of Aquinas’ doctrine. A further attack took place in 1286, launched by Kilwardby’s successor to the archbishopric of Canterbury, the Franciscan John Pecham. An old adversary of Aquinas, Pecham ratified his predecessor’s prohibition, this time condemning the 30 propositions that some Oxford masters, notably the young Dominican Richard Knapwell, had allegedly maintained in disobedience to Kilwardby’s censure. This second assault, coming from the rival order and with all the ideological weight this involved, awakened a concerted movement within the Dominican order in defense of their most famous doctor.
The Dominican reaction manifested itself in two forms. On the one hand, in the legislation issued at subsequent general chapters, encouraging the support, defense, and promotion of Aquinas’ doctrine (notably the capitular legislations of 1278, 1279, and 1286). Dominican defense was also expressed in literary form in a series of treatises devoted to the unicity of form theory, and in the composition of polemical writings sarcastically entitled Correctoria corruptorii, in allusion to William’s first attack. Young Dominicans such as Thomas of Sutton, Richard Knapwell, and Robert Orford at Oxford, and John of Paris and Giles of Lessines at Paris devoted themselves to the defense of Aquinas’ innovative theses, particularly the doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form, but also the related theses of the pure potentiality of matter, the spirituality of separate substances, individuation by matter, and the real distinction between essence and existence. Non-Dominican masters were also involved in the controversy: the well-known Augustinian theologian, Giles of Rome, suffered on his own count for having supported the Thomist theses, while the secular master Godfrey of Fontaines took his part in defending the credibility and intellectual competence of Aquinas.
For all its zeal, the allegiance to Aquinas’ theses revealed by these early disputes does not seem to have gone beyond a literal affiliation to a particular way of “determining” a question which at best resulted in lucid clarifications of important theories. Moreover, not all Dominicans welcomed Aquinas’ innovations (recall Kilwardby), and even if some of them had acted in the defensive, they seem to have been prompted mostly by esprit de corps. A case in point is William of Huthum, one of the earliest defenders of Aquinas, and certainly the most prominent figure among them (he was provincial of the order in England in 1282 and again in 1290). Although William remained sceptical about the theological value of the unicity of form theory, presumably prompted by the need to safeguard his order’s doctrinal reputation, he nevertheless pleaded a degree of intellectual freedom in matters which remained open to inquiry.
(2) Fourteenth-century Thomism is characterized on the one hand by the increasing institutionalization of Aquinas’ teaching within the Dominican order, and on the other by the Dominican effort to reestablish its credibility after the 1277 condemnation. Aquinas’ teaching became established as the order’s official doctrinal line in 1309. Conformity with Thomist doctrine was reinforced in 1313 at the general chapter in Metz, promoting Tho-mism as the ‘‘common opinion,’’ and again in 1316, encouraging tighter control of the content of lectures and writings issued within the order. These directives were in all likelihood issued in order to fight internal dissidence represented notably in the writings of James of Metz and Durand of St. Pourcain. Heading the order’s endeavor to enforce doctrinal uniformity in accordance to Aquinas’ teaching were Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), master general of the order from 1318, and John of Naples, an active campaigner for Aquinas’ canonization. Apart from producing a defense of Aquinas’ doctrine (Defensio doctrinae fratris Thomae, between 1307 and 1309), Hervaeus took personal care in correcting all forms of deviation (examples are his Correctiones super dicta Durandi in Quol. Aven. I, 1315 and Responsio ad Jacobum Metensem, 1310). With Hervaeus, John of Naples took a leading part in the commission examining Durand’s work. A conscientious Thomist from his early years as master, John’s efforts to reestablish Aquinas’ doctrinal credibility are exemplified by a quodlibetal question concerning the canonical value of Tempier’s 1277 condemnation (Quodl. 6, 2: Utrum licitepossit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quoad omnes conclusiones ejus). Other leading Dominicans who were active in the promotion of Aquinas’ teaching at the time were Pierre de la Palud, John of Lausanne, and Gerard of Bologna.
Although their Thomism did not manifest itself in literal adherence to Aquinas’ teaching, the concerted activity of Dominicans like Hervaeus and John of Naples was decisive for the development of Thomism into an established philosophy. The promotion of Thomism followed a twofold strategy: on the one hand, it attempted to assimilate Aquinas’ doctrine to the ‘‘common opinion’’; on the other, it sought to affiliate it to a classical philosophical tradition - mainly Neoplatonist and Aristotelian in origin - deemed integral to the good exercise of theology. On the first count, Franciscan intellectual achievements had much to contribute as Hervaeus ostensibly borrowed from Scotist insights (notably the notion of ‘‘formal distinction’’). John, for his part, proposed enhanced interpretations of Aquinas’ theses as he sought to chase away internal contradictions. By filing down ambiguities and incorporating alien insights, second-generation Thomists were endeavoring to invest Aquinas’ teaching with the coherence and soundness that could merit the relative approval accorded to the common opinion. In this sense, it is no mean homage to the success of Thomism that Dante, writing his Comedy at around the same time, should have drawn significant inspiration from Thomist teaching, to the point of attributing to Aquinas a privileged place in his Paradise.
On the second count, second-generation Thomists rallied themselves in the defense of those theses, of Neo-platonist and Aristotelian affinity, which seemed particularly exposed to the 1277 condemnation and its doctrinal priorities. The unifying strand in Tempier’s otherwise unsystematic syllabus appeared to be the emphasis on God’s absolute power, the notion of God as absolutely free and as infinitely superior to his creation. Yet, central Thomist tenets, notably the veto on multiplying angels within one and the same species on account of their immateriality, appeared to subordinate God’s power to the natural laws of his creation. This impression was only reinforced by Aquinas’ metaphysics of participation and the connected theory of the analogy of being, which purported to establish an essential continuity between the natural and the supernatural order. The Thomist understanding of universals and the resulting explanation of cognition as a process of abstraction appeared as yet another expression of a view which downplayed the plurality and contingency of creation in favor of its reduction to a set of rational principles. Moreover, Aquinas’ conviction on the pertinence and salutary role of reason in the explanation of the natural order was easily affiliated, failing a more nuanced analysis, to the doctrine of the ‘‘double truth’’ and the radical separation of philosophy and theology. Finally, the Thomist emphasis on the intellect as controlling faculty over the will, an emphasis which informed Aquinas’ explanation of moral action, contributed to the general impression of Thomist doctrine as running counter to the philosophical - mainly Franciscan - tendency imposing itself at the time which rather placed the accent on the will, on God’s infinity, and on the contingency of creation. An illustrative example of the contrast between the Thomist outlook, much attached to Aristotelian philosophy, and the fourteenth-century emerging view is the much-debated issue of sacramental causality. Governed by the Aristotelian thesis whereby the cause is efficacious by virtue of an infused quality inherent in it, Thomists maintained that the sacrament produces its effect on account of a superadded virtue which is infused at the moment of the institution of the sacrament and which ‘‘disposes’’ the soul to receiving grace. In contrast to this view, Franciscan theologians and some non-Thomist Dominicans advanced a “contractual” explanation of causality whereby the efficacity of the sacrament rests on the ‘‘pact’’ voluntarily established between man and God at the institution of the sacrament. But Thomists’ heavy reliance on Aristotle’s view of causality and inherent value led them to dismiss contractual causality as tantamount to denying true causality to the sacraments and reduce them to nothing more than mere signs.
Still suffering the consequences of the 1277 condemnation, fourteenth-century Thomists would endeavor to disengage Aquinas’ teaching from all kind ofphilosophical necessitarianism, while at the same time reassert the benefits of classical philosophy in the explanation of theological truths. Aquinas’ later sobriquet of Doctor angelicus is highly illustrative of the kind of philosophical and theological tradition Thomists were keen to safeguard: with angels at its center as ‘‘mediating intelligences,’’ the Tho-mist worldview would guarantee the essential continuity of the natural with the supernatural order and the intelligibility of God’s plan.
Ecclesiastical intervention came in handy, as the doctrinal promotion of Thomism was crowned in 1323 with Aquinas’ canonization by Pope John XXII. A first biography of Aquinas was written by William of Tocco for the occasion, while the pope commissioned the transcription of the Summa for the pontifical library. Aquinas’ work was praised as a ‘‘miracle of doctrine,’’ for the Dominican doctor had performed ‘‘as many miracles as he had written articles.’’ Despite the repercussions of the 1277 condemnation, Aquinas’ canonization revealed the papacy’s strong reliance on the doctrinal uniformity of Thomism, deemed to bring stability at a time when the church was troubled by the quarrels over apostolic poverty with the Franciscans.
(3) A direct consequence of Aquinas’ canonization was his full rehabilitation in 1325, as the concerted action of the University of Paris and Bishop Stephen Bourret brought about the official revocation of the 1277 condemnation ‘‘insofar as it touched on Aquinas’ doctrines.’’ That the condemnation was not revoked as a whole was all the more revealing of Aquinas’ selected status as a theological authority. Illustrative of this new stage of Thomist ‘‘orthodoxy’’ is the appearance of one last tract against Durand of St. Pourcain, probably prompted by the persistence of his influence within the order. Written around the time the veto on Aquinas’ teaching was lifted and shortly after the canonization, Durandellus’ Evidentiae contra Durandum (1325) reflects the influence which the canonization exerted on the expansion and authority of Thomist teaching. The purpose of the Evidentiae is not so much to engage in criticism of Dominican dissidence, but to present evidence of the soundness of Thomism by using Durand’s discredited theses as a critical vehicle. Whereas Hervaeus’ Thomism showed the resilience of times of controversy, the Thomist elements in the Evidentiae are presented in a way more suitable for commentary than interpretation. Durandellus makes a normative use of the Thomist corpus, as he adduces quotations from Aquinas’ works for the sake of proof in his arguments against Durand. The value of the Evidentiae thus resides in its being probably the first example we possess of Aquinas’ writings being treated as a locus theologicus, as obliged theological reference.
The rapid headway of Thomism did not exclude criticism from other quarters. The Immaculate Conception controversy is a case in point, as it saw the Dominicans temporarily expelled from the University of Paris. Following Aquinas’ teaching and in opposition to Franciscans, who followed Duns Scotus and most of the University establishment, Thomists maintained that Mary was conceived in the natural way and that as such she was not exempt from the transmission of original sin. Guiding the Thomist view was the need to safeguard the truth and the value of Christ’s universal redemption. The problem presented by a Thomist minority was not only doctrinal but also institutional: since his canonization, Aquinas’ teaching had acquired normative value and his opinion was supposed to call for obedience not only within the Dominican order but also within the Church at large. The doctrinal tension between Thomism and the University establishment is well illustrated by the case of the Spanish Dominican John Montson. In his inaugural lecture at Paris in 1387, Montson declared that Mary was conceived in sin and that the contrary view was heretical. Montson’s audacity deeply offended the magisterial opinion, which had reached a consensus in favor of the immaculist view. Far from retracting, Montson claimed Aquinas’ authority in order to justify his view. He was subsequently censured by the University and excommunicated by the bishop of Paris who, capitalizing on Montson’s blunder, prohibited any preaching or teaching against the immaculist view. The affair transcended University jurisdiction as Montson decided to bring his case to the Avignon pope, Clement VII. The pope readily supported Montson’s appeal, but the University delegation finally succeeded in obtaining Montson’s condemnation. Revealing of Aquinas’ theological ascendancy at Paris, the University’s authorities hastened to add that Montson’s condemnation was brought about ‘‘without prejudice to the reverence owed to saint
Thomas and his doctrine.’’ For it is not the soundness of Aquinas’ doctrine which they have condemned and reproved, but Monston’s ‘‘distortion of it by altering its sense towards the contradiction of faith’’ (Chartularium, II pp. 497-498). Thomism had fallen victim to the political paradoxes of the Schism: while the University was keen to safeguard the authority of the Common Doctor as a way to reinforce its own magisterial authority, the Avignonese pope, at the mercy of French priorities, was compelled to condemn the Dominican destabilizer. The controversy was finally settled in 1439, when the Council of Basle affirmed the belief in the Immaculate Conception as pious opinion and in accordance with the Catholic faith. Although he was unable to present his case at the Council, the Spanish Dominican John of Torquemada had prepared a treatise on the matter arguing in favor of the Thomist thesis. In his hands, Thomism was intended to serve as a stronghold for the pontifical faction against Conciliar views. Other unyielding Thomists continued to teach against the Immaculate Conception throughout the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century. A notable example is Vincent Bandelli, a Dominican from Lombardy and master general of the order in 1501. It is an eloquent commentary not only on the normative weight Thomism had acquired within the order, but also on Dominicans’ strong institutional attachment to Aquinas, that most of them continued to teach against the Immaculate Conception despite the University’s official requirement to defend it and the Church’s proclamation of its feast day in 1476.
(4) At the beginning of the fifteenth century, with the Immaculate Conception controversy still impairing Dominican doctrinal credibility, the work of John Capreolus (c. 1380-1444), a native of Languedoc, was decisive in reviving the authority of Thomism. Written in four volumes, John’s Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae (1409-1432) constitutes a comprehensive defense of Thomism against critics from all quarters: Tempier’s 1277 syllabus, William of la Mare, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Duns Scot, Peter Auriol, Durand of St. Pourcain, William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, to mention only the most notable. In responding to each objection, John offers a lucid interpretation of Aquinas’ teaching as he both attempts to harmonize conflicting texts and reassesses alternative interpretations from previous Thomists such as Hervaeus Natalis and John of Naples. Among the vast material he considers, John devotes particular attention to Nominalism, especially the way in which this view was expressed in terministic logic. Not in vain was he called the ‘‘Prince of Thomists’’: John’s seminal work sets the precedents for the great age of commentaries on Aquinas’ Summa in the sixteenth century. Indeed, though Peter Lombard’s Sentences remained the official text at University and in Dominican schools, Aquinas’ Summa was gradually taking its place as the main theological reference.
Testifying to this is the flow of abbreviations, concordances, and indices of Aquinas’ works composed at the time, as well as epitomes or compendia summarizing his thought for study purposes. The Thomist corpus was thus gradually coming to embody an intellectual tradition whose transmission had to be guaranteed. In this tradition, literal adherence to Aquinas’ writings set the standards for true doctrine and philosophical soundness.
Marking the revival of scholasticism in the sixteenth century is Cajetan’s (Thomas de Vio, 1469-1534) monumental commentary on Aquinas’ Summa, composed between 1507 and 1522. Despite some divergences (he remains sceptical about Aquinas’ demonstration of the immortality of the soul), Cajetan’s commentary remains to this day a classical reference for Thomist scholars. Written precisely at the time when Luther was developing his theological ideas on justification, Cajetan’s Tho-mism gains in topical significance if we take into account that he played an important part in mediating with Luther. Cajetan’s embassy was bolstered a few years later by the Council of Trent (1545-1563), recognizing the substance of Thomist teaching as an expression of true doctrine. In 1567, 3 years after the Council’s last session, Pius V promoted Aquinas to the rank of Doctor of the Church and ordered the first complete printed edition of his works.
Another famous commentator of Aquinas’ Summa around the same period is John of St Thomas (15891644), a Spanish Dominican who, as his name intended to show, devoted himself to safeguarding the guiding principles and main conclusions of Aquinas’ thought against more syncretistic forms of commentary, such as that practiced by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). Suarez’s first work, De verbo incarnato (1590) is a commentary on Aquinas’ view of Redemption as it appears expounded in the third part of the Summa. Suarez attempts to reconcile the Thomist view with Duns Scotus’ position, according to which the final cause of the Incarnation is not Redemption, as Aquinas sees it, but the manifestation of the perfection of God’s creation. On this view, the Incarnation would then have taken place even without the Fall. With Sutirez, the tradition of interpretation of Aquinas’ works begins to evolve into a vast philosophical synthesis which is more accurately described as Aristotelico-Thomistic. An illustrative example is his Disputationes metaphysicae, in which he attempts to integrate Aristotle’s teaching with that of Aquinas’ into a coherent body of knowledge. In contrast to the traditional scholastic commentaries, the aim is not to gloss Aristotle’s work but rather to offer a systematic treatment independent of the letter and adapted to contemporary theologians. But reliance on Aquinas’ work did not always go hand in hand with fidelity to his teaching, as Suarez was brought to question the Thomist view on grace and its relation to human freedom in a famous controversy which opposed Jesuits to Dominicans. Following the Molinist line (after the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina) and hoping in that way to safeguard human free will, Suarez claims that what renders grace efficacious is not the divine gift itself, as Thomists maintain, but God’s foreknowledge that man will freely cooperate with this gift in certain circumstances. This view was widely adopted by Jesuits and became the prevalent non-Thomist position on the issue.
The period immediately following Sutirez witnesses the development of the Summa Commentary into a literary genre in its own right. The Cursus theologicus, composed by the Carmelites of Salamanca between 1631 and 1701, is a noteworthy example. This monumental commentary on Aquinas’ Summa was completed with the aim of forming a comprehensive corpus of sound theological teaching. The Salmanticenses’ treatment of Thomism, one which reflects not institutional affiliation but a systematic philosophical approach, is revealing of the status Thomism had acquired at this time as a coherent body of doctrine setting the standard for the solution to major philosophical and theological questions. It is on this platform that the nineteenth-century Church will resort to Thomist doctrine as the official Catholic response to modern philosophy. The founding charter of Neo-Thomism, Leo Xlll’s bull Aeternis patris (1879), thus inaugurates a new epoch in the history of Thomism, one unsuspected by medieval minds.