Francisco de Vitoria (1485-1546) was a Spanish theologian and philosopher known in the history of philosophy as a major figure in the revival of the study of Thomism in the sixteenth century. He used Thomism to formulate influential responses to the spiritual and political issues of his time, such as the Reformation, the nature of sovereignty and the notion of the sovereign state, imperial expansion, and the rights of conquered peoples. As a Counter-Reformation theologian, he asserted the goodness and rationality of man’s nature, which were manifested in his natural inclinations, irrespective of man’s reception of grace or spiritual status. His doctrine of natural inclinations had political consequences, and made him an opponent not only of Lutheranism but also of republicanism, as political authority - and particularly monarchy - was natural to man, not a result of his sinfulness, and its purpose was to enable man to fulfill his God-given human nature. The source of political authority was God, and God was therefore the source of human law, which men must see as binding in conscience. Yet, Vitoria contributed not only to the idea of a God-given mandate for the exercise of political power, but also to the idea of the limits of political power, as it must be constrained by the fulfillment of man’s humanity.
Francisco de Vitoria (1485-1546) was a Spanish theologian and philosopher who was a leading figure in the sixteenth-century revival of Thomism, a movement which was central to early modern ideas about natural law, individual rights, and the state. This revival of Thomism is associated most closely with the ‘‘School of Salamanca’’ or, the ‘‘Second Scholastic”, a group of Spanish theologians and jurists spanning two generations who wrote immensely influential works on moral and political philosophy. Vitoria is known as the ‘‘father’’ of this school, as nearly all of these scholars were either his students, or students of his students.
Vitoria was born around 1485. He entered the Dominican Order in Burgos in 1506. In 1509 he went to study in Paris at the College de Saint Jacques, where he eventually studied under the Thomist Peter Crockaert, who, in a pivotal move for the history of ideas, changed the set text in his lectures from Lombard’s Sentences to Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. Vitoria continued this tradition when he himself became a professor. Vitoria returned to Spain in 1523, and was elected Prime Chair of Theology at the University of Salamanca in 1526.
Vitoria published nothing of his own during his lifetime; what we have of his works are notes taken by his students during his lectures. Vitoria lectured on the Summa theologiae as well as on the Sentences, and he also gave several relectiones, which were longer and more formal lectures given at a certain time during the year on a particular academic problem. Since they have a distinct focus, these “relectiones” are, therefore, an especially good source for becoming familiar with Vitoria’s thought on a variety of different subjects.
Vitoria’s fame comes not because of his role in the revival of Thomism, but rather because of his role in employing Thomism to develop a political philosophy which was responsive to the challenges of sixteenth-century Europe, such as the notion of the sovereign state, the Reformation and the questions which it raised about the nature of the power of the church as well as the power of the state, and the conquest of America and imperial expansion. He is known in the history of political thought, perhaps most famously, for his writings on ‘‘international relations,’’ by which is meant his theory of the just war, the legitimation of the Spanish conquest of America, and his theory of the rights of the American Indians as the indigenous people of a conquered territory. His Thomist approach enabled him to formulate a theory of rights in which all human beings had rights because of their inborn rational nature, rights not dependent upon God’s grace or the righteousness of the individual. He could, therefore, assert that the Indians had rights over themselves and their property although they were non-Christians. Because much scholarly work on Vitoria has been done on his treatment of these subjects of human rights and imperial expansion (Fernandez-Santamaria 2005:58-59; Pagden and Lawrance 1991:xxxi-xxxii and 383-387; Tierney 1997:255-256), I will focus on his responses to other challenges of his time, specifically the sovereignty of the state and some of the theological and political problems posed by the Reformation. Addressing these issues will allow us to look at some of the more basic elements of his political thought, namely, his theory of natural law, natural inclinations, naturalness of the state, and the location of sovereignty. I regret that for reasons of space it will not be possible to treat his theory of the church in this article.
Vitoria’s most systematic treatment of political questions is the De potestate civili, which is one of his earliest relectiones, delivered in 1528. The political theory that Vitoria lays out here was formed in the shadow of two major rebellions: the comuneros revolt of 1521-1522 and the Peasants’ War of 1525. The first was republican in inspiration, the second, Catholics saw as a direct result of Lutheranism (Cargill Thompson 1984:99-100). Despite the differences between republicanism and Lutheranism, both led to what Vitoria perceived as disrespect for political authority. Neither saw the state as natural to man in his present condition, and therefore both portrayed political authority in a way that could lead to discontent and unrest.
Vitoria’s thinking on political issues throughout his career was of course not limited to countering republicanism and Lutheranism. However, these movements set the agenda for Vitoria in two ways. First, the fact that they ‘‘dissuade... simple men from due obedience to their princes...’’ was to make the preservation of the civil order a central theme in Vitoria’s political thought; anarchy was to be avoided through political obedience and a strong monarchy. Second, the way in which he tries to counter these issues in De potestate civili - by proving the necessity and legitimacy of political authority through showing that political society is the arrangement best suited to man because it fulfills his rational, human nature - sets the framework of his theory which was to endure throughout his work. I will first briefly set out some republican and Lutheran arguments and their political consequences, and then look at the way Vitoria used elements in his theory to directly or indirectly counter these arguments.
In 1520, the cities of Castile rebelled against Charles I in what is now known as the Comunero movement. Due to various grievances committed by the king, the members of these cities grouped together to form a body of representatives (procuradores) which saw itself as a parliamentary institution, which could convene itself and legislate without regard to the king’s will (Fernandez-Santamaria 1977:55). Although the movement was crushed by royal forces in 1522, the fundamental questions which it raised about the nature of sovereignty were kept alive through the publication of the Tractado de republica in 1521, written by Trinitarian friar Alonso de Castrillo, who was sympathetic to the movement (Fernandez-Santamaria 2005:292).
In his treatise, Castrillo had tried to discredit the idea of royal power, arguing that the political servitude which it represented was far from natural. According to Vitoria, the republican cause ‘‘denied that kingly power or any kind of rule by a single person comes from God’’ and affirmed ‘‘that all sovereigns, generals, and princes are tyrants and robbers of human liberty’’ (De potestate civili, 1.5, trans. in Pagden and Lawrance 1991). Instead, they argue that ‘‘man was born free,’’ since in the state of innocence ‘‘no man was master and no man was slave.’’ God has never decreed that men ‘‘should suffer the dominion of some other man who had violently arrogated sovereignty to himself,’’ which is the way in which they portray the relationship of a king to his subjects. The result of these arguments is that they ‘‘stir up sedition against our rulers.’’
In Vitoria’s view, Lutheranism, too, led to political disobedience, but for different reasons. Luther’s main political work, Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, appeared in March, 1523, and argued that there were limits to political authority, which should not be overstepped by the ruler. These limits were a result of Luther’s view of the purpose of government, which in turn resulted from his view of the nature of man. Man in his human nature is sinful and naturally inclined to act against the law which God has given to him; political authority, which is ordained of God, is founded solely to restrain these natural inclinations for evil and malice. Its purpose is to ‘‘punish the wicked and protect the just.’’ It is, therefore, a purely temporal authority; that is, it’s laws ‘‘extend no further than the body, goods and outward, earthly matters,’’ such as maintaining order and peace (Von Weltlicher Oberkeit, in Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority, ed. Hopfl). Thus, if secular rulers ‘‘command anything that is contrary to God’s word or which involves disobedience to God, they must not be obeyed (Cargill Thompson 1984:97).’’
Vitoria’s basis for refuting both ofthese positions is his view of the origin and purpose of political society and, therefore, of political authority. This, in turn, is founded on his theory of natural law and man’s natural inclinations, so I will turn to this aspect of his theory first.
Following Aquinas, Vitoria maintains that there are four varieties of law: eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law. Eternal law is God’s dictate of practical reason which governs all of his creation, and natural law is the participation of rational creatures in this summa ratio. It was accessible to man in two ways; the first way was through a set of‘‘first’’ principles self-evident (per se nota) to man’s understanding. Per se nota principles were known to man through a habit called synderesis. They consisted of principles such as ‘‘good is to be done and evil avoided’’ and ‘‘do unto others as you would have others do unto you,’’ and could be recognized as true by everyone. These were regarded among scholastics as implanted by God in man, and were proof of man’s inherent rationality and sense of justice, which could be developed through good education and experience.
The second way in which natural law was recognizable to man was through divinely implanted natural inclinations towards certain ends. Just as in speculative reasoning there are principles which are per se nota, so too there are principles which are per se nota in practical reasoning. Yet, the process by which these principles are known is different for each. In the case of practical reasoning, man knows the per se nota principles through natural inclinations which he has; these natural inclinations thus indicate the way in which God has ordered man to live, and therefore indicate precepts of the natural law. Vitoria explains: ‘‘if a thing is against natural inclination it is prohibited, if it is according to natural inclination it is a precept’’ (Comentario al tratado de la ley, trans. in Pagden and Lawrance 1991).
It was through his theory of natural inclinations that Vitoria was able to offer some of his strongest refutations of Luther - both of Luther’s concept of man, as well as of his concept of political society. Although Vitoria discusses his notion of natural inclinations in his commentary on qu. 94 of the Summa without mentioning theories which may be opposed to it, in his De homicidio he offers a sustained defense of natural inclinations, specifically directing his arguments against current ideologies in which ‘‘nature and grace, law and natural inclination’’ are opposed to one another (Relecciones, ed. Gatino, 3:26).
Vitoria recognizes here that there is a diverse group of scholars and theologians arguing for the opposition of man’s nature and the law of God: some are Aristotelians, who argue that although man by nature is inclined to seek what is good, the ‘‘good’’ which man naturally seeks is really the ‘‘pleasurable,’’ which is most often sinful and against the law of God; others note that man is naturally inclined against what is demanded by virtue and the law of God, such as the commandment to have charity toward others and love God more than himself, as man is naturally inclined to preserve himself before others. Still others show through Scripture that the natural inclination of man is to sin and seek out what is bad. Yet, the conclusion drawn through all these arguments is the Lutheran contention that ‘‘all the works of every human being are sinful,’ and man is able to do nothing good of himself without the grace of God.
Vitoria asserts that he cannot believe that ‘‘human nature, which an all powerful and most wise God formed in his image,’’ could have been created with bad inclinations and a depraved character, such that he would be inclined ‘‘to his own destruction and condemnation.’’ Rather, ‘‘the inclination of human nature is immediately from God Himself,’’ and it is therefore impossible for that inclination to be toward what is bad. God is the author of human nature, and Vitoria invokes Aristotle to explain how this authorship is to be understood: God created man with his particular form, by which is dictated man’s end, and whatever gives form, also determines the consequences of that form. Thus, only God can be the cause of human inclinations, which are toward the end which God has established for man.
If we say therefore, that ‘‘man is naturally inclined to the bad,’’ that inclination, along with the motions toward sin which follow from that inclination, must be imputed to God. Since God would not give a particular end to man, and a nature completely repugnant to it, Vitoria argues that nature inclines us only toward the good, and ‘‘thus everything that is contrary to natural inclination is bad.’’
Vitoria’s theory of the origin of the state - and therefore of civil power - follows directly from this notion of natural inclinations. Man is naturally inclined toward political society, first because he lacks certain physical qualities which would enable him to live alone; and second, man’s ‘‘rational soul itself makes man need partnership’’ (De potestate civili, 1.2). Both man’s reason and his will can only be perfected by interacting with others. So, God ‘‘was responsible for endowing men with the necessity and inclination which ensure that they cannot live except in partnership.’’ The city is the partnership which best fulfills these needs, and is therefore the most natural arrangement for men to establish. In this way, the city is God-given, since God has given man his form, and man’s form dictates that he live in partnership with others. Furthermore, since God made man ‘‘part of the republic,’’ he also gave man a natural inclination toward the social virtues, such as to love the common good more than his own proper good (De homocidio:31).
Vitoria uses this notion of political society fulfilling man’s God-given human nature as the foundation of his arguments for political obedience, and even (against the republicans) for the divine right of kings. First, since political society is God-given, and the city cannot exist without some ruling power, civil power is also God-given. Throughout his work, Vitoria cites many times the Pauline phrase ‘‘whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.’’
In order to counter republican arguments, it is essential to identify the location of this power. Vitoria attempts this in De potestate civili. He maintains that ‘‘first and per se’’ civil power resides in the commonwealth itself, for ‘‘there is no convincing reason why one man should have more power than another’’ (1.4). Thus, the commonwealth has this power as a whole body, and it has this power collectively “over the individual members of the commonwealth” (1.5).
However, it is impossible for the whole commonwealth to exercise this power over itself. It is therefore ‘‘necessary that the government and administration of affairs be entrusted to certain men who take upon themselves the responsibilities of the commonwealth and look
After the common good.....’’ Although republicans
Declare that there cannot be liberty in any system other than government ‘‘by the whole commonwealth,” Vitoria dismisses this idea, arguing that there is no more liberty in rule by the multitude than there is in a monarchy or aristocracy (1.8). Yet, Vitoria is interested in justifying royal power in particular. The establishment of rulers - indeed, of a king - does not represent political servitude; for, not only does the naturalness of political society show that the relationship between king and subject is not one of unnatural dominion, but also, the commonwealth, as possessor of civil power over itself, sets up its own sovereign to administer its affairs.
Initially, Vitoria held that even though sovereignty resides in the body of the people, the ruler does not have his power from the people: “sovereigns are set up by the commonwealth, [but] royal power derives immediately from God... therefore we must say about royal power exactly what we have asserted about the power of the commonwealth, namely that it is set up by God and by natural law’’ (1.5). Vitoria then used this idea of the divine right of kings to argue for political obedience. Because God is the source of political authority, he is also, therefore, the source of human law, for ‘‘a work of God is not only one which He performs Himself, but also one which He produces through intermediate causes’’ (3.1). For Vitoria, this means, contra Luther, that human laws are binding in conscience. It is incorrect to say that ‘‘secular power is solely temporal,’’ and therefore ‘‘has nothing to do with conscience.’’ Although he maintains a distinction between temporal and spiritual authority, Vitoria’s notion of man and the divine origins of the ruler’s power allows him to dismiss the limits which Luther had placed on secular power. Rather, Christ has decreed obedience to rulers, and their laws therefore are binding in conscience, just as divine laws are.
These ideas of the ruler’s power and his laws coming directly from God are conservative to be sure; the most likely explanation for them is Vitoria’s fear of anarchy and desire for political order. In Vitoria’s later writings, he seemed to drop the idea of the ruler’s power coming directly from God, and asserted instead that the ruler’s power came wholly from the people; however, he continued to maintain the importance of a strong monarchy, as well as the fact that human law was ordained of God and was therefore binding in conscience (Tierney 1997:294-295).
Yet, Vitoria’s conservative conclusions were based on Thomist principles of the rationality and goodness of man. These principles allowed him to set out two essential political doctrines. First, political power, although ordained of God, was separate from spiritual power - an idea that was to become crucial with the rise of the monarch as head of state and of church, as with Henry VIII. Second, the individual as political subject was a rational being who had certain natural inclinations, pointing toward his end as a human being. The fulfillment of these inclinations gave political power its purpose, but also its limitations. The agenda of political authority was written according to man’s God-given needs and rights, not according to his unworthiness, or the ruler’s desire for power. From these foundations, Vitoria would contribute to the idea of a just and limited secular power in a way that Lutheranism never could. Although his successors of the ‘‘second scholastic’’ were to come to different conclusions than Vitoria as they faced their own problems and fought their own ideological battles, they owed to him the beginnings of a crucial project to reinsert man’s inherent rationality and goodness into the heart of sixteenth-century political thought.
See also: > Natural Law > Natural Rights > Thomas Aquinas > Thomas Aquinas, Political Thought > Thomism
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