Introduction

The theory of the properties of terms is one of the important innovations of medieval semantics. It emerged in the twelfth century, and it developed until far into the fifteenth century. Even in the postmedieval period, interesting, though less creative, traces of this theory can be found. The medievals themselves did not consider the theory as something new. In their view it only explained what was implicit in Aristotle's logic. However, from our modern point of view, the theory is original.

The theory concerns the semantic properties of terms. It attempts to analyze the presuppositions of natural language, and deals with the meaning of a term mostly when it is used in a proposition. The theory is about what terms stand for, and their relation to other terms within a certain context.

The expression “properties of terms’’ reminds one of the properties of natural things. The medievals considered this an apt comparison. As they themselves often say, things are composed of form and matter, which constitute their substance. The most important component of a substance, such as a man, is the form, i. e., humanity. A substance possesses properties, for instance, a stone’s property moving downward. In the same way a term can be said to possess form and matter. The form of the term is the signification, for instance, ‘‘horse-ness’’ of ‘‘horse’’; its matter is its actual occurrence in, for instance, a proposition. In this proposition, a term having a signification stands for something. This is the property of supposition.

The form of a concrete individual thing is stable, but its matter can change. Likewise, the form of a term, its signification, is stable; that to what it stands for, can change. The things for which a term like ‘‘man'' stands in the proposition ‘‘a man runs'' are different from those to which the same term ‘‘man'' stands for in ‘‘some men were not running,'' of from that ‘‘man'' stands for in ‘‘man is a three letter word.’’ But some authors, such as Peter of Spain and Buridan, seem to claim that ‘‘man'' supposits for all men in any proposition, but propositions are verified by different quantities of men, according to the syncategoremata.

In medieval semantics the notion of signification is used in two ways: primarily for a kind of nucleus or what a term essentially means, secondarily for the things a term stands for. The ways in which a term, which already possesses the primary kind of signification, stands for other things (be they material things or concepts), vary. The things denoted may be, and often are, things in the outside world, such as an individual man or horse, but they may also be things in the mind, for instance, the concept of ‘‘man'' or that of ‘‘horse,'' or even the terms ‘‘man'' or ‘‘horse'' themselves in their material occurrence, for instance ‘‘man'' in ‘‘man is a noun'' or in ‘‘man has three letters.''