Philosophers Against Theologians

The conflict between the theologians and the philosophers in Islam is usually presented in terms of the theologians being the aggressors (and typically also anti-rational dogmatists), while the philosophers on this telling of the story get to act the part of innocent defenders of reasonable and peaceful coexistence. In light of these Enlightenment historiographical prejudices it is worth noting how in the historical materials, it is the philosophers who early on settle on a polemical invective against the professional theologians, without any recorded provocation on the part of the latter. From al-Kindl to Avicenna, and from al-FarabI to twelfth-century Andalusia, nary a philosopher can be found who would have a kind word to say either about kalam or about its practitioners.

Al-Kindl initiates this trend with a volley against those who would ‘‘peddle in religion even as they lack religion’’ (On First Philosophy, 1:104.5 Abu Rida). The tone is apologetic in the extreme: al-Kindii presents the philosophical project as being identical with the aims of Islam, though not impinging on it in any way - both aim at understanding the transcendent Truth and in acting in accordance with that Truth - while his unnamed opponents are strangers to the truth (garba ‘an al-haqq), in thrall to their vices, and intent upon seizing power. Al-Kindii laments how in his time such wretched people can nonetheless be renowned for their speculative acumen (nazar): one or another theological party is meant, though more than this it is difficult to say.

Al-FarabI expanded this polemic through establishing a general theory of religions - one that, moreover, set religion into a subordinate relation to philosophy. According to al-FarabI, any veridical religion presents the essential findings of philosophy in more palatable form, in the shape of likenesses and images which faithfully represent - though they do not adequately capture - the true natures or realities of things (h aqa’iq al-ashya’, a formulation already found in al-Kindl). Assent to religious propositions, moreover, is achieved through rhetorical or poetic persuasion, not by means of demonstration or dialectic: the latter mode of reasoning lies beyond the ken of those who cannot adequately comprehend the nature of scientific premises, that is, the multitude (al-jumhur, al-amma: Attainment of Happiness, 90 Yasin).

What this means is that neither the raw notions nor the reasonings presented by religion correspond to reality in any straightforward manner: at best they are simulacra, or likenesses, designed by a teacher to guide people to believe and behave in accordance with a higher truth which they are unable to perceive clearly for themselves (see Mahdi 1972).

The picture al-FarabI paints of religion is perhaps unflattering, but there is no reason to doubt that he meant it as an enthusiastic, even uplifting, endorsement of how God, providential nature, and the prophets work in concert to secure the maximal degree of happiness for all humankind. An unsettling corollary to al-Farabl’s theory, however, is that it makes of the kalam theologians a profession without a proper function. The true structure of reality is worked out by the philosophers, after all, while the transmission and safekeeping of the symbols of faith is the province of the religious authorities; but as the latter base themselves on rhetoric and poetics, dialectic no longer has any place in any well-functioning society. On this understanding, the theologians can only be meddlers (or worse, rank amateurs), building sandcastles on contentious premises. Thus we find Ibn Sina (the Latin Avicenna, 980-1037), for instance, situating kalam reasoning on a line that stretches from dialectic to rank sophistry (Gutas 2005; cf Marmura 1991-1992); while Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126-1198) expends considerable energy on pointing out the precise ways in which the theologians, especially the Ash'arites, had gone astray in their attempts at legitimate inference - where they had wrongly tried to pass off dialectical, rhetorical, or sophistic arguments as being certain and irrefutable. Averroes even blames the rise in sectarianism on the theologians trying their hand at something they were not equipped to do (Kashf, 251 Qasim; cp. Farabi, Attainment, 50 Ytisln).

Averroes’ efforts, however, belong to a different era, one in which the quality of the philosophers’ own inferences had been called into question. His attempts at reversing the flow of the discussion were unsuccessful as, following upon al-(Gazall’s (1058-1111) incisive analysis of the Peripatetic philosophers’ premises, few people were willing to accept at face value anymore their claims to demonstrable truth in matters metaphysical. This did not result in any lessening of the influence of philosophy on theology, indeed, the opposite is the case; it is to this paradoxical development that we turn next.