The deductive theologian, as explained above, had reason to pursue philosophy in the strongest possible way: he aimed at gaining certainty. Even if his subject matter could deliver only probable conclusions, he aimed at the highest type of probability. His greatest helper, then, was metaphysics. If he wanted to deduce further certain truths from a faith premise that was certain, such as an article of the Creed, then he needed either another certain faith premise or a metaphysical premise. If he wanted to demonstrate by reason some truth about God and his attributes, then he was actually doing metaphysics. Ockham, in his role as a deductive theologian, also was a metaphysician. This is evident in his defense of the univocal concept of being as providing the necessary common ground for arguments concerning the existence of God and the divine attributes. Ockham denies any univocal reality between God and creatures, but he admits a univocal concept that is a common concept, not a proper one which would include the differences of ‘‘infinite’’ and ‘‘finite’’ that distinguish God from creatures. Often he is accused of nominalism, but certainly he is not a nominalist in the sense of Hobbes’ non-spiritual nominalism. Ockham denies that there are universal essences or realities, but he does admit that there are universal concepts in the mind, so he might justly be labeled a conceptualist. He is, nonetheless, not an idealistic conceptualist like Kant, where universality comes from the mind and the way it organizes. Ockham’s concepts have their source in the objects. Men are essentially alike, even though they do not have, according to Ockham, a further common human likeness in them beyond their actually being men. He might more accurately be called a realistic conceptualist.
World History
