It was not clear that Ockham had considered all possible realist positions. Even if he had done so, as some commentators have argued, many of Ockham’s arguments failed to show any contradiction or outright falsehood. At best these arguments showed that some forms of realism had some unexpected consequences (see, e. g., Adams 1987, vol. 1:31-38).
Walter Burley agreed with Ockham that the only distinction that can hold between two created things is a real distinction. Hence, universals are really distinct from particulars. Burley also asserted that the whole universal exists in each of its particulars, but that this does not imply that the universal is numerically multiplied by its existence in numerically distinct particulars (Adams 1982:422-423). Ockham thought that the latter thesis implied that the universal that is in particulars is numerically one. But how can one thing exist in many numerically distinct individuals without being divided into many? Furthermore, if all of human were in Adam, then if Adam were annihilated (i. e., every part of Adam utterly ceased to exist), human also would be annihilated. But Burley never claimed that the universal that is in the particulars is itself numerically one, he merely denied that it was numerically many. Moreover, he replied, no particular has anything but particulars for its parts. Accordingly, human is not a ‘‘part’’ of Adam, and the annihilation of Adam would not entail the annihilation of human (Tractatus de universalibus, pp. 32-36; cf. Adams 1982:424-426).
Many realists considered Burley’s position to be too ‘‘extravagant.’’ For one thing, Burley seemed to be multiplying entities at an alarming rate. For example, Burley thought that there was both an individual form, which is a part of the individual, and a universal form. But what is the relation between the individual form and the universal (see Boh in Gracia 1994:351-356)? Moreover, to many, Burley appeared to be flirting with Platonism (Conti 2008:386). If the universal is really distinct from particulars, then it seems possible that God could create a universal that exists separately from all particulars.
A number of later realists reacted to Burley’s extravagance by returning either to a broadly Thomist position or to a broadly Scotist position (Conti 2008:386-403). Dominicans such as Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate insisted that universal forms have no being outside of the being of their individual instances, and that real identity comes in degrees. The limit case of real identity is being ‘‘convertibly,’’ or entirely, the same. A universal and one of its individuals is really identical, but not entirely identical (Conti 2008:387-388). Wyclif and the so-called Oxford realists defended the view that the universal is formally, and not really distinct from the particular (see, e. g., Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus cap. 4, p. 87).
See also: > Boethius > Categories > Essence and Existence
> Ibn Sina, Abti ‘All (Avicenna) > John Duns Scotus
> Mereology > Metaphysics > Peter Abelard > Platonism
> Thomas Aquinas > Walter Burley > William of Champeaux > William of Ockham
World History
