Fatimids

An Arab dynasty that ruled Egypt from 969 to 1171. The Fatimids belonged to the Isma‘ili branch of Shi‘ite Islam, which recognized the descendants of Hasan and Husayn, the two sons of Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima and ‘All, the fourth caliph, as the legitimate rulers of the Muslim community. By the mid-ninth century, the Isma‘ilis were engaged in subversive and revolutionary activities against the ‘Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. In 909, the establishment of a Fatimid state in Tunisia caused a rupture in the Isma‘ili movement, when the Carmathians of Bahrayn opposed the Fatimid claim to be the imams, that is, divinely chosen and rightly guided rulers of Islam.

The Fatimids ruled Tunisia and Sicily until 973, when they transferred their state to Egypt, following the conquest of that country by their general Jawhar in 969. The North African phase of the Fatimid state was marked by the establishment of two new capital cities: Mahdia (mod. al-Mahdiyya, Tunisia), built in 916-921, and al-Sabra or al-Mansuriyya (near mod. Kairouan, Tunisia), begun in 946, and occupied until 1053. Mahdia was erected on a peninsula on the coast of Tunisia and marked the Fatimid state’s Mediterranean orientation, both with its deep involvement in trade with Muslim Spain, Italy (especially Amalfi), and Byzantium, and with its naval activities against them. The Fatimids also maintained a network of commercial relations with sub-Saharan Africa, where they procured gold and black slaves.

The Fatimid efforts to conquer Egypt were inspired not only by their difficulties in ruling North Africa (exemplified by the rebellion of Abu Yazid in 944-947, which posed a serious challenge to the Fatimid rule) but mainly by their desire to reach Baghdad and supplant the ‘Abbasid caliphs. The conquest of Egypt in 969 was achieved after some initial failures, and the Near Eastern phase in the history of the Fatimid state began. Immediately after the conquest of Egypt, the Fatimids invaded Palestine and Syria, but their dream of reaching Baghdad never materialized and their always precarious hold over Damascus and Palestine collapsed in the second half of the eleventh century with the arrival of the Turkish Saljuqs.

The impact of Fatimid rule on Egypt was manifold and outlived the Fatimids in two areas. The establishment of Cairo proved to be a great success. The town became the seat of the Fatimid rulers, a religious and cultural center and magnet for local and foreign merchants. During Fatimid rule in Egypt, a commercial network that connected India and the Mediterranean emerged, and it lasted well into the late Middle Ages, declining only during the Ottoman period. The trade of Egypt flourished, with merchants from the Muslim areas of the Mediterranean (Spain, North Africa, and Sicily), Italy, and Byzantium visiting Alexandria and Cairo in pursuit of spices and goods from India and the East Indies.

The majority of the Egyptian population were Sunni Muslims, with minorities of Christians and Jews. The number of Shi‘ites was small. The Fatimid regime depended largely on its control of the army, which was mostly made up of non-Egyptian elements. Although the Fatimid caliph was nominally the head of state, from the second half of the eleventh century the actual control of government was usually in the hands of a vizier. The Fatimids used missionaries outside the empire to spread Shi‘ite doctrines, especially among the urban populations of Saljuq-controlled Syria, but there was no attempt to spread Shi‘ism within Egypt, as this would have aroused antagonism within the majority Sunni population.

The Fatimids misunderstood the intentions of the First Crusade (1096-1099) and initially tried to form an alliance with the crusaders for cooperation against the Saljuqs, who supported the rival ‘Abbasid caliphate. As it was the Saljuq territories that came under attack first, the Fatimids were able to take the opportunity to seize the city of Jerusalem from Saljuq control (June 1099). However, they were slow to recognize that Jerusalem itself was the main goal of the crusade, and their relieving army arrived too late to prevent the fall of the city to the crusaders (15 July 1099). The Fatimid army that camped around Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel) suffered a humiliating defeat by the crusaders at the battle of Ascalon (12 August 1099), allowing the crusaders to consolidate the territorial achievements up to that point. During the first decade of the twelfth century, the Fatimids lost the towns of Arsuf, Haifa, Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli to the Franks of Jerusalem and Tripoli. The Fatimid land and

The Fatimid Caliphate in 1099

Naval efforts were uncoordinated and their armies hesitant and unable to mount a serious military challenge to the Franks. The fall of Tyre (mod. Sour, Lebanon) in 1124 came about as the result of lack of cooperation between the Fatimids and the rulers of Damascus, while a contributory factor to the fall of Ascalon in 1153 was a coup that took place in Cairo while the Franks were besieging the town.

An examination of the battles that took place between the Fatimids and the Franks shows that the Fatimids failed militarily because their army collapsed in crucial battles fought in Palestine (1099, 1105, and 1123), due to a lack of cooperation between the cavalry and the infantry. This reflected a sociomilitary problem deriving from the inherent weakness of Muslim multi-ethnic armies. Traditionally, the Fatimid army was a multi-ethnic force dominated by a very large component of black slave infantry with a much smaller, but ethnically diverse, cavalry element. In the mid-eleventh century, the strength of the Fatimid army was probably over 100,000 soldiers, but the numbers dwindled from that point, and during the 1060s, the army consisted of only 40,000 African infantry and over 10,000 cavalry. The Fatimid multiethnic army was very difficult to handle on the battlefield, since such a heterogeneous force was ridden with ethnic animosities, exacerbated by the different status of freeborn troops and military slaves (Arab. mamluks).

On three occasions (at Ramla in 1105, Ibelin in 1123, and Ascalon in 1153), the navy performed better than the army, but the navy on its own, without the support of the army, achieved nothing. The small Fatimid navy was vastly outnumbered by the European fleets that operated in the eastern Mediterranean in support of the crusades, and its ability to ship supplies and reinforcements was limited. For this reason the Fatimids were very hesitant about committing their navy to the support of coastal towns that were besieged by the Franks and large European naval forces, as happened at Acre in 1104, Tripoli in 1109, and Tyre in 1124. In any case, naval battles were quite rare events, and only in the summer of 1123, off the south Palestinian coast, was the Fatimid navy involved in a disastrous naval battle with a Venetian fleet. Naval raids were more common, but the shipping lanes used by the European fleets on their way to the Levant were beyond the range of Fatimid warships operating from the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Damietta. The Fatimid naval failure was a result of European naval superiority combined with geographical and naval factors characteristic of the eastern Mediterranean.

During the 1160s, the Fatimids became entangled in the conflict between Nur al-Din, the ruler of Muslim Syria, and the Franks. Shawar, an ousted Fatimid vizier, managed to involve both Nur al-Din and the king of Jerusalem in the internal affairs of the Fatimid state. Each power coveted Egypt and was ready to do anything to prevent its rival from gaining control of Egypt. Politically the Fatimid state was weak and divided, and the Fatimid army was not a match either for the Franks or the forces of Nur al-Din. In economic terms, Egypt was a valuable prize with its rich agricultural output and flourishing long-distance international trade. The Franks were well informed about Egypt’s agricultural potential, and are known to have possessed a list of Egyptian villages and the incomes derived from them. The participation of Italian maritime republics in the crusades also posed a serious dilemma for the Fatimids, since the Italians stimulated trade with India because of their demand for spices and their presence in Egypt was crucial to maintain the momentum of this trade. Egypt was also dependent on its Mediterranean partners for supplies of timber, iron, and pitch. The Fatimids, like Saladin later on, continued to maintain commercial relations with the Europeans and allowed the presence of Italian and Byzantine merchants in their ports in spite of the wars of the crusades.

Between 1164 and 1171, the armies of Nur al-Din and the kingdom of Jerusalem fought their wars on Egyptian soil with the Fatimids being unable to influence the course of events. Eventually, the Franks withdrew from Egypt, and Egypt came under the control of Nur al-Din’s general Shirkuh. On Shirkuh’s death his nephew Saladin succeded him as vizier. The Fatimid regime had failed to strike deep roots among the Muslim population of the country during the two centuries of its rule in Egypt, and it was overthrown by Saladin with ease. He broke up the Fatimid army and on the death of the caliph al-‘Adid (1171) recognized the religious authority of the ‘Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, which effectively ended Fatimid rule. From the Franks’ point of view, the rise of Sal-adin meant a change for the worst and, under Saladin’s rule, Egypt became fully integrated in the Muslim wars against the Franks; the Fatimids had lacked any real zeal or motivation in their military efforts against the kingdom of Jerusalem.

-Yaacov Lev

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