Constantine VIII to Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1025-81)

When Basil II died in 1025 the Byzantine Empire’s frontiers extended from the Danube to the Euphrates. Byzantium’s only serious rivals were the Fatimids and Ottonians. But within fifty years Byzantium had collapsed. Michael Psellos, a contemporary, suggested that the incompetence of the emperors who followed Basil II precipitated decline. They frittered away the financial reserves on self-promoting building projects; they left the frontiers unprotected. More modern explanations include economic collapse, conflict between rival civilian and military aristocracies, hostility between descendants of families involved in the tenth-century civil wars, disloyal overseas mercenaries, the disappearance of the theme armies, and ethnic tension between Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians and subject populations: Slavs in Bulgaria, Lombards in southern Italy, and Armenians and Syrians in the east (Vryonis 1959; Svoronos 1966; Cheynet 1990:38-90,337-58). More recently Basil II has been blamed for overstretching imperial resources by creating an army that was too expensive to maintain and a frontier too extensive to defend (Angold 1997: 24-34).

The most obvious manifestation of political instability after Basil’s death was the very rapid turnover in imperial rulers: Constantine VIII (1025-8), Romanos III Argyros (1028-34), Michael IV (1034-41), Michael V (1041-2), Zoe and Theodora (1042), Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-55), Theodora (1055-6), Michael VI (1056-7), Isaac Komnenos (1057-9), Constantine X Doukas (1059-67), Romanos IV Diogenes (1068-71), Michael VII Doukas (1071-8), and Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-81). Few of these imperial rulers could claim deep-seated legitimacy. From Romanos III to Constantine IX emperors held imperial office primarily because of their connection by marriage or adoption with empress Zoe, daughter of Constantine VIIL When Theodora, the last Macedonian, died in 1056, no family succeeded in establishing a viable imperial dynasty until 1081. Only Constantine IX reigned for more than ten years, and even he was forced to deal with two military coups, by George Maniakes (1043) and Leo Tornikios (1047). Eight other emperors were deposed. One of the principal agents in the deposition of Michael V was the Constantinopolitan crowd. As the city of Constantinople expanded in size so the ‘mob’ became an important, unpredictable actor in times of crisis. One particularly important intervention occurred during conflict between Latin and Greek churches in 1054. When the patriarch, Michael Kerularios, was excommunicated by the papal legate, he fomented an anti-Latin riot which destroyed the emperor Constantine IX’s efforts to build an alliance between Byzantium and the papacy (Ostrogorsky 1968:316-50; Angold 1997: 56-80; Treadgold 1997: 583-611).

Yet, while the reigns of individual emperors were often short and tumultuous, in other respects Byzantium initially remained robust. The economy boomed. At many urban sites new domestic dwellings and monasteries were constructed, deserted churches reused, and small industrial sites established. In Cappadocia the excavation and decoration of rock-cut churches continued apace. The incidence of stray copper coins, evidence of everyday economic exchange, is strong throughout the eleventh century. Minor debasements in the middle of the century are no longer thought to reflect economic collapse but instead measures taken during a period of inadequate metal supply to sustain a booming economy (Morrisson 1976:13-20; Rodley 1985; Harvey 1989). Territorially too Byzantium continued to expand. Edessa was annexed in 1032 and Ani in 1042. Of course not all ‘foreign policy’ initiatives were successes. An invasion of northern Syria in 1030 and a naval expedition against Egypt in 1033 were disasters. Yet neither failure precipitated a revived Muslim threat (Felix 1981: 82-104,142-6,154-60). A deterioration in relations between Kiev and Byzantium which led to an ‘out-of-the-blue’ attack by a Rus fleet in 1043 was soon rectified by a marriage alliance (Shepard and Franklin 1996: 215-17). Incursions by the Seljuk Turks into Armenia and a Norman-assisted uprising in southern Italy were, at first, successfully contained. And while Pecheneg nomads intermittently attacked the northern Balkans, their aggression was defused by tactics reminiscent of the De Administrando; the Pechenegs were bribed with titles, tribute, and opportunities to trade with fortified entrepots on the Lower Danube. Later they were encouraged to settle on the plains north of the Haimos mountains and to become soldiers (Stephenson 2000: 80-93). In their mid-century dealings with the Pechenegs the Byzantines tried to consolidate imperial power in peripheral zones of the empire by absorbing neighbouring peoples, a strategy first developed on the tenth-century eastern frontier when Armenian and Syrian immigrants had been used to repopulate conquered areas (Dagron 1976).

Signs of a deterioration in this relatively favourable situation first appear in the late 1050s. At this point attacks became more common on three separate frontiers: from Seljuk Turks in the east, from Normans in the west, and from nomads in the north. Melitene (1058), Sebasteia (1059), and Caesarea (1067) were sacked by the Seljuks; in 1064 Ani was occupied. In 1059 the Norman Robert Guiscard was recognized by the pope as Duke of Apulia; the following year he seized Reggio, Otranto, and Brindisi. In 1065 the Oghuz Turks ravaged the northern Balkans. The year 1071 represented a double blow: the Normans seized Bari, Byzantium’s principal stronghold in Italy; meanwhile the main imperial field army was defeated at Manzikert in Armenia by the Seljuks. The emperor, Romanos IV, was temporarily taken prisoner. One reason why the empire’s strategic position began to deteriorate was because it was difficult for the imperial field armies, accustomed to offensive campaigns, suddenly to conduct defensive operations on several frontiers at once against invaders not easily defeated in single set-piece battles. The Turkomans, Normans, and nomads usually came in small groups rather than mass armies; they came as not just raiders but as permanent settlers. Temporary victory or defeat in battle was of little import to them. Yet, while these adversaries certainly presented the Byzantines with new problems, they only became truly dangerous when a vacuum opened up at the empire’s centre. During the coup of Isaac Komnenos in 1057 and the Doukas-sponsored rebellion which followed the capture of Romanos IV in 1071, the main Byzantine armies were withdrawn from the frontiers, creating opportunities for invasions. More significantly, armies involved in the internal conflict employed the invaders as mercenaries, thus accelerating the rate of migration. Byzantium collapsed because too many senior political figures were more interested in acquiring personal power in Constantinople than in uniting to protect the empire (Ostrogorsky 1968: 341-50; Cheynet 1990: 337-57; Angold 1997: 35-55; Treadgold 1997:598-611; Stephenson 2000: 93-100,135-44: Magdalino 2002b: 182-90; Haldon 2003).