According to a military manual of c.1400 the Mamluks still customarily drew up in the old al-khamis, or ‘five’ formation, so-called from the army’s deployment in 5 divisions comprising centre, left flank, right flank, vanguard and rearguard. They preferred to draw up with their backs protected by a river or high ground, otherwise digging ditches or establishing ambushes to defend their rear. The army commander would also try to get the sun and wind behind him, particularly important in the Middle East where the wind whipping up clouds of sand or dust into soldiers’ faces could be a severe tactical disadvantage; if the wind should turn out to be blowing against their own army, the Mamluks apparently favoured dismounting their cavalry to fight on foot rather than have them disordered by their horses becoming unmanageable. The cavalry of the vanguard were selected from those ‘outstanding for strength and courage, conquering spirit and experience in war’. They might be subdivided into centre, left and right, the latter often being referred to as ‘the 2 advance guards’ or ‘the 2 wings’, and all 3 bodies might even be further subdivided so that the whole vanguard might actually comprise 9 individual squadrons {karadis). The centre, where the army standards and commander were invariably stationed, might be similarly subdivided. The Mamluks favoured fighting in line (the ‘closed formation’ praised by Ibn Khaldun), otherwise usually drawing up in crescent formation with their wings either thrown forward (hilali) or drawn back (mujannah). Circular {kurah), rectangular imurabba) and wedge-shaped {mustatil) battle formations are also recorded.
Ambushes remained an important Moslem tactic as in earlier times. An early-14th century Damascene military manual by Mohammed ibn Isa states that units placed in ambush could, indeed should, comprise a third or even two-thirds of the army’s strength. They should not be positioned more than 1V4 miles from the main army, and should be divided up into 3, positioned one each to the left and right of the enemy with the third troop, drawn up behind the main army, responsible for reinforcing and supporting the 2 advance ambush units. It was recommended that only one of the ambush units should reveal itself initially: ‘if the enemy sees them to be few in number they will seek [to attack] them and when the Moslem force is routed will give chase, and then the second group will break out upon them. . . Once they have gained their objective they should return straightway to their positions.’ The manuals recommend that a routed enemy should be pursued only with caution in case it should prove to be a feigned flight. Only the flanks should pursue, while the main body should advance at a steady pace, and the flanks should never pursue beyond sight of it.
Military manuals also provide details of the role of infantry in battle, though they are rarely encountered in the chronicles. If the army was caught unprepared the infantry were expected to hold the enemy back until their own cavalry were mounted and drawn up. This they did by forming line and going down on one knee with their shields to the fore and spears held out ‘from the upper part of the chest’; their archers were meanwhile to shoot into the enemy’s faces. That infantry were actually employed in this role is confirmed by al-Maqrizi, who reports of a battle in 1354 that ‘the infantry stood in front of the cavalry with large shields to intercept the missiles. The cavalry stood behind them in safety with their weapons ready.’
Artillery was not employed on the battlefield until the very last days of the Mamluk era. Though Qansuh al-Ghawri, during the Ottoman invasion of 1516, left the largest part, if not all, of his artillery in Aleppo before marching out to defeat at Marj Dabiq, his successor Tuman Bey actually deployed his guns in prepared, entrenched positions for the Battle of al-Raydaniya in 1517. However, these were heavy, unmanoeuvrable guns that proved of little consequence against a highly mobile foe. Experiments aimed at increasing the mobility of his firepower, by putting arquebusiers and light guns in ox-drawn wagons called ajalat min khashab and by mounting heavy arquebuses on camel’s humps, proved similarly ineffective, even though as many as 100 wagons mounting copper cannon were included in the army that marched to al-Raydaniya.
World History
