Richard Brinkley’s theory of the proposition is a case of ‘‘propositional realism’’ in the sense that the author of the Summa acknowledges specific significates for propositions, which are not reducible to the significates of the constituent parts of the propositions (Cesalli 2007:241309). Contrary to Burley and Wyclif who speak of propositions which are not signs but significates (propositio in re for the former, propositio realis for the latter), Brinkley only uses the term propositio for complexes of signs (written, spoken, and mental). The principle of semantic subordination (see above, point 2) holds for propositions as it does for their constituents: every non-mental proposition is a sign in virtue of a mental proposition (De propositione in genere, §54). But this does not mean that a non-mental proposition signifies a mental proposition (rather, as we shall see, every proposition, mental or not, has a significate, which is not a proposition). In spite of subordination, the three types of propositions are functionally equivalent: any proposition, be it mental or not, is the vehicle of a complex cognitive content (ibid., §49). When addressing the question of the formation of a mental proposition, Brinkley insists, that when the intellect produces a mental proposition, it does not combine concepts, but it exerts its combining and dividing activity on the very things of which concepts are natural signs (ibid., §48). Brinkley answers the question of the nature of the propositional significates as follows:
For Brinkley, then, the propositional significate is something like an ordained complex of things. In his tract on the significate of the proposition, Brinkley extensively criticizes the opinions of Richard Billingham (modus rei), William Birmingham (compositio mentis), and Richard Ferrybridge (the propositional significate is nothing be the significate of its subject term, ibid.:52-99). At the beginning of his tract on sentential reference, Brinkley announces that he will address the question whether the ‘‘truth of a proposition arises from its significates as from its cause’’ (‘‘si ex illo <significato> tamquam ex causa in propositione veritas oriatur’’ ibid.:34). Although this point is not discussed as such in the Summa, the element of response that can be gathered converges toward a positive answer to that question: the ordained complex of things - one would want to say, the state of affairs - signified by a proposition is also its truth-maker (Cesalli 2007: 297-299).
See also: > John Wyclif > Logic > Obligations Logic
> Supposition Theory > Truth, Theories of
Walter Burley > William of Ockham
World History
