Tabt‘a, ‘‘nature,’’ was a widely used technical term in Arabic. Maimonides knew of several different meanings that were assigned to it, and he recognized the need to be clear in which sense one employs the term in any given discussion. In his Medical Aphorisms VI, 94, he employs the formulaic declaration that tabl‘a is an equivocal term (ism mushtarak) possessing several meanings. One of these, the one most relevant to medicine, is ‘‘the faculty which governs the body of living beings... This faculty always spares the most eminent activities of the body and always strives to maintain the integrity of all [its] activities” (trans. Bos, 20).
There is no concentrated discussion on the various usages of tabt‘a in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, but the term is often employed and defined in different ways. The most important of these, indeed one of the bedrocks of Maimonides’ religious philosophy, is this: nature is the fixed mode of operation by which the cosmos functions, a set and unchanging protocol that forces things to move in a certain fashion. We shall shortly elaborate upon and illustrate this concept. Nonetheless, Maimonides takes care on occasion to alert the reader that he is using the term in a different sense. Indeed, in some cases, confusion is almost inevitable. For example, in Guide II, 4, Maimonides takes up the knotty and delicate issue of the principle or source of the celestial motions. This cannot be a ‘‘nature’’; in a kinematic context, that term applies specifically to the upward motion of the light elements and the downward motion of the heavy ones. Both classes of body move only insofar as it is necessary to regain their ‘‘place,’’ where they come to rest. The celestial bodies possess a circular motion, and, therefore, the principle of this motion cannot be ‘‘nature.’’ Is the principle then a soul? Ensouled bodies move only ‘‘because of a certain nature or because of a mental representation.’’ Here ‘‘nature’’ must have a different meaning than the one assigned to it previously. Maimonides duly elaborates, ‘‘I mean here by the expression ‘nature,’ the seeking to attain what agrees with one and the flight from what disagrees.’’
A fixed and permanent nature, or natural order, is basic to Maimonides’ worldview. This is the half of Aristotle’s worldview that conforms to his own: ‘‘We agree with Aristotle with regard to one half of his opinion and we believe that what exists is eternal a parte post and will last forever with that nature which He, may He be exalted, has willed’’ (II, 29; trans. 346). The natural order as such is blind and unthinking; the intentionality or purposefulness that is evident in the natural order must come from some other principle. The purposes of the natural bodies are interconnected; for example, plants exist for the sake of animals. Aristotle recognized an intellectual or divine principle. For Maimonides, this ‘‘principle’’ standing above nature is surely the God of Jewish tradition. (This, by the way, is a clear indication that
Maimonides does not subscribe to the notion of deus sive natura.) More precisely, according to Aristotle, the ‘‘craftsmanlike governance proceeds from an intellectual principle” but, ‘‘according to us,’’ it is the act of an intelligent being (III, 19; trans. 479).
But there is more: Maimonides insists that the combination of the two ideas - the teloi, or ‘‘final purposes’’ for which natural things exist, and the inflexible and permanent nature of the components of the universe that possess these teloi - leads inevitably to the belief in creation. Otherwise, how can one explain the existence of a set of bodies, all uncreated, yet well-ordered in a system in which the one exists for the sake of the other? In Maimonides’ words: ‘‘Know that the existence of this final end in natural things has of necessity led to a belief in a principle other than nature... Know too that to the mind of an equitable man, one of the strongest proofs for the production of the world in time is the fact, demonstrated with reference to natural beings, that every one of these has a certain final end, some of them existing for the sake of others; for this is a proof of purpose on the part of a being possessing purpose. And purpose can only be conceived with reference to the production in time of something so produced.’’ (III, 13; trans. 449; see also the beginning of II, 19).
By extension, ‘‘nature’’ refers to any fixed and unalterable rule, and it can be applied to entities that, strictly speaking do not belong to the world of nature. In the passage to be cited presently, the ‘‘flow’’ of intellect from one individual to another is compared to the overflow of water from one vessel to another. Maimonides is there developing his theory of prophecy, and he is eager to emphasize that the phenomenon is essentially ‘‘natural’’; in line with this, he speaks of the ‘‘nature of the intellect.’’ Maimonides writes, ‘‘But the nature of that intellect is such that it always overflows and is transmitted from one who receives it after him until reaches an individual beyond whom this overflow cannot go and whom it merely renders perfect...’’ (II, 37; trans., 375). Even the nonexistent (because it is impossible for it to exist) has a ‘‘nature,’’ meaning here that its status cannot be changed. ‘‘The impossible has a stable nature, one whose stability is constant and is not made by a maker; it is impossible to change it in any way’’ (Guide III, 15; trans. 459). This statement is an important principle for Maimonides.
Human nature, or what we may call the natural inclination of most people to look at things in a certain way, figures as well in Maimonides’ thought. Biological ‘‘nature’’ is fixed too, but in a weaker sense. In line with the general thinking of the period, biological characteristics are true statistically (to use an anachronism) rather than absolutely; in the scientific idiom of the period, they are akthariyy, ‘‘mostly usually so.’’ We must distinguish here between societies and individuals. With regard to the former (because they are statistical), Maimonides is more open to stating rules. For example, certain opinions can be revealed only in the form of parables because ‘‘it is not within the nature of the common multitude that its capacity should suffice for apprehending that subject matter as it is’’ (III, 27; trans. 510). Understandings of this sort are part of the raison d’etre for writing the Guide.
Concerning the individual, on the other hand, Maimonides is much more circumspect. Committed as he is to the freedom of the will, he must carefully define just what human functions are determined by ‘‘nature.’’ The lengthy final chapter of his Eight Chapters focuses upon the problem of the fitra, the inborn human nature. Human nature (tab‘) cannot predetermine any ethical or intellectual quality or even profession. However, it does mold significantly character traits concerning which the Jewish tradition pronounces a moral judgment. A person endowed with coarse natures (here in the sense of the four humors) will have great difficulty in her studies. These and other traits, however, can be overcome, to some degree, but only with great difficulty.
World History
