THE DANIILOVICH ASCENSION

During the century following the Mongol invasion of the Rus' lands, the Mongol khans and Riurikid princes stabilized their relations. The Riurikid princes acknowledged Golden Horde suzerainty. They paid tribute to the khans, supplemented those payments with gifts to Horde notables, and participated in Mongol military campaigns. The khans issued patents confirming each prince’s right to rule. When the occasion demanded, they intervened diplomatically or militarily in interprincely disputes. Despite the devastation caused by their invasion and subsequent military expeditions and despite the loss of capital occasioned by tribute payments, those Mongol demands for tribute coupled with the Rus' involvement through the Horde in the vast Mongol commercial network provided an economic stimulus for the Rus'. The Rus' principalities gradually recovered.

Mongol participation in both the political and economic activity of the Rus' lands slowly altered Rus' political institutions and patterns. Initially the Mongol khans issued patents to princes who, according to dynastic traditions, were also the legitimate heirs to their thrones, including, most significantly, the throne of the grand prince of Vladimir. Ruling princes cooperated with the Mongol officials, the baskaki, who oversaw censuses and conscription and tribute collection. As the Mongols shifted responsibility for those functions from their own baskaki to the Riurikid princes, they favored those princes who demonstrated the best ability to raise and deliver revenue to the Horde and maintain peace and stability in the Rus' lands. For the Rus'

Princes who aspired to the grand princely throne, it became increasingly important to dominate the commercial center of Novgorod, the source of wealth, particularly silver, needed for tribute payments. By the second quarter of the fourteenth century, the Golden Horde khans were favoring the Daniilovichi of Moscow over their chief competitors, the princes of Tver'. According to dynastic standards, the Daniilovichi were illegitimate. And other members ofthe dynasty repeatedly protested the khans’ issuance of the grand princely patent to the Moscow princes. Mongol power, however, was sufficient to overcome their objections. An important result of Mongol suzerainty was thus that by the middle of the fourteenth century the dynasty was forced to abandon a significant element of the succession system that had guided it and framed relations among its members for centuries. The principle of collateral succession through generational rotation survived; but the definition of eligibility changed. That issue was no longer determined by a prince’s father’s service as grand prince. It was decided by the khan.

As the second century of Mongol dominance over the Rus' lands opened, the latter had substantially recovered from the initial economic and political impact ofthe invasion. The Muscovite branch of the dynasty, buoyed exclusively by Mongol support, had become the grand princes of Vladimir. With the transfer of the grand princely throne to the Muscovite princes, the dependency ofthe grand prince upon the Horde reached a peak. Without dynastic legitimacy Danii-lovich authority rested on the power of the khan, not, as before, on a combination of domestic tradition and Horde confirmation. The Daniilovich princes focused their policies on maintaining Horde support. They were obedient servants of the Horde. They strove to preserve their authority over Novgorod. But they also attempted to broaden their base of power, to create sources of domestic support that might compensate for their lack of dynastic legitimacy. They therefore extended their domain territorially. They forged bilateral bonds with other branches of the dynasty, particularly through marriage ties, and gained recognition of seniority from those branches. Through such means they also gathered a larger, stronger military retinue, which, due to the lack of division within the Muscovite principality, remained a united force. Finally, they also bolstered their legitimacy by converting Moscow into an ecclesiastical center and creating at least the appearance that their role as grand princes was sanctified by the Church.

By i359, the princes of Moscow had achieved relative prominence among the northern Russian lands. But their dominance was not assured. During the reign of Ivan II (1353-59), the successes of the Daniilovichi were subsiding, while the advantages secured by his predecessors were eroding. Novgorod ignored him, threatening his ability to provide the Horde with its required tribute. Territorial expansion ceased. And his own principality of Moscow as well as his military retinue showed signs of internal division. In addition, two external factors compounded the problems facing Ivan’s successors: the political crisis within the Golden Horde and Lithuanian expansion. Those factors created a radically different political context for the next two Muscovite princes, Dmitry Donskoi (1359-89) and Vasily I (1389-1425).

Discord within the horde

In 1359 the Golden Horde began to experience violent internal political disorder. Its problems were provoked by at least two external circumstances. The first was decimation of the population caused by the Black Death, which had struck down Grand Prince Semen the Proud, his sons and brother, and Metropolitan Feognost in 1353. Bubonic plague, which had spread westward along trade routes from Asia, had attacked the populace of the Golden Horde several years earlier, in 1346-47, as it passed through Sarai, Astrakhan', the Caucasus, and the ports of the Crimea. From those ports it was carried to Europe, where it ravaged the populations of Italy, France, and England as it circled around the continent and returned eastward. On that return sweep the plague reached Pskov and Novgorod (1352), then other lands of western and northeastern Rus' (1353). In 1364 the plague struck Sarai a second time; it then traveled northward to attack the population of Nizhnii Novgorod and, again, virtually all the towns of northeastern Rus' (1365-66). A decade later the Horde and the Rus' lands were visited by the Black Death for the third time.

Bubonic plague, whose symptoms included boils or glandular swellings accompanied by severe pain, high fever, and chills, could kill its victims in as brief a period as one or two days; in other cases the victims suffered longer. In Russian towns, according to chronicle reports, as many as one hundred people died daily during the peak of the epidemic. It has been estimated that the population of the Rus' lands declined by at least 25 percent as a result of the repeated waves of plague. Such reports are consistent with death tolls recorded for western European towns. In its first sweep through the Crimea, the plague is reported to have claimed the lives of three-quarters of the European population; Tana lost half of its Venetian residents. One may assume that the townspeople of the Golden Horde cities perished in comparable numbers. Mongol notables, who had exchanged nomadic for sedentary lifestyles, and Jewish, Italian, Armenian, and Caucasian tradespeople and residents were all among the victims of the epidemic.

The second factor that adversely affected the Golden Horde was its commerce. The Golden Horde controlled the northwestern segment of the Mongols’ Great Silk Road. But, at virtually the same time that the Horde was suffering the effects ofthe plague, both ends ofthe Silk Road were being disrupted. In the west the Genoese and Venetians were engaged in a conflict involving Tana (1350-55). Meanwhile, the Ottoman Turks captured Gallipoli, had established themselves in the Balkans, and were threatening sea traffic through the straits (1350s). In the east after over a decade of fending off rebellions, the Yuan dynasty, as the Mongol rulers of China were known, was overthrown (1368). The new Ming rulers occupied Beijing and expelled the Mongols to their native lands. The collapse of the Yuan dynasty in China undermined the economic strength of the remainder of the empire, including the Golden Horde. The new Ming rulers reduced commercial contacts with the outside world. The resulting decay of the east-west trade network did not destroy the bazaars of the Golden Horde, but it did weaken its economic underpinnings and contribute to a decline that within half a century would result in its disintegration.

Demographic and economic traumas contributed to political instability, and by the 1360s the Horde was engaged in internally divisive and fatal conflicts. Following the death of Uzbek (1341), who had overseen the peak of the Horde’s power, Tinibek (1341-42), Janibek (1342-57), and Janibek’s son Berdibek (1357-59) ruled successively as khan. But in 1359 Berdibek’s brother overthrew him. That palace coup launched a political upheaval. During the next twenty years the Sarai throne changed hands dozens of times; on occasion two rival khans simultaneously claimed the throne. The range of the Sarai khan’s authority also contracted as portions of Horde territory and segments of clans recognized the leadership of local khans. At times as many as seven khans controlled different sections of the Horde’s domain, including Bulgar and the Crimea. The power vacuum within the Golden Horde created a force so great that it sucked into its vortex contenders from the eastern half of Juchi’s ulus.

Non-Chingisid clan leaders and notables played major roles in the general melee. Chief among them was Mamai, whose base of power was the western territories of the Golden Horde. He exercised his influence not only by dominating those lands, but also by supporting his own candidates for the Sarai throne and effectively ruling through them when they attained it.

Mamai was challenged, however, by those figures who emerged from the eastern half of the ulus. Tokhtamysh, a member of the Chingisid dynasty and a descendant of Juchi, was foremost among them. In 1378, he seized control of Sarai. By 1381, he and Mamai were at war. With his victory over Mamai at a battle on the Kalka River, Tokhtamysh became the unchallenged ruler of both halves of Juchi’s ulus.

Although Tokhtamysh’s ascendancy to power temporarily stabilized the political fluctuations within the Horde, its troubles were not over. Before he had seized Sarai, Tokhtamysh had recognized the suzerainty of Timur (Tamerlane), a non-Chingisid conqueror who was building his own empire centered around Samarkand in Central Asia. Throughout the 1380s, friction between Tokhtamysh and Timur mounted as both sought dominance over Khwarezm and Azerbaijan. In 1391 Timur defeated Tokhtamysh in a major battle east of the Volga River. As a result, Tokhtamysh lost control of the eastern portion of his ulus. He continued to rule the western half, the Golden Horde, and from that base he pursued his contest with Timur.

In 1395 Timur defeated Tokhtamysh again at a battle on the Terek River, north of the Caucasus. Timur chased Tokhtamysh toward Bulgar-on-the-Volga, but then, leaving a small force to pacify the area, turned back southward. On his way he passed through southern Riazan', where he rested his troops who pillaged the region. After several weeks, Timur resumed his campaign against his primary targets: Tana (Azak) at the mouth of the Don, Sarai, and Astrakhan' on the lower Volga. He demolished the chiefcities ofthe Golden Horde, then returned to his Central Asian capital, Samarkand. The campaign of 1395-96 not only radically weakened the Golden Horde politically and militarily, but ruined one of the main components of its economy.

By wrecking its cities, just as he had destroyed the Central Asian emporium of Urgench in 1387, Timur eliminated the market centers that had formed the Horde’s trade route linking Europe and Asia.

After his defeat, Tokhtamysh fled to Lithuania, where he sought refuge and support. The Golden Horde fell under the rule of Edigei, another of Timur’s proteges from the eastern half of Juchi’s ulus. A non-Chingisid himself, Edigei ruled through the khan, Timur-Kutlugh. In 1399, a combined Lithuanian-Tatar army, led by the Lithuanian grand duke Vitovt and Tokhtamysh, met the forces of Timur-Kutlugh and Edigei on the Vorskla River (a tributary of the Dnieper). Once again Tokhtamysh was defeated. This time he fled to western Siberia, where he died a few years later. Timur turned his attention to other conquests and died in February 1405 at Otrar, as he prepared to launch a campaign against China.

Edigei remained the dominant figure in the Golden Horde and, as Tokhtamysh before him, focused on consolidating his authority, reuniting the Horde, and reviving trade. To those ends he seized Khwarezm in 1406. He remained in power until 1411, when his son-in-law drove him from Sarai. Edigei, whose Mangyt clan had been allotted grazing lands in the western steppe (around the lower Bug River), retreated to the steppe, where he exercised local influence until he was killed in 1419.

In the wake of this extended political turmoil, the crumbling of a major pillar supporting its economic structure, and the loss of the strong capable leadership of Edigei, the Golden Horde fragmented. During the next decades competing khans once again acquired power and the loyalty of clans in various portions of the Horde territories. By the 1420s a Crimean khanate was forming independently of Sarai but dependent on Lithuanian protection. It ultimately recognized the rule of Khan Hadji-Girey and his descendants. By 1445, another khanate coalesced around Kazan' on the mid-Volga. It consisted of followers of Ulu-Muhammed (Mahmet), who had ruled briefly at Sarai and had then led his clans and supporters to the Crimea (c. 1427). About ten years later, they appeared in Lithuanian territory in the vicinity of Belev on the upper Oka River; they moved past Moscow in 1439 and ultimately established themselves under Ulu-Muhammed’s son on the mid-Volga. The Kazan' khanate absorbed the state of Bulgar.

By the middle of the fifteenth century only a relatively small core, known in Russian sources as the Great Horde, remained of the once formidable Golden Horde. It too disappeared in the early sixteenth century, leaving the Khanate of Astrakhan' on the lower Volga and the Khanate of Sibir' along with the Crimean and Kazan' Khanates as its heirs.

Lithuanian expansion

While the Horde was transforming and disintegrating, Lithuania was steadily growing in territory, military power, and political influence. Stimulated by the aggression of the crusading German knights, who as noted in the last chapter Were advancing eastward in the thirteenth century, pagan Lithuanian tribes united under Prince Mindovg (d. 1263). Their successful resistance to the knights in 1236 forced the Teutonic Order and the Livonian Brothers of the Sword to unite the following year. Located between Catholic Poland, the crusading knights, Orthodox Rus', and the Muslim Tatars, Mindovg and his successors adroitly maneuvered among their neighbors, forming and breaking alliances, converting to and renouncing Christianity, and all the while expanding.

Lithuania’s territory in the thirteenth century encompassed the lands around the Neman (Niemen) River. Its princes extended their possessions eastward to incorporate principalities that had formerly been associated with Kievan Rus'. Polotsk on the western Dvina River was one of the first to fall under Lithuanian influence; when its Riurikid dynastic line died out in 1307, it became an integral part of Lithuania. In addition, Lithuania encompassed the principalities of modern Belarus: Minsk, Pinsk, and Turov.

During the reigns of its princes Gedymin (Gediminas; 1316-41) and Olgerd (1345-77), as discussed in the previous chapter, Lithuania expanded into southwestern Rus' as well. Among its targets were Galicia and Volynia, which had been dominated immediately after the Mongol invasion by their powerful prince Daniil (with whom Mindovg had formed an alliance in the 1250s). Although those regions were weakened after the Mongolian devastation of the area in the 1280s, Daniil’s descendants, who continued to rule them, remained invulnerable to their western and northern neighbors due to a continued Tatar presence. Even after that branch of the dynasty died out in the 1320s, Khans Uzbek andJanibek retained authority there, as demonstrated by their ability to use Galician forces and territory in their campaigns against Poland and Hungary.

By Janibek’s reign, however, the Golden Horde was diverted by concerns with Persia. It retreated to the Dniester River valley, providing Poland and Lithuania with an opportunity to expand into the southwestern Rus' lands. Although they had tended to be allies against the Order, Poland and Lithuania became competitors for dominance in this region. Their struggle, which continued for over a decade, was resolved by Lithuanian occupation of Volynia (1340) and Polish acquisition of most of Galicia (1349).

As the Golden Horde became absorbed in its internal turmoil following Berdibek’s death (1359), the Lithuanian prince Olgerd replaced the khan as suzerain over the principalities that had formed the heartland of Kievan Rus': Chernigov, Pereiaslavl', and Kiev itself. The Lithuanian lands reached the shores of the Black Sea.

The Lithuanian-Polish contest revolved not just around political control of territory. They vied for control over commercial markets and routes. As the Horde’s grip loosened, Lithuania and Poland each attempted to secure control over land routes connecting the Italian Black Sea colonies with central and northern Europe. King Casimir of Poland (1333-70) explicitly attempted to channel such commercial traffic through the Galician town of Lwow (L'viv or L'vov). Lithuanian princes, by expanding their domain to include territories stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, provided alternate routes.

With its incorporation of former Kievan Rus' territories, Lithuania also acquired an increasingly Orthodox population. That population gave its secular allegiance to the Lithuanian grand duke, but continued to look to the metropolitan located in Moscow for spiritual guidance. Lithuanian rulers, as noted in chapter 6, Made repeated efforts to establish a separate metropolitanate for their Orthodox subjects. Olgerd, although personally a pagan, appealed to the patriarch of Constantinople to detach Lithuania’s lands from the Rus' metropolitanate and create a new see for Kiev and Lithuania. The result was a conflict for ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Orthodox in Lithuanian territories.

After Metropolitan Feognost died in 1353, the patriarch named Aleksei, the son of a Moscow boyar, to succeed him. But later, in 1354, he also created a metropolitanate of Lithuania and consecrated Roman, who was related to Olgerd’s wife, herself a princess from Tver', as its primate with ecclesiastical responsibility for Lithuania proper, Kiev, and the western lands of the Chernigov principality. It was in conjunction with the competition between the two prelates that Aleksei formalized the transfer, unofficially made by Metropolitan Maksim at the turn of the century, of the metropolitan seat from Kiev to Vladimir (1354). Aleksei’s preoccupation with restoring the unity of his see also accounts for the fact that he provided little assistance to the politically ailing Ivan II and his young successor Dmitry Ivanovich.

Only after he had returned to Moscow from captivity in Lithuania (1360) and his rival Roman had died (1361) did Aleksei achieve his goal of reunification. But Olgerd of Lithuania as well as the Polish king Casimir complained that Aleksei favored his northeastern Rus' flock to the neglect of those in the southwest. Olgerd argued further that Aleksei abused his ecclesiastical authority by using it to the political advantage of the grand prince of Vladimir and the detriment of other secular princes in his ecclesiastical domain, most particularly himself and the prince of Tver'. In 1371 the patriarch approved the creation of a separate metropolitanate for Galicia, the Orthodox territory within Poland. And in 1375, Kiprian was consecrated as metropolitan of Kiev and Lithuania; it was understood that upon the death of Aleksei (which occurred in 1378), Kiprian would become metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus', once again reuniting the Lithuanian and Russian churches.

Lithuania’s intermittent success in its efforts to acquire ecclesiastical recognition contributed to its rulers’ legitimacy and the consolidation of their authority in Orthodox territories. Its struggle to gain that recognition also emphasized the competitive nature of Lithuania’s relationship with northeastern Rus' and the principality that was emerging as its center, Moscow. That competition was also evident in the relationships of Moscow with Lithuania, the principality of Tver', and the Golden Horde during the reign of Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoi.

The reign of dmitry donskoi

While the Golden Horde was engaged in its internal conflicts and Lithuania was expanding to its southeast and engaging its neighbors, Poland and the Teutonic Knights, the principality of Moscow was fashioning itself into one of the leading states of eastern Europe. Just as it had been unclear at the beginning of the fourteenth century that the Daniilovichi would transform their domain into the major political and ecclesiastical center among the northern Rus' principalities by the middle of that century, so in 1359 it was scarcely a foregone conclusion that Moscow would become the center of a unified Russian state that would absorb its former Tatar overlords and curb Lithuanian expansion.

On the contrary, during the reign of Ivan II, Daniilovich influence was waning. When Ivan died in 1359, his son and heir Dmitry was only nine years old. The Horde’s Great Troubles were just beginning, and the young prince could not rely on the consistent support from Sarai that his father and uncle had received. By the time Metropolitan Aleksei returned to Moscow from his captivity in Lithuania in 1360 and assumed responsibility for advising and protecting Dmitry Ivanovich, the child had already lost his position as grand prince of Vladimir.

When Khan Berdibek was killed in 1359, the Russian princes had gone to Sarai to receive their patents from his successor. Events were transpiring so rapidly that by the time they reached the Horde, yet another khan, Navruz, had assumed the throne. He issued the patent for the grand principality not to Dmitry Ivanovich, but to Dmitry Konstantinovich, the prince of Suzdal' and Nizhnii Novgorod (1360).

Dmitry Konstantinovich was the nephew of Prince Aleksandr of Suzdal' , who had held the grand princely title just before Ivan Kalita secured it. Dmitry’s father had not been grand prince ofVladimir, but had been among the princes who had opposed the accession of Semen in 1341 and Ivan II in 1353. Although Dmitry Konstantinovich did represent the generation that preceded Dmitry Ivanovich’s, he too had no legitimate dynastic claim to the throne, only a tradition of opposition to the Daniilovichi.

Nevertheless, a group of Russian princes, consigned to rule appanages of diminishing size and importance, alienated by Grand Prince Ivan II, and dismayed at the prospect of a minor succeeding him, revived the resistance to Daniilovich domination and formed a coalition around Dmitry Konstantinovich. It included a Rostov prince, Konstantin Vasil'evich, who had married a daughter of Ivan Kalita and had joined in Grand Prince Semen’s military campaigns in the 1340s. Prince Ivan Fedorovich of Beloozero, the son of Fedor Romanovich and another of Ivan Kalita’s daughters, was also a member, as was Prince Dmitry Borisovich of Dmitrov, an appanage carved out of the former Galich—Dmitrov principality. When Dmitry Konstantinovich was named grand prince, his allies were elevated as well. Konstantin Vasil'evich became prince of all the Rostov lands, Dmitry Borisovich of the full Galich principality.

But the following year their sponsor Navruz was overthrown. Once again the Russian princes obediently went to the Horde to receive their patents. By this time, however, the situation in the Horde was politically more unstable and generally more violent. The Russian princes were subjected to personal abuse and their property was stolen. Thereafter the Russian princes refrained from traveling to the Horde; they sent personal agents to pay homage to the khans and receive the patents on their behalf.

It was under these conditions that Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow recovered the grand principality of Vladimir and overcame his domestic rivals. He obtained a patent first in 1362 from the Sarai khan. On the basis of that patent the young prince’s forces expelled Dmitry Konstantinovich from the city of Vladimir (winter 1362—63). But by this time Mamai, who was supporting his own candidate for khan, had openly attacked their rival at Sarai. Mamai also claimed the Horde’s suzerainty over the Rus' lands as well as their tribute for his candidate and, accordingly, issued a second patent for the grand principality to Prince Dmitry Ivanovich. By accepting the second patent, the prince of Moscow alienated his original patron, the Sarai khan, who transferred the grand principality back to Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich. His order was carried from Sarai to Dmitry Konstantinovich by Prince Ivan Fedorovich of Beloozero.

But the prince of Suzdal' and Nizhnii Novgorod was not able to retake Vladimir and other territories belonging to the grand principality. He was physically separated from his Tatar protector by Mamai, who controlled the lands directly south of the Rus' principalities and helped his client, Dmitry Ivanovich, drive Dmitry Konstantinovich back to Suzdal'. By 1364, the two Prince Dmitrys had reached an accord; when yet another Sarai khan offered his patent to Dmitry Konstantinovich that year, he refused it and continued to recognize Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow as the grand prince of Vladimir.

At about the time the prince of Suzdal'-Nizhnii Novgorod accepted Muscovite leadership, the Muscovite prince also confirmed his authority over the other princes who had been reluctant to recognize his seniority. In 1364, he engineered the eviction of Prince

Konstantin Vasil'evich from Rostov to Ustiug; Konstantin’s nephew, Andrei Fedorovich, became the prince of Rostov and a faithful ally of Dmitry Ivanovich. The year before the grand prince had also expelled the princes of Starodub and Galich from their lands and attached those principalities to his domain. It may have been in conjunction with this suppression of his political opponents that he assumed control of the other territories (Beloozero and Uglich, in addition to Galich) that he identified in his will as “purchases” made by his grandfather Ivan I Kalita.

In 1363—64, when the Daniilovich prince Dmitry Ivanovich recovered the grand principality of Vladimir, his legitimacy continued to emanate from the Tatars. But in the context of the Horde’s Great Troubles, Dmitry’s position did not rest with the Sarai khan, as had his predecessors’. Rather his claim to the Vladimir throne depended on the support of a non-Chingisid Tatar lord, Mamai.

Also, like his ancestors, Dmitry Ivanovich lacked a broad base of domestic support at the beginning of his reign. He did, however, benefit from the support and guidance ofMetropolitan Aleksei, who, having returned to Moscow in 1360, quickly became one of Dmitry’s most influential advisers and coordinated Muscovite princely policy with his own ecclesiastical goal of retaining the unity of his see, which had been achieved after the death of his rival in 1361. As the grand prince overcame the opposition of Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal', he also gained the latter’s support. Their new relationship was symbolized by the grand prince’s marriage in 1366 to Evdokiia, the daughter of his former rival. Following the example set by his grandfather, Dmitry Ivanovich thus not only neutralized a rival branch of the dynasty, but forged an alliance, symbolized by marriage, with it. The grand prince further consolidated his position by asserting Muscovite dominance over the principalities of Galich and Starodub. And most of the other northeastern Riurikid princes, including the Rostov clan, recognized his seniority. Dmitry Ivanovich, finally, also developed a good working relationship with his cousin, Vladimir Andreevich, who controlled the single appanage of Serpukhov, within the principality of Moscow.

Muscovite relations with Tver' and Lithuania

The major exception to this broad domestic acceptance of Dmitry Ivanovich came from Tver'. During the reigns of Semen and Ivan II, that principality had been torn apart by internal strife between rival branches of the Tver' princely family. The princes of the appanage principality of Kashin opposed those of Mikulin. By 1366, Prince Mikhail Aleksandrovich of Mikulin had won the title grand prince of Tver'. He had done so with the aid of his brother-in-law, Grand Duke Olgerd of Lithuania.

In 1367, Dmitry Ivanovich initiated hostilities against Mikhail of Tver'. The ensuing conflict lasted until 1375. Throughout the contest Mikhail repeatedly turned to Olgerd for assistance. Although they did advance to the very walls of Moscow (1368), Mikhail and Olgerd were unable to penetrate the stone fortifications that Dmitry had constructed the year before. Dmitry, on the other hand, pushed deeply into Tver' territory in 1370, and captured Mikulin, the capital of Mikhail’s appanage. Mikhail appealed to Mamai, and received a patent for the grand principality of Vladimir from him (1370). Dmitry refused to yield and quickly recovered the patent.

As the events of 1367-70 suggest, the conflict between Moscow and Tver' engaged not only Lithuania, but also involved the troubled Golden Horde. For the princes who sought the grand princely throne, approval from a Tatar khan remained essential. But rival khans were competing among themselves for control over the sources of revenue and grazing lands that had in the past sustained the Horde’s cohesion and power. Each of the khans, therefore, dispensed princely patents to those clients who demonstrated an ability to produce the required tribute and maintain domestic order, especially along trade routes that fed into the Golden Horde’s declining commerce. Control over the commercial center of Novgorod as well as over key points along the Russian trade routes was therefore a priority for the competing Russian princes. Each strove to keep the routes safe, to dispense gifts to the Tatar authorities, and to deliver tribute to the appropriate khan.

The discord within the Horde had also contributed to instability along the trade routes. As early as 1360, a band of pirate-adventurers from Novgorod (ushkuinniki) were able to take advantage of the weakened authority of Sarai as well as the renewed interprincely rivalry among the Riurikids to seize Zhiukomen (Zhukotin) on the Kama River and threaten Kostroma, a grand princely possession northeast of Moscow and a key point on the upper Volga waterway. The khan of Sarai sent envoys to then-Grand Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich, demanding that he maintain order along the trade route. The grand prince convened a princely assembly, captured the ushkuinniki, and sent their booty to the khan. The trade routes, however, remained insecure. In 1366, ushkuinniki attacked Muslim merchants in Nizhnii Novgorod and approached Bulgar. Dmitry Ivanovich, who had by then become grand prince, held Novgorod responsible and pressured its officials to control the situation. A year later Dmitry’s governors were accepted in Novgorod.

The vitality of the trade routes ultimately depended upon Novgorod and the continuation of its trade with the Hanseatic merchants and also the commercial agents of the Teutonic Knights. Beginning in 1367, however, their trade relations began to deteriorate. The Teutonic Order increased military pressure on the Pskov frontier, and Novgorod was drawn into the ensuing conflicts. In 1369, the Hansa imposed duties on its export of silver to Novgorod. These actions may well have disturbed both Novgorod’s trade and Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich’s ability to make the obligatory tribute payments. It may, correspondingly, provide the motive for Mamai’s decision in 1370 to transfer the grand princely patent from Dmitry Ivanovich to Tver’s prince Mikhail Aleksandrovich.

But Grand Prince Mikhail proved to be less capable of stabilizing the commercial avenues within Rus' and delivering tribute than Dmitry had been. His efforts in 1371 to establish order in Kostroma failed. A year later, Novgorod, allied with Dmitry Ivanovich, evicted Mikhail’s governors from another important town on Rus' internal trade routes, Torzhok. By spring of 1373, Mikhail and Novgorod were at war.

In the meantime, Dmitry, who had refused to yield the city of Vladimir to Mikhail, was able to win back Mamai’s confidence. While Grand Prince Mikhail sent his son Ivan to represent him at Mamai’s camp, Dmitry Ivanovich personally paid homage to the Tatar lord. Dmitry, furthermore, liberally distributed gifts to Mamai, his relatives, and court officials. His presentations convinced Mamai to return the patent to him (1371). Dmitry also paid Mikhail’s debt to Mamai, and was allowed to take Ivan Mikhailovich into custody as a hostage (1371). In 1372, Dmitry and Mikhail made peace.

Prelude to Kulikovo

The truce with Tver' constituted a confirmation of Dmitry Ivanovich as grand prince of Vladimir; it also served as an indicator that Moscow was reemerging as the political center of the northern Russian lands. The event that has come to symbolize the might of Moscow and its prince, however, is the Battle of Kulikovo. That battle was fought on September 8, 1380, between Dmitry, who there earned the epithet Donskoi, and his former patron, Mamai. It has commonly been depicted as the courageous stand of an energetic ambitious young prince, who, having united the Russian princes, led them against their common foe, Mamai, in a valiant effort to throw off the oppressive Tatar yoke.

Despite its general acceptance, this interpretation of the Battle of Kulikovo is inherently flawed. One problem, which arises from the previous discussion, derives from the fact that despite their checkered relationship, Dmitry Ivanovich owed his position as grand prince and his legitimacy to Mamai. Rather than regarding Mamai as leader of the oppressive Tatar Horde, Dmitry himself had, shortly before the battle, been courting Mamai’s favor. The basis and causes of the conflict between the two may be more clearly understood if the battle is considered in the context of the discord within the Horde and the nature of the obligations of the grand prince of Vladimir to the Horde.

When in 1371 Dmitry visited Mamai and received the patent for the grand principality of Vladimir from him, Dmitry also pledged, according to A. E. Presniakov, to deliver to Mamai the Russian tribute, albeit at a reduced amount.1 But in 1373 the Hansa cut off its silver export to Novgorod. That ban lasted two years. During that period Dmitry Ivanovich reneged on his obligations; he ceased making any tribute payments to Mamai.

Possibly to compensate for that loss of revenue, Mamai focused his own attention on the mid-Volga and its trading centers. He sent his officials to Nizhnii Novgorod, but in 1374 the residents massacred them. Ushkuinniki once again rampaged along the Volga, attacking Viatka and Bulgar and then descending the river to Sarai. Faced with Dmitry’s refusal to pay tribute, coupled with his own apparent inability to control the chaotic conditions on the Volga commercial avenue, Mamai in 1375 once again issued the grand princely patent to Prince Mikhail of Tver'.

A. E. Presniakov, The Formation of the Great Russian State, trans. byA. E. Moorhouse (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 265. See also Gorskii, Moskva i Orda, p. 97.

But Mamai could not offer Mikhail substantial military support. His Horde had been decimated the year before by another attack of the plague, and was in no position to send a strong army to enforce his decree. Nor did Mikhail receive aid from Lithuania. His own forces were inadequate to defeat Dmitry’s assemblage, which included contingents from virtually all the northeastern Russian principalities as well as Novgorod and Mikhail’s long-standing rivals in the Tver' appanage of Kashin. With that army Dmitry successfully defended his throne. Rather than yield his position to Mikhail, he defied Mamai and launched his own offensive, during which he besieged Tver' for four weeks and forced Mikhail to surrender.

The subsequent peace treaty, concluded between Dmitry and Mikhail in 1375, referred to Mikhail by the title of grand prince of Tver', but nevertheless acknowledged Dmitry’s seniority by declaring him Mikhail’s “elder brother” and the rightful grand prince of Vladimir. Mikhail accordingly renounced all claims to Novgorod. He also recognized the autonomy of Kashin and promised to refrain from conducting independent diplomatic relations with Lithuania and the Golden Horde. Although he would not abide by those last provisions of the treaty, peace was restored.

Once again, Dmitry Ivanovich had regained his grand princely throne. But he had yet to overcome his difficulties in raising and delivering tribute that had evidently persuaded Mamai to transfer the responsibilities of the grand prince to Mikhail. He too turned his attention to the Volga route and Bulgar, which was then nominally ruled by the khan of Sarai, but still vulnerable to disruptions from ushkuinniki. Another band had managed in 1375 to make its way down the entire length of the river, only to be murdered at Astrakhan' . In 1377, Dmitry Ivanovich, joined by Dmitry Konstantinovich of Nizhnii Novgorod and Suzdal', restored a measure of security along the route by attacking Bulgar and forcing it to accept their customs officials.

The following year, however, the grand prince’s forces clashed with a Tatar military force subject to Mamai and defeated it on the Vozha River, a tributary of the Oka, in the Riazan' principality. Mamai’s force in 1378 may have been responding to the fact that Dmitry, despite his success in reestablishing order and collecting revenue, had not resumed his tribute payments. On the contrary, as the Russian grand prince imposed his authority over the mid-Volga, he was depriving the Tatar chieftain of yet another source of revenue, customs fees from Bulgar. Mamai’s deteriorating fiscal position turned into an urgent crisis when Tokhtamysh established himself at Sarai (1378). Mamai had to confront Tokhtamysh, but to do so he required revenue. And for that he had to force the grand prince of Vladimir, Dmitry Ivanovich, to pay the tribute to him. It was in this context that the Battle of Kulikovo occurred.

The Battle of Kulikovo

In preparation for the confrontation Mamai, between 1378 and 1380, turned to Lithuania. Its grand duke, Jagailo, agreed to provide military support. Mamai also negotiated with Prince Oleg of Riazan'. Finally, he sent messengers to Dmitry Ivanovich with the demand that the grand prince deliver his tribute at, significantly, the higher amount that had been customary during the reigns of Uzbek and Janibek. By the time Dmitry was able, according to some accounts, to collect the tribute and to dispatch it to Mamai, the latter’s Tatar forces, supplemented by troops hired from the Caucasus and along the Black Sea coast, had begun advancing northward. Dmitry’s envoys, seeing little chance ofsuccess for their mission, returned without delivering their treasure.

Dmitry then assembled his own army. His successful efforts to consolidate his power enabled him to draw upon the military forces from many of the Russian principalities. The chief exceptions were: Riazan' , which, located on the Tatar frontier, had agreed to aid Mamai; Tver', which despite the 1375 treaty, did not on this occasion respect Dmitry’s leadership; Suzdal' - Nizhnii Novgorod, whose prince Dmitry Konstantinovich, Donskoi’s former rival, was not identified among the participants; and Novgorod Velikii.

The battle took place on a field called Kulikovo Pole (Snipes’ Field), near the upper Don River. Mamai had camped there while awaiting the arrival ofhis Lithuanian allies. The Russian army meanwhile gathered at Kolomna, where it was joined by two ofJagailo’s brothers, the princes of Polotsk and Briansk. Grand Prince Dmitry then took the initiative. He led his forces across the Oka and the upper Don, and, before their Lithuanian support arrived, engaged the Tatars.

The battle, as described in the Russian chronicles, was intense. After several hours, Mamai’s army appeared to have gained an advantage, and it seemed that the Russian troops, stretched across a seven-mile front, were on the verge of collapse. But at the critical moment, a unit commanded by Dmitry’s cousin Prince Vladimir of Serpukhov, which had been held in reserve, was unleashed. This strategy turned the tide of the battle. The exhausted Tatars were no match for the fresh Russian troops. Mamai fled. Dmitry Donskoi was victorious.

Despite its symbolic significance and the historical emphasis placed on the Battle of Kulikovo, the victory had little immediate practical effect on the relationship between the Russian principalities and the Golden Horde. Almost immediately after his defeat, Mamai raised another army and directed it against his main opponent and challenger, Tokhtamysh. At their battle on the Kalka River Mamai again suffered defeat (1381). Mamai’s subsequent fate is recorded variously. According to one account, he was captured and executed by Tokhtamysh. Another claims he fled to the Genoese at Caffa, only to be killed there.

Tokhtamysh seized Mamai’s treasury and absorbed his family and followers into his own Horde. He also sent envoys to Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich, Prince Oleg of Riazan', and the other Russian princes to inform them of his victory and assumption of power as khan of the Golden Horde. The Russian princes respectfully acknowledged the new khan by sending gifts, but declined to attend his court personally to receive their patents. This factor, coupled with the grand prince’s tardiness in delivering regular tribute, prompted Tokhtamysh to assert his authority. In 1382, he led an expedition against the Russian principalities. Gaining support and cooperation from Oleg of Riazan', he crossed the Oka and approached Moscow. Dmitry Donskoi, hero of Kulikovo, fled to Kostroma. His city was besieged, then sacked by Tokhtamysh’s Tatars.

The Russian princes, including those of Tver' and Nizhnii Novgorod, immediately submitted to Tokhtamysh. Dmitry Ivanovich similarly acknowledged the khan’s suzerainty and was accorded the grand princely title. Their relationship was reflected on coins struck by Dmitry after 1382. While he proclaimed his own status with the words “Grand Prince Dmitry Ivanovich” on one side of the coins, he marked the other side with the inscription “Sultan Tokhtamysh: Long may he live.” In addition to his title, Dmitry also reassumed responsibility for collecting and delivering tribute, now set at higher amounts than he had previously paid Mamai. When Dmitry’s son Vasily escorted the first payment to Tokhtamysh, the khan held him as a royal hostage at his court until 1386. Although Dmitry bequeathed the grand principality ofVladimir to Vasily, his principal heir, without reference to a patent from the khan, he nevertheless only speculated in his will about the possibility that his sons might one day no longer have to pay tribute to the Tatars.

The causes of the Battle ofKulikovo were thus rooted in the internal discord within the Horde, particularly Mamai’s desperate need to strengthen his position before facing Tokhtamysh. Tokhtamysh’s victory over Mamai ended the division within the Horde and thus removed Dmitry Ivanovich’s opportunities for maneuvering among the Tatar competitors. The grand prince ofVladimir and all the Russian principalities remained subordinate to the khan of the Golden Horde, as they had been before the Great Troubles within the Horde had begun.

Nor did the Battle ofKulikovo alter the Muscovite prince’s position within the Rus' lands. As discussed above, before Kulikovo Dmitry had overcome his strongest dynastic rivals and asserted dominance over the Rostov and Galich princes and probably those of Beloozero and Uglich as well. As grand prince he commanded obedience from Pereiaslavl', Kostroma, and lur'ev. The laroslavl' princes also appear to have recognized his seniority. He was thus able to gather a large army from the retinues of these numerous principalities in 1380. And, when Dmitry died in 1389, no members of the dynasty, except his cousin Vladimir Andreevich and Vladimir’s son, raised any objection to the succession of his son Vasily to the grand princely throne. Vasily easily overcame their opposition and ruled from 1389 to 1425.

Nevertheless, at the time of the Battle of Kulikovo, Dmitry Ivanovich lacked the authority to command the princes or military retinues from Tver', Suzdal'-Nizhnii Novgorod, Riazan', or Novgorod to join his army. And even the prince of Nizhnii Novgorod, who may have cooperated with the campaign, did not submit his retinue to Moscow’s command. After returning to Moscow in 1382, Dmitry did send a punitive expedition against Riazan' and temporarily replaced Prince Oleg with his own governors. Even with this expansion of its authority, however, Moscow had not yet achieved supremacy within the Russian lands.

The post-kulikovo transition

Although Tokhtamysh rapidly restored Tatar authority, during the next fifty years the relative power of the states of eastern Europe altered dramatically. The Golden Horde fragmented. It was not Moscow, however, that immediately benefited from its decay. Rather, Lithuania under the capable leadership of its grand duke Vitovt rose to prominence. During the remainder of the reign of Dmitry and that of his son Vasily (1389-1425), Moscow, although quietly growing in size and economic might, remained relatively weak and under the shadow first of the Golden Horde, then increasingly of Lithuania.

Lithuania

As discussed above, Lithuania had been an expanding power during the fourteenth century. When Olgerd died in 1377, a succession struggle broke out between his sons and his brother, Keistut. By

1381,  Keistut had been killed, his son Vitovt (Vytautas) had escaped to the Order, and Jagailo Olgerdovich was ruling Lithuania. Jagailo led his realm into a new relationship with Poland, which earlier in the century had been Lithuania’s chief rival. King Casimir, who had competed with Lithuania over Galicia and Volynia, had died in 1370. When his nephew and successor, King Louis ofHungary, also died in

1382,  Louis’ daughter Jadwiga acceded to the Polish throne. In 1386, she and Jagailo married, joining their two countries in the dynastic union of Krewo.

Jagailo focused his attention on Poland, leaving Lithuania to a viceroy. By 1393, his cousin Vitovt emerged from a renewed power struggle to become grand duke of Lithuania and lead his domain to new heights of power. Under his administration Lithuania extended its influence deeper into the lands of Rus' as well as into the realm of the Golden Horde itself. In addition, in 1410 Vitovt and his cousin, the king of Poland, delivered a debilitating blow to the Teutonic Knights. Although hostilities against the Order continued, the knights were never able to regain their former power after the Battle of Tannenberg (Grunwald).

But even earlier, before his political victory in Lithuania, Vitovt had begun to extend his authority eastward. Moscow was among the first of the Russian principalities to recognize his seniority. In 1386, Prince Vasily Dmitr'evich escaped from Tokhtamysh’s court where he had been held as a hostage. In his flight he reached Lithuania, where he became betrothed to Vitovt’s daughter. Vitovt then assisted his return to Moscow. Four years later, Vasily, who had become grand prince in 1389, married his fiancee, Sofiia. In doing so, he implicitly acknowledged his father-in-law, Vitovt, as the senior prince in the region. Thereafter, with the exception of a disagreement over Novgorod in 1406-08, Vasily fully cooperated with Vitovt. Moscow did not intervene even when Vitovt seized Smolensk (1395) and then entered into a decade-long war against Riazan', whose Prince Oleg came to the defense of his own son-in-law, the deposed Smolensk prince. In 1385, the Riazan' prince, after being punished by Dmitry Donskoi for his role at the Battle of Kulikovo and then seeing his domain devastated by Tatar troops as well, had recognized Dmitry Ivanovich’s seniority. Nevertheless, Moscow neglected to protect its client and left Oleg to operate alone in his conflict against Lithuania.

Novgorod was a lingering source of contention between Moscow and Lithuania. And Novgorod’s relations with Lithuania were ambivalent. On several occasions during the Lithuanian dynastic quarrels of the 1380s, Novgorod had received Jagailo’s displaced relatives and assigned them lands for their sustenance. In 1398 Vitovt, who had been subordinating the junior Lithuanian princes, formed an alliance with the Teutonic Knights to launch a major campaign against Novgorod and Pskov, but the events in the steppe that culminated in the Battle of the Vorskla forced him to abort it.

After he had secured his position in Smolensk, however, Vitovt resumed his efforts to extend his authority over Pskov and Novgorod. His attack on Pskov in 1406 generated a hostile response from his son-in-law, Grand Prince Vasily Dmitr'evich. Nevertheless, although they gathered their armies and sparred for three years, Vitovt and Vasily avoided any serious direct engagements. As their dispute ended, Novgorod again received and set aside lands for a Lithuanian prince, one of Vitovt’s cousins, and Vitovt and Vasily concluded a truce (i408).

Nor did their differences over Novgorod upset the basic relationship between Vitovt and Vasily I. In his will Vasily Dmitr'evich included Vitovt in the group of guardians to whom he entrusted the safety and care of his own son and heir, Vasily Vasil'evich, as well as that of his wife and other children. The Lithuanian ruler’s authority was so great that, when the grand prince died in 1425, no Russian prince dared challenge the succession of Vasily II while the boy’s grandfather lived. Only when Vitovt died in 1430 did the young grand prince’s uncle and cousins claim the throne and plunge the Russian lands into a civil war that would last a quarter of a century.

Vitovt protected his grandson, but also used his position to strengthen Lithuania. While Moscow passively observed, he concluded a treaty with Tver', in which its prince Boris recognized Vitovt’s seniority (1427). Then, after years of pressuring Novgorod, he undertook a final campaign against the city. In i428,he brought up a cannon so heavy it required forty horses to transport it and placed it before Porkhov, an outpost southwest of Novgorod. When fired, the cannon not only destroyed the fortress tower, but also blew itself up along with the German craftsman who had built it. Nevertheless, Novgorod quickly sued for peace, and paid Vitovt a large sum of silver (io, ooo rubles). Finally Vitovt, having established his governors in Smolensk in 1404, reached an accord with Riazan', whose prince agreed to render his service to Lithuania (1430).

By the time of his death in 1430, Vitovt had incorporated Smolensk, achieved varying forms ofsupremacy over the grand principality of Vladimir and its possessions as well as Tver' and Riazan', and had intimidated Novgorod. In short, by the end of Vitovt’s reign, Lithuania dominated most of the Russian lands. In a similar fashion Vitovt extended Lithuanian political authority into the Tatar realm.

The Golden Horde

Vitovt’s ability to expand his sphere of influence was, at least in part, the result of the final decay of the Golden Horde, which was precipitated by Timur’s onslaught in 1395-96. After Timur defeated Tokhtamysh, the deposed khan sought refuge with Vitovt. Together the two prepared to confront the new khan of Sarai, Timur-Kutlugh, and his non-Chingisid supporter, Edigei. On August 12, 1399, the two camps met on the banks of a tributary of the Dnieper River. Vitovt adopted a haughty, confident attitude. Unlike Jagailo, who had accepted a junior status in his relations with the Tatars, Vitovt did not. When Edigei and Timur-Kutlugh offered him peace if he would recognize their suzerainty, Vitovt disdainfully refused and made a counteroffer, proposing the same terms but in reverse.

Vitovt and Tokhtamysh lost the subsequent Battle of the Vorskla. Tatar forces ravaged Lithuanian possessions, including Kiev, and repossessed the lower Bug River, which since Olgerd’s reign had been Lithuania’s access to the Black Sea. The defeated Tokhtamysh eventually found sanctuary in western Siberia (Tiumen'), where he died early in the fifteenth century. Despite the outcome of the battle, during the next several decades the Golden Horde deteriorated, while Vitovt’s power grew.

Immediately after the Battle of the Vorskla, under the guidance of Edigei and the khans he sponsored, the Horde appeared to remain cohesive and powerful. Tatar strength was clearly evident in 1408, when Edigei launched a campaign against the lands of Rus', besieged Moscow, and devastated the Russian lands in his path. But very shortly after that demonstration of his might, Edigei was evicted from the Golden Horde by his son-in-law, Khan Timur-khan (1411). The absence of a strong political and military leader, coupled with its disrupted commerce and economic disarray, resulted in the final disintegration of the Golden Horde.

As the Golden Horde entered another period of political anarchy, Lithuania emerged as the dominant power in the eastern European steppe. Vitovt took advantage of the Horde’s weakness to bolster Lithuania’s economic potential. By constructing a series of forts between Kiev and the Black Sea, he reasserted Lithuanian control over the steppe and secured the lower Dnieper River. This effort, combined with his territorial expansion into western Russia, gave Vitovt control over the ancient Rus' trade route that connected the Baltic and Black Seas. This asset, acquired just after Timur had inflicted so much damage on the alternate commercial network of the Golden Horde, provided Lithuania with a distinct economic advantage, which he duly exploited.

Lithuania’s political influence in the steppe was also heightened. Actively participating in the Horde’s power struggle, Vitovt supported Tokhtamysh’s son after Edigei’s flight in 1411. But, by 1419, the Horde’s territories were once again divided. The lower Volga was controlled by the Sarai khan, while the lands west of the Volga were dominated by Ulu-Muhammed. Vitovt gave his support to the latter. When he suffered military defeat in 1422, Vitovt offered him sanctuary in Lithuania where he remained until he was able to reestablish his authority in the Crimea (1427).

Ten years later Ulu-Muhammed was forced to abandon the Crimea as well. He led his band northward, where they appeared at Belev on the Lithuanian side of the Oka River in 1437—38, then before Moscow in 1439, and finally settled in the vicinity of Kazan' by 1445. Ulu-Muhammed’s son Mahmutek there founded the Khanate of Kazan'.

Ulu-Muhammed was not the only Tatar khan to appeal for and obtain Vitovt’s aid. When Ulu-Muhammed established himself in the Crimea in 1427, he forced another Tatar leader, Hadji-Girey, to abandon the area. He too found refuge on Lithuanian soil, where he stayed until 1449, when he returned to the Crimea. He then founded the Crimean Khanate. Hadji-Girey remained a loyal ally of his patrons, the grand dukes of Lithuania.

Moscow

In the immediate post-Kulikovo period, the Russian principalities and their Daniilovich grand princes resumed roles subordinate to the Golden Horde. They received their patents from the Golden Horde khan and paid tribute to him. Even as the Horde began to disintegrate, it was not the Russian lands but Lithuania that initially filled the political vacuum left by the Tatar khans. Western Russian principalities increasingly recognized the hegemony of Vitovt of Lithuania, while the Daniilovichi placed themselves under his protection through the marriage of Vasily Dmitr'evich to Vitovt’s daughter. Despite the victory at Kulikovo, the northeastern Russian lands remained subordinate to their more powerful neighbors.

Nevertheless, operating within the evolving political context, facing the fragmentation of the Golden Horde and overshadowed by Lithuania, Dmitry Donskoi and his son Vasily I oversaw the formation of a larger, stronger, and more centralized state of Muscovy. Their motivation, however, stemmed from the issue of dynastic legitimacy. Through the fourteenth century, Tatar authority had supplanted the Riurikid dynastic traditions as the basis of the Rus' political structure and legitimacy for its princes. The Daniilovichi had attained their positions by virtue of Tatar favor and support. Internal political disturbances followed by Timur’s invasions, however, had shaken the foundations of the Golden Horde. The Daniilovich princes, the chief beneficiaries of the khans’ favors, could no longer rely exclusively on their Tatar patrons.

The weakening of the Golden Horde thus prompted the Dani-ilovichi, even after they turned to Lithuania for supplementary support, to solidify their domestic political base. Several factors favored Dmitry Donskoi and Vasily I in their pursuit of that objective. In the absence of intra-Daniilovich political disputes, they benefited from the stability at their court and among their boyar elite. They profited from the economic recovery that the Rus' lands were enjoying and were more successful than any of the others in adding territory and economic resources to their principality. And they basked in the reflected glory of the cultural dynamism of the Orthodox Church, which lent its prestige and influence to Daniilovich hegemony. By the end of the reign of Vasily I in 1425, Moscow did not yet possess the size or strength to rival its neighbors beyond Russian borders, but it had no peer within northeastern Rus' .

The court

The size of the Daniilovich branch of the dynasty and the absence of divisive feuds within it gave an advantage to Moscow’s princes. Having lost so many relatives to the plague, the Daniilovich princes were able to stem the tendency, frequently practiced by their distant cousins and even tentatively begun in the 1340s during the reign of Semen the Proud, to subdivide their lands into numerous small appanage principalities. Thus, after the death of his younger brother Ivan in 1364, Dmitry Donskoi shared the Muscovite realm with only one cousin, Vladimir Andreevich. Vladimir’s father, a younger brother of Semen and Ivan II, had also died during the plague in 1353. Vladimir had inherited his father’s otchina, the appanage principality of Serpukhov. Relations between the cousins, guided by a series of three treaties, were cordial. Vladimir retained rights to rule his own realm and collect revenues from it as well as from one-third of Moscow itself. He was responsible for gathering tribute for the Golden Horde from his domain, but paid it through the grand prince, not directly to the khan. He also acknowledged Dmitry’s seniority, supported him in military campaigns, and recognized Dmitry’s son, Vasily, as his “elder brother” or the rightful heir to Dmitry’s throne.

Dmitry Donskoi was survived not only by Vasily, but also by four other sons. Nevertheless, due to early deaths and the failure of some to have sons of their own, only one more lasting appanage principality,

Mozhaisk, was carved out of the Muscovite realm. In the next generation it was subdivided into the principalities of Mozhaisk and Vereia.

The relative unity of the house of Moscow was mirrored by its court, at the peak of which was a small group of boyars. As Moscow’s size, power, and prestige grew, its court attracted servitors from all over Rus' as well as from Lithuania. Moscow’s military might correspondingly increased. During the reigns of Dmitry and Vasily I the court remained relatively unstructured, allowing some of the new servitors to rise relatively rapidly to prominence; they were drawn into the small elite, consisting of fewer than two dozen families in middle of Vasily I’s reign, whose members were accorded boyar rank.