Historians were able to trace the origin of most of the articles prohibited by Tempier to the writings of Arts Masters who worked in the years preceding the decree of March 7, 1277, notably those of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Still, many condemned theses remain unidentified, which maybe explained by invoking the loss, indeed the destruction, of the contentious works in which they were found, or the existence of a heterodoxical oral teaching which left no trace, or perhaps the fact that there are still many texts emanating from the Faculty of Arts that were not edited and that continue to sleep in manuscript libraries. Nonetheless, the problem is that, even in the case of theses whose written sources are identified, historians have noted a discrepancy between, on the one hand, what the passages from which the censored articles were extracted really want to say and, on the other hand, what Tempier’s decree had them say by removing them from their original contexts. An assertion advanced by an Arts Master in a qualified, nuanced, and careful mode, becomes, once pinned by the Bishop, a radical and audacious thesis, claiming to be absolute truth. One example will suffice to eloquently illustrate this phenomenon of distortion. In his treatise On the Eternity of the World, Boethius of Dacia teaches that creation (in the strict sense, that is, a production ex nihilo) is impossible from the point of view of natural causality which the physician (the philosopher of nature) must adopt, since, as experience proves, all natural agents produce their effects starting from a matter or a subject that preexists. From this, to know the ultimate truth about the duration of the world, Boethius invites his readers to return to the teachings of the Catholic faith, that claims that the world was created in time, since, as he firmly established in his treatise, philosophy possesses no method of demonstration that could prove definitively one of the two alternatives, either eternity or the newness of the world. In other words, confronting a question of this sort, that transcends the limits of philosophy as rational knowledge drawing its principles from the natural course of things, the philosopher acknowledges his incompetence and, since he is a believer, sends his readers back to the teachings of the Christian faith, that admits the supernatural causality of a God who is the Creator. This is a carefully measured position, respectful of orthodoxy. Now, reading the decree of condemnation of March 7, 1277, we are led to believe that the philosopher is professing a doctrine of double truth identical to that which Tempier is denouncing, as we recall, in his letter-preface. Indeed, when the Bishop of Paris transposes Boethian thought to the register of his list of condemned articles, he has him claiming this: (90) ‘‘the physician (naturalis philosophus) must deny without qualification (simpliciter) the newness of the world, because he relies on natural causes and reasons. As for the believer, he may deny the eternity of the world, because he relies on supernatural causes.’’ This is the position of Boethius as expressed in his treatise On the Eternity of the World, with the exception of one word which changes everything: ‘‘simpliciter’’ (without qualification). While the Arts Master modestly argues that the newness of the world, that is to say, its origin in time or the fact that it began to be, cannot be conceded by the physician as such, to the extent that it exceeds his inevitably naturalist perspective, leaving to the religious authorities the task of determining the absolute truth in this matter, Bishop Tempier wrongly understood that Boethius accepted the truth of the faith only to oppose it at once with a naturalistic rationalism elevated to the level of an absolute knowledge, in the light of which the creationist thesis unequivocally had to be rejected. As a general rule, Boethius and his colleagues of the Arts Faculty never claimed ‘‘that the possible or impossible without qualification (simpliciter), that is, according to all modes, is the equivalent to the possible or impossible according to philosophy,” contrary to what Tempier suggests here in article 146 of his syllabus, but instead they taught that what is impossible from the limited point of view of natural reason, to which philosophy is strictly bound, is possible for the person who believes in the action of a Supreme Cause transcending the limits of nature. Behind Stephen Tempier’s manifest lack of understanding of the subtleties of the Arts Masters’ position lies what we might term ‘‘the epistemological issue’’ of the condemnation of March 7, 1277. In the years preceding this date, the Arts Masters, to whom devolved the task of teaching the entirety of a philosophical corpus inherited from the Greeks and the Arabs, became aware of the intrinsic value of philosophy. Consequently, they developed an epistemological theory with a twofold objective: first, circumscribing the limits of the epistemic validity of diverse scientific disciplines for which they were, according to regulations, responsible (logic, physics, mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics); secondly and correlatively, guaranteeing the autonomy of philosophy as purely rational knowledge compared to the tenets of the Catholic faith and their hermeneutic consequences, which properly concern the teaching for which Theology Masters were responsible in their own faculty. Such a position on the part of the Arts Masters was new in the history of western Christianity. The document where this is expressed most forcefully and clearly was, unquestionably, the treatise On the Eternity of the World written by Boethius of Dacia. While discussing the problem which gave the book its title, the Danish scholar establishes an epistemological doctrine that can be viewed as the ‘‘charter’’ of professional philosophers, consisting essentially of three methodological rules for Arts Masters: (1) a specialist in a particular philosophical discipline must identify the principles on which his science is based and the legitimate area of application of these principles; (2) as well, he must draw all appropriate conclusions flowing from the principles pertaining to his science accordingly, even if some might diverge from the truths of the Catholic faith; and (3) finally, in remaining firmly within the limits of his field of knowledge, he must deny any claim or proposition contradicting or even undermining the principles on which his science is based. In the eyes of a theologian like Tempier, with a unitary and Christo-centered vision of knowledge, according to which the profane sciences have value only in as much as they serve the interests of Christian theology, such a conception of philosophy, that proclaims far and wide its epistemological independence, was absolutely inadmissible. Article 18 of the 1277 syllabus is perfectly eloquent in that respect: to the claim according to which ‘‘the future resurrection must not be conceded by the philosopher, because it is impossible that it be examined by reason,’’ a thesis that is totally consistent with the writings of Boethius and his Arts colleagues, the Bishop of Paris replies that ‘‘it is an error, because even the philosopher must keep his intellect captive in submission to the faith.’’ The Arts Masters want to build up in its entirety a philosophy that is an end in itself; Tempier and his acolytes want to bring it down to the level of a mere auxiliary to Christian wisdom. From this, we have the condemnation of article 145 that contends ‘‘that there is no question that can be rationally debated that the philosopher must not debate and determine, because rational arguments are drawn from reality and philosophy must study all of reality in its diverse parts.’’ There were ethical consequences to the enthusiasm for philosophy as comprehensive self-regulated knowledge that drove the Arts Masters condemned by Bishop Tempier. Indeed, prior to the decree of March 7, 1277, certain members of the Arts Faculty conceptualized a purely philosophical ideal of life based on the acquisition of intellectual virtues and oriented to attaining joyfulness of mind through the cognitive union with divine realities. This was a rigorous ethical program that came from a tradition of thought developed by the great Arabic philosophers, from al-FarabI to Averroes, including Avicenna, and that ultimately had its roots in Aristotle’s key texts, such as Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics and Book XII of the Metaphysics. In favoring a true philosophical asceticism that devalued the pleasures of the flesh arising from the lower powers of sensibility in favor of intellectual pleasures flowing from the exercise of man’s most noble faculty, this new way of life, a potential rival to Christian ethics, was essentially addressed to professional philosophers who, thanks to this, became aware of forming a class of elite thinkers that was superior to other social classes. Here again, it is Boethius of Dacia who offers the most complete manifesto reflecting this trend toward an autonomous practice of philosophy in which man’s intellectual essence is fully realized. In his treatise On the Supreme Good, after having determined that a morally good human life is that which is devoted to the knowledge of what is true, the Danish scholar concluded that the ultimate goal for human beings down here resides in the loving and joyful contemplation of the First Principle, which gives existence to all beings and at which the philosopher arrives in the end of a “journey of the mind’’ that traverses the ascending ladder of beings. Undoubtedly, as a consequence, Boethius and his Arts colleagues professed ‘‘that there is no more excellent status than to give oneself to philosophy” and they let it be understood ‘‘that only philosophers are the wise men of the world,’’ so Bishop Tempier reports in articles 40 and 154 of the syllabus. We can well see how such propositions could appear seditious to the theologians and men of the church who formed the ruling class of medieval society. We also perceive what a threat the advancing of a system of philosophical virtues capable of competing with the order of theological values could represent for Tempier and his acolytes. Therefore, the ecclesiastical power had to condemn some theses such as those that claim ‘‘that chastity is no greater good than perfect abstinence” (article 181) and ‘‘that charity is no greater good than perfect friendship’’ (article 220). The scandalous notion of man attaining salvation through philosophy started to emerge from the ethical discourse of Arts Masters, as is testified by article 157 of the Parisian decree: ‘‘if one is well ordered according to his intellect and affections, as one can be sufficiently through the intellectual virtues and other moral virtues of which the Philosopher (i. e., Aristotle) speaks in the Ethics, one is sufficiently disposed for eternal happiness.’’ However, with respect to what we might term the ‘‘ethical issue’’ of the Parisian condemnation, Tempier’s document acts as a mirror that deforms as well as reflects its object. Indeed, while the Arts Masters, as we have seen, favor an intellectual hedonism and exhort their audience to master their passions, the Bishop of Paris paints a picture of them as individuals with dissolute morals, whose life would follow such maxims as ‘‘the sin against nature, like abuse in intercourse, although contrary to the nature of the species, is not, however, contrary to the nature of the individual’’ (article 166) and ‘‘simple fornication, such as that of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman, is not a sin’’ (article 183). In doing so, Stephen Tempier’s condemnation sealed for one last time the alliance of the heretic and the libertine to better denounce the Arts Masters who, however, wanted nothing more nor less than the peaceful coexistence of the philosopher and the theologian.
World History
