Al-Farabl’s political philosophy left a deep impress on subsequent Islamic thought. In a crucial sense, Avicenna, Ibn Bajja, and Averroes were al-Farabi’s disciples in this area, as was the Jewish philosopher Maimonides. Maimonides not only applied al-Farabi’s political thought to his philosophic understanding of Judaism, but also to his pioneering Jewish legal activity. When Maimonides embarked on the project of writing the first complete code of Jewish law, he appears to have been strongly influenced by al-Farabl’s discussions of the characteristics of the virtuous religion. The question that faces students of Maimonides’ thought is the limits of this influence. Does Maimonides understand Mosaic Law completely in accordance with al-Farabl’s model, or does he adopts this model only in part.
For Maimonides, the divine law is distinguished from all other legislations in that it imparts true opinions to its adherents, thereby showing them the way to intellectual perfection and true felicity (Guide of the Perplexed 2:40; 3:27). In Maimonides’ terms, it is directed to the ‘‘welfare of the soul’’ and not only to the ‘‘welfare of the body,’’ or body politic, which is the goal of non-divine legislations. Moreover, the divine law inculcates the moral virtues that contribute to the ‘‘welfare of the body’’ by prescribing actions that are perfectly equibalanced, neither too extreme nor too lax, whereas non-divine legislations fall short in this matter (Guide 2:39). On these points Maimonides’ views are anchored in al-Farabl’s thought. Moreover, he opens his legal code, Mishneh Torah, with a section devoted to legally binding opinions regarding God and the order of the world that conform to al-Farabl’s conceptual scheme. Maimonides also agrees with al-Farabl that only one who attains intellectual perfection can lay down a divine law. He employs this point to argue that one can distinguish true divine law from its imitators by looking at the intellectual and moral characteristics of the lawgiver (Guide 2:40). But he stops far short of al-Farabl by maintaining that there was and will always be only one divine law, and that is the Law of Moses. More important, he appears to regard Moses as merely the recipient and transmitter of the divine law, with God being the actual author who communicates the Law to Moses by means of a created divine voice (Guide 2:33). In other words, Maimonides appears to be closer to his coreligionist, Judah Halevi, than he is to al-Farabl by treating God as the immediate efficient cause ofthe divine law, with the divine voice created by God and heard by all of Israel attesting to the truth of this point.
Maimonidean scholars have debated the problem whether Maimonides in fact believed that God, and not Moses, was the immediate author of the divine law as contained in the Torah and that God created an audible voice heard by all Israel as the Torah relates. A number have argued that Maimonides’ esoteric view on this matter was that Moses himself was the legislator of the law in one or both of the two ways described by al-Farabl in the passage from the Book of Religion cited above. Maimonides draws a number of parallels between the divine law and nature. Like nature, he notes, there is nothing in the divine law that is in vain. Like nature the divine law does not pay attention to the isolated, but to what is beneficial in the majority of instances (Guide 3:25-26, 34). If we interpret Maimonides as agreeing with al-FarabI that the divine law is the product of a naturally attained ability, even if Maimonides regards the level of perfection attained by Moses as a unique occurrence, then the distinction between divine law and nature breaks down even more. For Mai-monides, as for al-FarabI, the divine law is the ideal expression of both natural law and conventional or human law. It was framed by one who attained ultimate perfection and was designed to promote it in the most effective manner possible within a polity. Based on his perfect theoretical and practical apprehension, Moses organized the Jewish polity in a manner that best imitates God’s ordering of the world.
Maimonides leaves little doubt that even nonprophetic legislators partake of a divine though natural gift - namely, the ability to rule. While people are by nature social animals, they are not by temperament capable of living together without destroying each other. Only one with the ability to rule, an ability that Maimonides traces to an emanation from the Active Intellect to those possessing a superior imagination, can bring about the social harmony necessary for communal existence. Yet in lacking theoretical perfection these rulers and lawgivers are not concerned about inculcating true opinions, nor are they capable of organizing society with the view of directing it to final perfection (Guide 2:37, 40). Only one who combines intellectual and imaginative perfection, the prophet, is the one who receives the emanation from the Active Intellect to both faculties and is capable of ruling society in an optimal manner. Only the individual who achieved the ultimate intellectual perfection, Moses, was capable of legislating a permanent law that merits the label ‘‘divine.’’
Yet even if we accept the interpretation that Mai-monides understands divine law completely in accordance with a naturalistic model, his approach to the issue is not framed by purely theoretical philosophical considerations. His primary concern is to defend Mosaic Law as the unique divine law in a manner that is at least consistent with what he regards as philosophic truth regarding God’s governance of the world. The concern to uphold the validity of Mosaic Law is all the more evident if we interpret Maimonides as agreeing with the traditional belief that God is the immediate author of the law given to Moses. For all his commitment to medieval Aristotelian philosophy in general, and the commitment to al-FarabI in particular, Maimonides’ first commitment remains to Judaism.