Development of a Christian idea of bellum iustum, including distinctions between just war and holy war, was a matter of utmost import for the history of Europe and of the Americas. In the process, Christian writers made use of many non-Christian sources. The legacy of Rome, Greek philosophical and historical writing, and the knightly or chivalric code all provided material, which Christians connected with a reading of the Bible.
As well, the existence of Judaism and Islam played a part in Christian just war discourse, though not so much in the way of providing source material or precedents. The persistence and, in the case of Islam, the power of non-Christian religious communities pressed just war thinkers to answer significant questions. Should war be used to spread the Christian faith? Under what conditions could an alternative religious community become an enemy? For what purposes could a war between Christians and Jews or Muslims be fought?
From the standpoint of Christian just war thinking, Jews were identified as a persistent, though for the most part nonthreatening religious minority. The task of Christians was to govern those Jewish communities living under Christian rule. Thomas Aquinas illustrates well the ambiguity of this position. Christians should think, he wrote, of the persistence of Jews and their erroneous practices as the result of God’s providence. Their position should be regulated in ways designed to reinforce the costs of error, and correlatively of the impending triumph of Christ. Jews might be invited to receive the Gospel. But they ought not to be coerced, at least if that involves the use of military force. The payment of special taxes, the imposition of restrictions on freedom of movement and association, and the like were acceptable to Thomas. War within Christendom should be reserved for heretics and apostates, however.
That said, it is of interest to historians that Jewish tradition developed its own ‘‘just war tradition’’ in the period of our interest. Following the failure of wars of liberation against Rome in 70 and again in 130-135 CE, rabbinic authorities interpreted the Hebrew Bible in a way that radically delimited the right of Jews to resort to military force for political and/or religious purposes. For reasons connected to purposes of communal discipline, God had decreed that the people of Israel be governed by others, and anyone who raised the sword by organizing a revolt should be judged as controverting the purposes of
God. The Talmudic tract called Sotah articulated this judgment, even as it noted that biblical tradition indicated God’s authorization for two types of wars. The one, milhemet mitzvah or “obligatory” war involved fighting commanded by God, as in the book of Joshua or more generally, against the mythic enemy identified as Amalek. In terms of means, the obligatory war is total war, according to the rules recorded in Deuteronomy 20. The other, milhemet rashut or ‘‘permitted’’ war, identified with the wars of King David and other exemplary rulers, suggests a war for political purposes, for example the expansion of Israel’s territory and/or the enhancement of its security. In its means, this type of war is more limited, again as indicated by the provisions for war against cities ‘‘far away’’ in Deuteronomy 20. The Talmud, in the portions called Mishna and Gemara (usually dated c. 200 and 500 CE, respectively) recorded rabbinic commentary suggesting that the ruler of a Jewish state should gain the approval of the Sanhedrin or council of 70 prior to initiating a ‘‘permitted’’ war.
In Mishneh Torah, the great medieval scholar Moses Maimonides (d. 1204) systematized these and other rabbinic judgments. In discussing the laws pertaining to kings and wars, Maimonides restates the distinction between obligatory and permitted wars, and notes that these are valid for any King of Israel. Maimonides, born in Spain at a time when Christians were making progress toward retaking the peninsula from Muslims, migrated to Egypt and thus produced most of his work in a context dominated by Islam. It is not clear whether and how Maimon-ides thought these judgments might be implemented, though it is of interest that his comments, along with the views presented by Nachmanides (d. 1270), provide material for Jewish debate over the military and political policies of present-day Israel.
By contrast with authorities like Maimonides, Muslim scholars dealt with questions of war in connection with rule over vast expanses of territory. Following the rapid conquest of much of the Middle East and North Africa, members of the religious class (al-‘ulama’) articulated a set of judgments indicating that diplomatic and military activity designed to spread the blessings of Islamic government should be viewed as consistent with the program of the Prophet Muhammad (d. 632). According to this view, Muhammad’s early career in Mecca, the city of his birth, involved a divine restriction, in that he had only received the order to preach. Around the time of the migration to Medina (622 CE), the Prophet and his followers received first the permission to fight (cf. Qur’an 22: 39-41), and then in successive revelations the command obligating them to do so. Before his death, Muhammad declared that Arabia was now under the control of Islam, and according to tradition, sent letters to the ruler of the Byzantine, Sasanian, and ‘Abbasid Empires inviting them to accept Islam, to pay tribute to the Islamic state, or to make themselves ready to fight. As many Muslims understood it, such actions of the Prophet constituted a standing order for the faithful to struggle by means of the sword, as well as by teaching and preaching, so as to bring the world into a pattern consistent with God’s will or to ‘‘make God’s cause succeed’’ (Qur’an 8: 39).
Muslim thinking about war thus tied fighting to the example of the Prophet, and similarly restricted its means according to reports of orders Muhammad gave to his army. These include restrictions on targeting (women, children, the very old, members of religious classes, and others are classified as noncombatants and thus are not to be the direct target of attacks), as well as exhortations to keep pledges and in general to fight in ways worthy of the title mujahid (one who struggles, particularly by fighting in approved wars).
By the mid-ninth and tenth centuries, texts presenting the judgments of well-known scholars like Malik ibn ‘Atta (d. 795), al-Shaybani (d. 804), and al-Shafi‘i (d. 820) provided material studied by members of the learned class. These included a set of ‘‘judgments pertaining to armed struggle’’ or aJikam al-jihad, which were regarded as establishing precedents that could be extended so as to provide guidance for contemporary questions. The general character of such judgments provides a remarkable parallel with Christian just war thinking. Thus, Muslim authorities indicate that legitimate war requires authorization by a competent authority, must be fought for an approved cause, and must be conducted with right intention. The first requirement is usually taken to mean the head of state or his designee, albeit in consultation with recognized religious scholars. The second has to do with the establishment or extension of Islamic authority, or in some circumstances with its maintenance or defense. The third requires that Muslim military policy and the conduct of Muslim armies follow the orders of the Prophet. As Muslim just war thinking developed, these came to be associated not only with avoidance of direct or intentional harm to noncombatants, but also with a discussion about certain weapons and tactics. The use of hurling machines in siege warfare might be approved, for example; but the use of fire was more problematic.
One of the more interesting developments in Muslim discussion related to the problem of rebellion. In general, the idea of Muslims fighting Muslims was seen as problematic; as well, there are many sayings attributed to Muhammad designed to discourage Muslims from revolt,
Even in the context of unjust rule. Nevertheless, the subset of just war judgments indicated by the term ahikam al-bugat or ‘‘judgments pertaining to rebels’’ indicates that political authorities faced with a revolt orchestrated by a group with a clearly Islamic intention must tread lightly. Their goal should be reconciliation, in the manner suggested by Qur’an 49:10.
Three further items deserve mention: first, the texts in which authorities speak about the justification and conduct of war make a rigorous distinction between fighting intended to extend or defend Islamic territory, and the use of force with respect to faith. Here, as in the Christian case, forced conversions violate the rule of faith, though heretics, apostates, and religious minorities (ahl al-dhimma or ‘‘protected’’ people) who are recalcitrant may be fought. Second, a minority view, represented by the various Shl'ite groups, argued that most of the fighting by which Islam expanded had been illegitimate, since these wars did not take place under the leadership of a divinely appointed imam or religious-political authority. Third, during the period of the Crusades, the notion of fighting as an ‘‘individual duty’’ came to the fore. This notion, which received further development in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) in connection with the advance of the Mongols, suggested that when the Muslims of a particular region (e. g., Syro-Palestine during the eleventh and twelfth centuries) proved unable to defend themselves, the rulers of neighboring Muslim territories should send armies to help. It is this judgment which, by an interesting twist, would come to be developed in the nineteenth and subsequent centuries in connection with a variety of Muslim resistance movements.
World History
