Byzantines inherited from the opening paragraph of a famous text of Late Antiquity, Porphyry’s Isagoge (late third century), and from the ancient Greek Neoplatonic commentaries on it (by Ammonius, Elias, and David; fifth to sixth centuries) as well as on Aristotle’s Categories (by John Philoponus; sixth century) and from the Prolegomena (by Olympiodorus; sixth century), a question that later on proved of paramount importance for many philosophers in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries in Europe, that is, the question of the ontological status of the ‘‘universals.’’ Do ‘‘universals’’ exist in extramental reality or are they just concepts (epinoiai) in our minds? And, if the former, are they corporeal or incorporeal? And, if the latter, do they exist independently from the sensible beings or just inhere in them? In the ninth century, when Byzantine philosophy proper begins, Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople, subscribes to a conceptualist stand, which is very close to (if not identical with) the Stoic doctrine, by explicitly stating that the Universals are ‘‘bodies’’ or ‘‘corporeal’’ (Amphilochia, 77). Photios argues against the Platonic ‘‘ideas’’ by using Aristotle’s famous ‘‘third man’’ argument as well as the argument that an intelligible reality, such as a Platonic ‘‘idea,’’ is by nature unable to account for the identity of two or more sensible realities. True, Photios describes the Platonic ‘‘ideas’’ as a threat to God’s omnipotence, conceived as His freedom to create the world according to His own will only, without any constraint by this or that ‘‘exemplary form’’ potentially existent independently from His will. Further, his arguments are not original. Still, it is Photios himself who distinguishes the philosophical arguments against the Platonic ‘‘ideas’’ from the theological ones; and he seems to have investigated the question at stake in depth, insofar as he not only understood Aristotle’s disagreement with Plato but also detected from some indirect sources what the Stoics held on the question and voted for it.
In the second half of the eleventh century, John Italos and Eustratius of Nicaea, in the context of the revival of the Platonic tradition by Michael Psellos, seem to have been interested in the problem of the ontological status of universals and elaborated some version of Ammonius’ and Proclus’ relevant doctrines. It is not, however, quite clear whether they did adhere to some metaphysical tenets or, following Psellos’ policy, they just discussed the problem in the context of their teaching activity for learning purposes. Further, it is not quite clear if their application of some ancient doctrines ofthe ‘‘universals’’ on some strictly theological (Christological and Trinitarian) matters allows for extracting from this context some lines of argument, taking them at their face value, and drawing the conclusion that Italos and Eustratios held this or that metaphysical doctrine.
In late thirteenth century, a fierce attack on the ‘‘uni-versals’’ was launched by Nikephoros Choumnos, who rejected not only Plato’s ‘‘ideas’’ but also Aristotle’s immanent ‘‘forms’’ (On Matter and Forms, 242-316). True, Choumnos’ purpose was to exalt God’s power as the absolutely sufficient cause of the world’s existence and form; still, his description of the way God’s power acts is very close to that offered by Plotinus in Ennead II, 2, 1-2. Likewise, in the second half of the fourteenth century, Nicholas Kabasilas, being a strict Aristotelian with no Neoplatonic affinities, claimed that no being whatsoever can be regarded as a model of any other than itself; in so stating, he cut off any metaphysical tie between God and the created beings.
Yet, cases like that of Photios, Choumnos, and Kabasilas were exceptions; during the second Byzantine revival of Platonism (second half of thirteenth century to middle fifteenth century), Ammonius’ doctrine of ‘‘uni-versals’’ as existing ‘‘before the many,’’ ‘‘in the many,’’ and ‘‘after the many’’ was typical, even though thinkers like Nikephoros Blemmydes, George Pachymeres (fourteenth century), Theodore Metochites (thirteenth to fourteenth centuries), Nikephoros Gregoras, Barlaam of Calabria, and Gregory Palamas (fourteenth century) added each of their own epistemological nuances.
World History
