A clear theme throughout Marsilius’ works is the conviction that there are no real universals. Reality consists only of individuals, which can be signified by written or spoken words or by concepts in the human mind. Things that are similar can be signified and made known by the same name or concept. This is, for example, the case with the concept of ‘‘tree,’’ which refers both to an oak and to a beach. Universality, therefore, is a property of names and concepts that refer to like individuals. These names and concepts are themselves individual: each human being has his own concept of ‘‘tree’’ even if this concept signifies the same tree as that of another human being.
This theory, which he shared with William ofOckham, John Buridan, and many other contemporaries, had a direct impact on his theory of logic. In his treatise, On supposition, for example, he maintains that older logicians (like Peter of Spain) used a special kind of supposition, namely, suppositio simplex, to refer to the use of a term or concept that stands for a universal thing. Since, to Marsil-ius, there are no universal things, this type of supposition was senseless and should be abolished, since it confused students. To refer to the universal use of a term or concept in phrases such as ‘‘Tree is a genus,’’ another traditional type of supposition, namely, suppositio materialis, would suffice, as this kind of supposition takes the term or concept as referring to itself. In the above phrase, it is the term or concept ‘‘tree’’ itself which signifies universally and therefore is a genus, and not something in the trees outside in the yard.
In this connection, Marsilius explicitly criticized some of his contemporaries (he may have been thinking of Albert of Saxony), who, even if they did not accept the existence ofreal universals, still wished to retain the notion of suppositio simplex. They would say, like the old logicians, that the word or concept of ‘‘tree’’ in the given example has suppositio simplex, rather than suppositio materialis. Marsilius, however, saw no need to retain the vocabulary of the old logicians. The use of the term suppositio simplex was entirely arbitrary, he argued. Therefore, there was no reason not to replace it with suppositio materialis, which was moreover preferable, in that it avoided confusion.
This celebrated passage has important historical significance, as here Marsilius linked the acceptance of real universals with the old logicians (antiqui) and their denial with the modern logicians (moderni). However, though tempting, his remarks cannot be regarded as an early example of the fifteenth-century ‘‘Wegestreit’’ between Antiqui and Moderni. The antiqui of whom Marsilius spoke were no contemporary Realists, but rather logicians from earlier generations, as evinced by the fact that he referred to them also by the term antiquitus, that is, from ancient times. Nevertheless, this passage reveals why the Realists of the fifteenth century who based themselves on these older logicians were labeled as Antiqui, even if they themselves were not from the old days.
World History
