The reduced and impoverished East Roman or Byzantine empire now had to contend not only with an aggressive and extremely successful new foe in the east. It had far fewer resources at its disposal, it had lost effective control in the Balkans, and had no real power in Italy, where the exarch, based at Ravenna, struggled against increasingly difficult odds to maintain the imperial position. The insistence of the imperial government during the reign of Constans II on enforcing the official Monothelete policy reflected the government’s need to maintain imperial authority and the views of those in power that the Romans were being punished for their failure to deal with the divisions within the Church. But it also brought the empire into conflict with the papacy and the western Church, as well as provoking opposition within the empire, bringing a further degree of political and ideological isolation with it. Through the reigns of Constans II (641-68), Constantine IV (668-85), and Justinian II (685-95), Asia Minor was raided and substantial tracts of territory devastated annually from the early 640s well into the first half of the eighth century, with catastrophic effects on population, on the economy of the regions affected, especially the border zones, and on urban life, which was reduced effectively to fortified garrison towns. A series of sieges and attempts to break Constantinopo-litan resistance between 674 and 678 finally failed, and a major siege in 717-18 was defeated with great loss on the Arab side. The situation appeared desperate enough for Constans II to move the imperial court to Sicily in 662. His assassination in 668 brought the experiment to an end, but illustrates contemporary perceptions. Justinian II was deposed in 695; a series of short-lived usurpers followed until Justinian II himself recovered his throne in 705. Deposed again and killed in 711, internal political and military confusion lasted until the seizure of power by the general Leo, who became Leo III (717-41) and, having defeated the Arab besiegers in 717-18, finally re-established some political order (Haldon 1997: 41-91).
Arab strategy can be followed through several phases. Until the defeat of the siege of 717-18 Byzantine resistance seems to have been almost entirely passive, limited to holding on to fortified centres and avoiding any open contact. During the Arab civil wars of the late 680s and early 690s the emperor Justinian II was able to stabilize the situation for a short while; but it was only during the 720s that the empire was able effectively to begin meeting Arab armies in the field and reasserting imperial military control. In the meantime, the Byzantine resistance, focused on fortified key points and a strategy of harassment and avoidance, had at least prevented a permanent Arab presence in Asia Minor, aided of course also by the geography of the region. The Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges were an effective physical barrier, with only a few well-marked passes allowing access and egress.
The Balkan front was also a concern for Constantinople. Technically, the Danube remained the border even in the 660s and 670s. In practice, only the presence of an imperial army could bring the local Slav chieftains, briefly, to heel. In 679 the situation was transformed by the arrival of the Turkic Bulgars, a nomadic people who had been forced out of their homelands and pastures around the Volga by the encroachments of the Khazars from the east. They were refused permission by Constantine IV to cross the Danube for protection on ‘Roman’ territory (the Danube river itself remained in fact largely under Byzantine control because it was navigable, and the imperial fleet could patrol it); they crossed over, where they met an army under Constantine himself. Poor discipline and mistaken signals led to a serious defeat of the imperial forces, and over the next twenty years the Bulgars
Consolidated their hold over the region, establishing a loose hegemony over the indigenous Slav and other peoples in the region. By 700, the Bulgar khanate was an important political and military power threatening Byzantine Thrace (Haldon 1997; Whittow 1996).
World History
