Gilbert’s theories of the meaning of names and of predication are intrinsically connected not only to the grammatical conceptions of his time which derived from a Platonic reading of Priscian’s grammar, and to the foundations of the logica vetus, but also to his own personal ontology. Ordinary language, to which the language of natural philosophy is led back, reflects the ontological structure of created reality, albeit in the limited manner already discussed (Jacobi 1995a:96-100). If Priscian affirms that the noun signifies substance and quality, this is to be understood in the sense that it signifies both the subsistent and the subsistence or form. Homo signifies as much the particular man (substantia nominis, id quod est) as the form humanitas (qualitas nominis, id quo est). It is for the context (ratio propositi) to suggest which of the two meanings is actually intended by the author in different propositions: in ‘‘Homo est risibilis’’ the singular man, in ‘‘Homo est individuorum forma” the form humanitas (Comm. Contra Eutichen, p. 296, l. 31-297, l. 66). Like the significate of the noun, predication also reflects the duality of subsistents and forms that dominates the created world (Maioli 1979:79-99). In natural nonmetaphorical discourse the author refers to (supponit) by means of a noun in the subject-position the subsistent or id quod est as that of which is being spoken; through the predicate the author expresses the inherence of the form or the id quo est, which the predicate signifies in the subsistent referred to by the subject term: in ‘‘Socrates est homo’’ ‘‘est homo” expresses the inherence of the form humanitas in the individual represented by the name ‘‘Socrates.’’
Every subsistent has many names according to which of the forms it is being considered under: Socrates is called ‘‘Socrates’’ if his proper form socrateitas is being considered, ‘‘white’’ if his accidental form of whiteness is being considered, ‘‘man’’ if his substantial form of humanity is being considered, and so on. When a proposition is formulated to affirm something about the subsistent, first of all one of its possible names is chosen in order to indicate it as the object of discourse. But such names are chosen in view of what one wishes to predicate: ‘‘we do not predicate in order to supposit so much as supposit in order to predicate’’ (Comm. Contra Euticen p. 349, l. 50 s.). Among the predications of natural philosophy, which are true in a proper sense, in some the form signified by the predicate stands in a relation of consequence to that signified by the subject, which is its cause according to the internal order of the agglomeration of generic and specific forms that constitutes the subsistent (complexionis consequentia). For example, ‘‘corporeum est album’’ - given that the form of whiteness is an effect of corporeity; corporeity cannot exist without some color-form. Such propositions are called consequentes. But there are also cases of propositions which, although they have the external form of subject + predicate and are true in a proper sense and not the result of metaphorical discourse, nevertheless do not respect the complexionis consequentia. An example is ‘‘corporeum est rationale’’: although Socrates really is corporeal and rational, there is no relation of consequence between his form rationality and his form corporeity. For rationality is caused by the spirituality of Socrates' soul and not by the corporeity of his body, signified by the term corporeum. Such propositions are called accidentales tamen verae conexiones and provide a model for interpreting various theological propositions. For example, the proposition ‘‘God has died’’ is true since Christ is God and Christ has died, even though he died inasmuch as he was a man, and not inasmuch as he is God (Comm. Contra Euticen, p. 345, l. 29-348, l. 8; de Rijk 1987:164-170).
The predications of natural philosophy are also further distinguished in relation to the substantial or accidental function within the ontological structure of the subsistent of the form signified by the predicate, as well as in relation to Aristotle's classification of the ten categories (Maioli 1979:83-101; Comm. De Hebdomadibus, p. 198, ll. 76-90). Substantial predications express the irreplaceable elements, which cause a subsistent to be and to be this particular subsistent - its subsistentiae, the forms that make up its substantial being (esse aliquid in eo quod est). Accidental predications express characteristics of a subsistent, which may or may not be found in it without producing or destroying its being or its being this or that particular subsistent. They express only its accidental being (tantum esse aliquid). A further, different distinction is made between predications secundum rem or inhaerentium and those that are extrinsecus comparatae or non inhaerentium (De trinitate, p. 134, l. 77- 138, l. 78). Independently of their being accidental or substantial to a given subsistent, the forms signified by predications of substance, quality, and extensive quantity are always inherent in the subsistent and the predications which express them are thus ‘‘according to the thing.’’ On the other hand, predications of nonextensive quantity as well as of the remaining seven categories express, despite their subject-predicate form, not true inherence but external circumstances or relations of various types between subsistents and things other than themselves (status). Gilbert therefore calls them ‘‘extrinsically compared.''
World History
