From the vantage point of 1400, the chances of a single family emerging to the prominence the Medici gained even by the 1440s, let alone under Lorenzo, must have seemed remote. Not that it was unthinkable; indeed most of the
Communes of northern Italy had long since evolved into some form of one-family regime. But the Florentines had experimented with one-man emergency regimes in the 1320s and 1340s and in each case became quickly disenchanted with the reality of what initially seemed appealing. Moreover, the fate of the Alberti demonstrated the oligarchy’s fear of families of great size and wealth with international connections and prestige; their long exile, which eliminated them as a political force even after they returned, stood as a warning to other families that might have been tempted to become too great or visible. Florentine fear of the “signore” and the story of the Alberti made it at least unlikely that any family would succeed in doing what none had ever done in this republic in which all watched like hawks for signs of unacceptable ambition.
In retrospect, nonetheless, signs of change were not lacking and developments were preparing the way, if not for the Medici, then for someone like them. Increasingly cut off from the corporate solidarities that had defined their political role and collective interests for so long, guildsmen found it increasingly necessary to look to powerful men for patronage, favors, assistance, and protection. A few patrons emerged as leaders of more extensive networks of allies and clients that were the foundation of their political prominence. Patronage had always been a crucial source of elite power, but after 1400 it became politically more pervasive and decisive, as patrons expected “friends” and clients to support them in scrutinies, legislative councils, and executive offices. And because political power depended on the size, extent, and cohesiveness of these circles of friends and clients, men with political ambition competed as never before to form and keep large and dependable networks of amici. Politics came increasingly under the influence of these major figures who commanded the support of clients, who enjoyed influence beyond the offices they held, and whose opinions shaped political debate and policy. In a few cases they remained powerful and visibly prominent for decades, among other places in the pratiche, which became more frequent (from 21 in 1385 to 37 in 1410), and to which more citizens were invited (193 total participants in 1385, 464 in 1410, 153 of whom made recorded speeches). But certain individuals enjoyed a regular and dominating presence. Among the 153 speakers in 1410, six spoke fourteen or more times, and one spoke thirty times: four of these same six and one other spoke in over a hundred meetings between 1403 and 1414. As noted in chapter 6, this was the core of the leadership group in the century’s first two decades: Maso degli Albizzi, Piero Baroncelli, Filippo Corsini, Cristofano Spini, Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi, and, just beneath them in frequency of participation, Niccolo da Uzzano, Gino Capponi, and Lorenzo Ridolfi.1 In the next decade Rinaldo degli Albizzi, Palla Strozzi,
And Neri di Gino Capponi also assumed positions within the leadership. The emergence of these “big men” was not necessarily a function of the offices they held. Rinaldo degli Albizzi served often as a military commissioner, but only once on the priorate (1416) and twice on the advisory colleges. Palla Strozzi served three times on the advisory colleges, but never on the Signoria. Power was now exercised less through office-holding than through patronage and behind-the-scenes channels, and this established important precedents for the emergence in the 1420s and 1430s of Cosimo de’ Medici, who, although he became bigger than the rest and put them all in his shadow (or in exile), was neither the only nor the first “big man” of his generation.
Two further signs of the emergence of a new kind of political leadership were “successions” of sons to the dignities of prominent fathers, and public acknowledgments, under the influence of these same leaders, of the merits and “virtues” of leading citizens and sometimes even of the “successions.” Neri di Gino Capponi followed his father into the leadership; three of Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi’s sons became prominent in the oligarchy in the early 1430s; and Cosimo de’ Medici inherited and vastly expanded the influence bequeathed by his father Giovanni. But the Albizzi are the most revealing example: when Rinaldo “inherited” his father’s leadership role in the regime, the commune bestowed its formal approval by first honoring Maso with a state funeral and then, a few months later, conferring an honorary knighthood on Rinaldo. The Signoria in office in 1417 when Maso died (which included Filippo Corsini as Standardbearer of Justice) asked the councils to approve expenditures for the funeral, describing Maso as “dear to the patria, faithful to the state, beloved by the citizens, and resplendent with all the virtues.” Although the councils agreed, there was opposition: a total of 115 in the two councils voted against it. The Signoria of April 1418 proposed Rinaldo’s knighthood, describing him as a man “made famous not only by the distinguished deeds of his ancestors but also by his own virtue” and as “most worthy of supreme honors,” given him in order to “show in how much affection Rinaldo is held on account of his love for the patria and his loyalty to the state and all citizens.” This too was approved, but again with over one hundred dissenting votes.2 Rhetorical echoes of the first measure in the second clearly imply that Rinaldo’s virtues reflected those of his father and made him worthy of an honor that Maso had also enjoyed. Equally clear is that many in the councils were uneasy with this unprecedented official blessing of unofficial succession within the leadership. But the precedent was now established. A similar recognition of succession occurred at the funeral in 1429 of Matteo Castellani, who died while serving on the advisory college of the Sixteen and who had been awarded a knighthood
2
ASF, Provvisioni, Registri, 107, ff. 256-256v; 108, ff. 3v-4.
By the king of Naples when he was an ambassador in 1415, an honor subsequently confirmed by the Florentine government. The commune paid for his funeral, during which it also bestowed an honorary knighthood on his 12-year-old son Francesco.3 Giovanni de’ Medici also died in 1429, and the commune likewise paid for public honors at his funeral.4 But in this case there was no knighthood for the son.
Most of the political writing of this period comes from civic humanists who celebrated (much in the spirit of the legislative enactments honoring the Albizzi) the patriotic virtues of the leadership elite. But one observer, the enigmatic and choleric Giovanni Cavalcanti, saw dangers in the politics of big men and their factions. Born around 1380 into an old magnate family, Cavalcanti chronicled the tumultuous events of the 1420s and 1430s, with particular attention to the eruption of factional divisions between the ruling oligarchy and the Medici, and expressed his dismay at the way factions and patrons were removing power from the institutions of government and, as he saw things, bringing about the triumph of private interests over the public good. Later in the century, the Medici were similarly accused by their critics, but Cavalcanti already saw evidence of these trends in the pre-Medici oligarchy. He describes a pratica to which he was invited, together with many others, to give counsel to the Signoria on how to respond to provocations by the duke of Milan. “We do not ask your advice for our benefit or special interest,” he recalled the priors saying, “but we seek it as men who speak in the name of your commune, since, if today it is we who hold this office, tomorrow you will be here.” As many speakers then rose to give their different views, Cavalcanti noticed that Niccolo da Uzzano, the most eminent of the group, slept until all the speeches were finished, then rose and spoke decisively and at length in favor of a strong response to the Milanese threat. “Once Niccolo said these things,” the entire pratica “indicated its agreement with what he proposed,” which prompted Cavalcanti to conclude that Niccolo, “together with other powerful men, had decided, in some private and secret place, that. . . he would express the view that he did and that the others would confirm and support it.” Cavalcanti feared that pratiche were becoming a forum, not for exchanging and debating ideas, but for the ratification of policies already worked out in private by a few. As Cavalcanti told friends, “it seems to me that from this way of doing things tyrannical rule would replace constitutional government in the republic and that its governance would be conducted outside the palace [of the priors].” His friends agreed, adding that the “commune was being governed more at dinners and in studies than in the palace.” “From
3
G. Ciappelli, “Il cittadino fiorentino e il fisco,” p. 848. ASF, Provvisioni, Registri, 120, f. 18v.
Such abominable audacity,” he concluded, “would result the greatest evils for the republic.”303
Despite Cavalcanti’s misgivings, the oligarchy ruled successfully for a long generation between the 1380s and the early 1420s, expanding Florentine power in Tuscany, surviving serious threats from Milan and Naples, and presiding over what was later remembered with nostalgia as a decade of peace and prosperity between 1414 and 1424. Had they been able to avoid the wars that engulfed the regime, the Medici, despite their wealth, might never have become more powerful than other leading families. Giovanni de’ Medici was not among those who dominated the pratiche in these years (although, when he did speak, his opinions on financial and fiscal matters were highly respected),304 and it was not at all evident before 1425 or 1426 that the Medici were about to become leaders of a strong faction that would challenge the coalition of smaller factions led by Rinaldo degli Albizzi, Palla Strozzi, and other leading oligarchs. But by the mid-1420s, the two essential conditions of the oligarchy’s continued hegemony, containment of military expenses and relative harmony within the ruling group, were disintegrating. And when Cosimo emerged as the one man able to provide the needed funds for the hugely expensive wars that began in the mid-1420s, and, partly for this reason, began to play a leading role in the increasingly bitter divisions of the ruling group, the scene was set for the clash that led to Cosimo’s expulsion by his rivals in 1433 and his victorious recall by his friends in 1434.
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