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27-08-2015, 12:14

Justinian and the End of the Vandal Kingdom

In ad 565, the glittering funeral of the emperor Justinian took place in the imperial capital, Constantinople. On the orders of Sophia, the wife of his successor Justin, the body of the dead emperor was carried in a decorated pall, a magnificent piece of needlework which is described by the court poet Corippus:



And she [Sophia] brought a pall stitched with precious purple, where the whole vista of Justinian’s achievements was picked out in woven gold and glittered with gems. On one side the artist had skilfully represented with his sharp needle barbarian phalanxes bending their necks, slaughtered kings and subject peoples in order. And he made the yellow gold stand out from the colours, so everyone looking at it thought that they were real bodies. The faces were in gold, the blood in purple. And Justinian himself he had depicted as a victor amongst his courtiers, trampling on the brazen neck of the Vandal king, and Libya, applauding, bearing fruit and laurel.1



As a North African, Corippus, the author of this panegyric, might well have been expected to privilege the ‘liberation’ of his homeland. But amongst the population as a whole the conquest of North Africa, over three decades earlier, was still considered to be one the most impressive achievements of Justinian’s long and eventful reign, despite the years of military campaigning against the Moors and religious dissension that had followed it.2



The origin for the Byzantine invasion of the Vandal kingdom had been the usurpation and imprisonment of Hilderic by his cousin Gelimer in 530, a political fracas that initially looked like just another episode in the long internecine struggle between the two main branches of the Hasding family.3 On learning of the usurpation, Justinian immediately intervened by sending envoys to North Africa with a strongly worded letter of



The Vandals Andy Merrills and Richard Miles © 2010 Andy Merrills and Richard Miles. ISBN: 978-1-405-16068-1



Protest. In his missive, the emperor not only pointed out the moral improbity of Gelimer’s actions but also argued that, by deposing Hilderic, the new king had broken the custom of royal succession established by Geiseric. Gelimer, confident that Justinian’s complaint would translate into little more than an official protest, cursorily dismissed the imperial ambassadors, placed Hilderic and the king’s nephew Oageis in close confinement and blinded his other nephew Hoamer. Justinian responded with a second delegation who delivered what was in essence an ultimatum. Gelimer was to send Hilderic and his nephews to the safety of Constantinople or face war with the eastern Roman empire. Rather disingenuously, the emperor concluded the document by re-iterating that in attacking the Vandal king, he would be avenging the memory of Geiseric whose constitutional arrangements had been ignored by Gelimer.4



Gelimer was not prepared to cede any ground and probably calculated that the disastrous conclusions to the previous attempts by the eastern Roman empire to wrest control of North Africa would discourage Justinian from making good on his threats. He sent a letter to the emperor which robustly defended his actions and pointed out that it had, in fact, been Hilderic who had challenged the Vandal tradition of royal succession by promoting his own nephews at Gelimer’s expense. The communique concluded with a warning that any attack would be strongly resisted.5



In his account of the rupture of relations between Carthage and Constantinople, Procopius strongly implies that Justinian’s intervention was connected to the fact that Hilderic was a long-standing personal guest-friend of the emperor.6 Hilderic was, of course, the grandson of Valentinian III through his mother Eudocia, and the edict of toleration that he had issued towards the Nicene Church in ad 523 must also have been popular at the eastern imperial court. Justinian might also have been tempted by the renowned agricultural wealth of the region. Until the early fifth century Africa had been the bread basket of the western Roman Empire, and the emperor may well have believed that Africa could once more function as an agricultural powerhouse for his restored Roman Empire. All of these considerations might have played their part in Justinian’s decision to attempt an invasion of the Vandal kingdom, but the emperor’s principal motivation was probably the desire to deflect the mounting discontent within Constantinople at his high-handed style of rule and the unpopular fiscal policies of his senior officials.7 The previous year Justinian had only been saved from being overthrown during the so-called Nika riots by the brutal intervention of his generals who had massacred of 30,000 of his subjects in the



Hippodrome.8 A mission to restore Africa to the Roman Empire represented something of a fresh start for an emperor conscious that even his supporters would not tolerate any more blunders.



Justinian’s decision to invade North Africa would have been determined by the sources of information available to him. First there were merchants who plied their trade throughout the Mediterranean: on at least two occasions in Procopius’ narrative, merchants are represented as conduits of crucial strategic information.9 Then there were Roman refugees who had made their way to the imperial court. Procopius mentions a certain Apollinarius, a greatly favoured confident of Hilderic, who after the king’s fall:



Came to the Emperor Justinian with other Libyans, who were working in the interests of Hilderic, in order to entreat his favour as a suppliant.10



The Syrian chronicler Zacharias the Rhetor, a contemporary of Justinian, also recorded the major role that Romano-Africans had played in the emperor’s decision to send an expeditionary force:



There was then in Constantinople certain African nobles, who because of a quarrel that they had with a prince of that land [Gelimer], had quit their land and sought refuge with the emperor, and they had given him information about this country and urged him to act, saying that this country was extremely vast and very peaceful, and it was dreamt of a war with the Romans, but was locked in a war with the Moors, a people established in the desert and living like the Arabs on brigandage and raids. They emphasised in front of the emperor that this land had been snatched and stolen from the Roman Empire in the time of Geiseric, who had also taken Rome, carried off the objects of value in gold and silver, and retired to Carthage, in Africa. A fine city which he had seized and occupied.11



Such informants can only have furnished the emperor with a very partial account of affairs in Africa in order to encourage him to act. In his legislation, Justinian even made reference to the suffering inflicted by the Vandals on African exiles that he had encountered:



We have seen worthy men, with tongues cut off at the root, eloquently describe the punishment visited upon them. Others dispersed through the various provinces after different tortures and ended their life in exile.12



Procopius describes the gradual processes by which the empire geared up for a vast western war. Justinian immediately put into action a new foreign policy initiative designed to free up troops and resources for a military expedition against the Vandal kingdom. A new treaty, optimistically termed ‘the Eternal Peace’, was concluded with Persia in September 532. But as these preparations were made, few members of Justinian’s inner circle of advisors thought that the invasion was a sound idea. There were good reasons for this lack of enthusiasm. Although the potential rewards of the African campaign were high, the previous imperial expeditions to conquer the province had been unmitigated disasters and were hugely expensive. Whatever the economic potential of Africa, the initial expedition would demand a significant outlay in terms of manpower and money. Furthermore, there were concerns about how soldiers who had only just returned from a long hard war against the Persians would react to being immediately sent on what all knew to be an extremely risky enterprise.13



Despite these grave misgivings only John the Cappadocian, Justinian’s Praetorian Prefect, had the nerve to try and dissuade the emperor from this course of action:



You are planning to launch a mission against Carthage, to which if one goes by land, the journey takes one hundred and forty days, and by water, one is forced to cross the full extent of the open sea and go its very extremity. So whoever brings news to you from the camp will take a full year to deliver it. One might also add that if you are victorious over your enemies, you could not secure Africa whilst Sicily and Italy remain in the hands of others. At the same time if any reverse befalls you, O Emperor, the treaty having already been broken by you, you will bring danger to your own realm. In fact, pulling all of these thoughts together, it will be impossible for you to enjoy the fruits of victory whilst at the same time any defeat will jeopardise what is already well established.14



Initially it appeared that Justinian heeded these words of caution, but after the intervention of one of his own priests, who informed the emperor of a dream that revealed divine support for the campaign, preparations were recommenced. Justinian entrusted command of the expedition to his best general, Belisarius. At the same time encouraging news reached Constantinople that a serious revolt led by a certain Pudentius had broken against the Vandals in the territory of Tripolis in Libya. Justinian sent Pudentius the troops that he requested with the result that the easternmost reaches of the Vandal kingdom were permanently lost to the Hasdings. Further encouragement also arrived from Sardinia where the Vandal governor Godas had decided to break with Gelimer; on learning of the planned invasion, he sought an alliance with the eastern empire.15



Procopius served as an assessor in the expeditionary force commanded by Belisarius. The historian states that the general’s command comprised around 18,000 men, made up of both regular and federate infantry and cavalry. The army was transported on a convoy of 500 ships which was protected by a fleet of 92 warships. Having left Constantinople towards the end of June 533, the fleet landed at Caput Vada to the east of Carthage in the last days of August. On the way, they had been able to stop and take on new supplies in Sicily. Welcome intelligence was received there that Gelimer was away from his capital and that much of the Vandal army had been sent to deal with the revolt in Sardinia.



Belisarius wished to capitalize on this lack of preparation and was conscious of his troops’ lack of enthusiasm for a maritime engagement; consequently, he opted to disembark his force immediately and march on Carthage. Gelimer only learned of the invasion some four days after the landing, and immediately instructed his brother Ammata to take up a position at Ad Decimum, ten miles to the east of Carthage, with the intention of heading off Belisarius. Meanwhile, Gelimer and his cavalry caught up with the rear of the Byzantine army and shadowed it with the intention of entrapping it between the two Vandal forces. The Byzantine vanguard reached Ad Decimum far faster than Ammata expected, however; the Vandal commander was caught by surprise, killed and his army routed.16



Gelimer won a minor victory of his own, but instead of driving home his advantage, the king paused to bury Ammata - a moment of sentiment which gave the Byzantine forces time to rally and counter-attack. The Vandals were again surprised and retreated in total disarray. After this surprisingly easy victory, Belisarius led his troops into Carthage completely unopposed on 14 September. Climbing the Brysa Hill, Belisarius entered the royal palace where he took his ease on the throne of the absent Vandal king and feasted on the food that had been prepared in the royal kitchens.17



Meanwhile Gelimer had managed to rally his troops close to the city of Bulla Regia. He also recalled 5,000 troops who had been campaigning in Sardinia under the command of another brother, Tzazo. The Vandal king then marched on Carthage where he attempted to mount a blockade by cutting off its aqueduct whilst also attempting to induce the Arian soldiers in the Byzantine army and the inhabitants of the city to come over to his side. This initiative proved inconclusive. In December, Belisarius secured the defences of the city, satisfied himself that the Moors would not provide any aid to the Vandal king, marshalled his troops and marched out to confront Gelimer’s army. The two sides met at Tricamarum some 20 miles outside the city and the Vandal army was once again defeated. The king, with most of his troops killed or scattered, his treasure seized and his brother dead, fled to Mons Pappua in Numidia with a handful of followers and he sought sanctuary with the Moors. In Carthage, Hippo Regius and other African cities most of those Vandals who were still at large had taken refuge at Christian sanctuaries from where they were disarmed and taken into custody. A further blow to Gelimer’s fortunes was dealt by the handing over of what amounted to his reserve funds to Belisarius by one of his officials, Boniface.18



Gelimer’s last days of freedom saw him a broken man. After three months of harsh winter and starvation in his mountain hideout, the Vandal king was ready to surrender. In a peculiar passage, Procopius describes how the king asked Belisarius for gifts of bread to alleviate his hunger, a sponge to bathe an infected eye, a harp with which to lament his misfortune and assurances for his own safety. Gelimer received his gifts, bemoaned his fate and was brought before the imperial general in Carthage. The depredations that he had suffered had clearly affected him; Procopius describes how the defeated king broke out into fits of uncontrollable laughter during his audience with the general. Sympathizers protested that he was of sound mind and his amusement was merely a result of his realization, after the dramatic change in fortune that he had endured, that "man’s lot was worthy nothing else apart from much laughter’. In the summer of 534, Belisarius returned to Constantinople with Gelimer and 2,000 Vandal warriors.19



 

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