Diplomacy and Embassies

Diplomacy was a crucial aspect of the east Roman struggle for survival or for regional political supremacy. But the emphasis placed by Byzantine writers and governments on effective and intelligent diplomacy was not just a question of cultural preference informed by a Christian distaste for the shedding of blood: to the contrary, the continued existence of the state depended upon the deployment of a sophisticated diplomatic arsenal. The whole history of Byzantine foreign relations reflects this, both in the few explicit statements of political theory which survive, most obviously in the tenth-century De administrando imperio (‘On governing the empire’), as well as in the theory and practice of Byzantine diplomacy. As the Emperor Constantine VII states in the introduction to this treatise, a ruler must study what is known of the nearer and more distant peoples around the Roman state, so that he can understand ‘the difference between each of these nations, and how either to treat with and conciliate them, or to make war upon and oppose’.

Diplomacy also had a military edge: good relations with the various peoples of the steppe were essential to Byzantine interests in the Balkans and Caucasus, because a weapon might thereby be created which could be turned on the enemies of the empire - such as the Bulgars, for example - when necessary. In the autumn of the year 965, for example, shortly after the conquest by Byzantine armies of the islands of Crete and Cyprus, as well as the destruction of the Islamic power in Cilicia and its incorporation into the empire, Bulgarian envoys arrived at the court of the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas. Their purpose was to request the payment of the ‘tribute’ (or ‘subsidy’ from the imperial perspective) paid by Constantinople to the Bulgar Tsar as part of the guarantee for the long-lasting peace that had been established after the death of the Tsar Symeon in 927. But the situation of the empire had changed radically in the course of the preceding half century. Rather than pay, the Emperor Nikephoros, outraged by the presumptive demand of the Bulgarian ruler, had the envoys beaten and sent home in disgrace. He despatched a small force to demolish a number of Bulgarian frontier posts, and then called in his allies to the north, the Kievan Rus’, to attack the Bulgars in the rear.

Such allies and contacts were also an essential source of information, and much effort was expended in gathering information which might be relevant to the empire’s defence. Many people were involved - diplomatic contacts, embassies, as well as spies, merchants and other travellers, and not excluding churchmen. Military treatises devote considerable attention to information-gathering, which became even more important from the later seventh century when, following 50 years of warfare, both sides began to establish a sort of ‘no-man’s-land’ in Asia Minor, across which information travelled only with difficulty through the usual channels of social and commercial intercourse.

The history of Byzantine embassies to the empire’s eastern and western neighbours is complex and full of shifts in emphasis and motive as the empire’s political and strategic situation changed over the centuries. The routes used also changed as access was made possible or not according to the particular political situation in specific regions through which travellers had to pass. Several key motifs in imperial diplomacy remained constant, however. In the first place, the emperors needed to be able to persuade their neighbours not to attack them, and the offer of subsidies, the threat of an attack from another imperial ally from the rear, or of a direct imperial military response, were all part of the diplomat’s arsenal. Challenging aggression on the basis of a shared faith was also a useful tool, and was used in the case of the empire’s nearer neighbours, in particular the Bulgars. In the second place, the image that the east Romans wished others to have of them was important, and much effort was devoted to impressing visiting rulers and ambassadors of the splendour and thus the power of this God-protected empire. As part of this picture, and as one element in the development and maintenance of a set of protective alliances, the emperors also arranged extensive exchanges of gifts, offers of military, diplomatic or material support, cultural exchanges, and marriage alliances. Imperial diplomacy was certainly successful across the life of the empire, for its beleaguered strategic position rendered it extremely vulnerable, and its survival owes a great deal to factors other than the purely military. Even if many imperial plans foundered on the rocks of hostile intent abroad (or opposition at home), yet still there were many successes.

Apart from ideological considerations, there were also pragmatic concerns. A thread that runs throughout Byzantine history is a general reluctance to fight wars if they can possibly be avoided. An obvious reason for this is to be found in the strategic-geographical position of the state. Wars were costly, and for a state whose basic income derived from agricultural production, and which remained relatively stable as well as being vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters, they were to be avoided as far as was possible. The fact that the empire was strategically surrounded had major implications for its fiscal system and the extent of the military burden it could support. By the same token, manpower was a closely related factor: from a Byzantine perspective, the empire was always outnumbered, and both strategy and diplomacy had to take this into account in dealing with both neighbours and enemies.

Thus, although the political ideology of the empire dictated certain key themes, Byzantine diplomacy was extremely pragmatic and realistic. Occasionally, it is true, a particular emperor’s will might have caused difficulties, particularly when responding to demands which were taken to be unreasonable. Thus in 572, for example, the Emperor Justin II refused to pay the subsidies demanded by Persian envoys guaranteeing peace in the east. The Persians declared war, and although there followed some minor but successful Roman raids into Persian territory in Arzanene, there was also a major Persian incursion into Syria, with great loss of life and property to the Romans, followed in 574 by the successful Persian siege and capture of Daras, a strategic disaster for the Romans. The difficulties

Map 5.6 The diplomatic world of Byzantium c. 840.

Caused by the Avars on the Danube, as well as the emperor’s illness, meant that the Roman response was ineffective, and a truce on the Mesopotamian front was bought for the years 576-578: Justin’s rashness had brought some serious medium-term problems for the Romans.

In spite of such vagaries, however, continuity of purpose and effort is remarkable across many centuries, and again the fact of the empire’s survival is a testament to the effectiveness, responsiveness and flexibility of the imperial government when faced by a vast range of issues.