The problem of economic stagnation has been especially
prevalent in Western Europe, where unemployment is at
its highest level since the 1930s and economic growth in
recent years has averaged less than 1 percent annually.
Conditions have been exacerbated in recent years by the
need for individual governments to set their financial
houses in order so as to comply with the requirements for
unification as called for by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991
(see Chapter 9). For an individual nation to take part in
the process, government deficits must not greatly exceed
3 percent of gross domestic product, nor must the national
debt greatly exceed 60 percent of total output.
Inflation rates must also be cut to minimal levels.
The problem is that many countries are encountering
difficulties in adopting the severe economic measures
that are needed to qualify for the transition to economic
unity. France, concerned at the potential impact on its
own fragile economy, has threatened not to carry out the
necessary reforms. In Italy, the refusal of the Communist
Party to agree to belt-tightening measures almost led to
the fall of the coalition government. Even in Germany,
long the healthiest of all major Western European states,
reductions in social benefits sharpened tensions between
the eastern and western zones and undermined public
support for the government of Gerhard Schröder.
But perhaps the most ominous consequence of the new
economic austerity has been a rise in antiforeign senti-
ment. In Germany, attacks against foreign residents—
mainly Turks, many of whom have lived in the country for
years—have increased substantially. Conservative forces
have turned to the idea of preserving “German culture” as
a rallying cry to win the support of Germans concerned
over the rapid process of change. In France, hostility to
immigrants from North Africa has led to rising support
for Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front, which advocates
strict limits on immigration and the ejection of many foreigners
currently living in the country. It seems clear that
the ethnic animosities that so often fueled conflict in Europe
before World War II have not entirely abated.
By no means do all Europeans fear the costs of economic
unity. Official sources argue that it will increase
the region’s ability to compete with economic powerhouses
such as the United States and Japan. But fear of
change and a strong legacy of nationalist sentiment have
promoted public fears that economic unification could
have disastrous consequences. This is especially true in
Great Britain and also in Germany, where many see little
benefit and much risk from joining a larger Europe.
At the same time, some of the smaller states within the
European Union (EU) are afraid that their concerns will
be ignored by the larger powers. Such concerns have also
emerged in Eastern Europe, where several governments
are seeking membership in the EU to improve their own
economic conditions.