What explains the striking ability of Japan and the four
Little Tigers to follow the Western example and transform
themselves into export-oriented societies capable of
competing with the advanced nations of Europe and the
Western Hemisphere? Some analysts point to the traditional
character traits of Confucian societies, such as
thrift, a work ethic, respect for education, and obedience
to authority. In a recent poll of Asian executives, more
than 80 percent expressed the belief that Asian values
differ from those of the West, and most add that these
values have contributed significantly to the region’s recent
success. Others place more emphasis on deliberate
steps taken by government and economic leaders to meet
the political, economic, and social challenges their societies
face.
There seems no reason to doubt that cultural factors
connected to East Asian social traditions have contributed
to the economic success of these societies. Certainly,
habits such as frugality, industriousness, and subordination
of individual desires have all played a role in their
governments’ ability to concentrate on the collective interest.
Political elites in these countries have been highly
conscious of these factors and willing to use them for national
purposes. Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew of Singapore
deliberately fostered the inculcation of such ideals
among the citizens of his small nation and lamented the
decline of Confucian values among the young.
The importance of specifically Confucian values, however,
should not be overemphasized as a factor in what
authors Roy Hofheinz and Kent E. Calder call the “East
Asia Edge.” In the first place, until recently, mainland
China did not share in the economic success of its neighbors
despite a long tradition of espousing Confucian values.
In fact, some historians in recent years have maintained
that it was precisely those Confucian values
that hindered China’s early response to the challenge of
theWest.
As this and preceding chapters have shown, without
active encouragement by political elites, such traditions
cannot be effectively harnessed for the good of society as
a whole. The creative talents of the Chinese people were
not efficiently utilized under Mao Zedong or in the Little
Tigers while they were under European or Japanese colonial
rule (although Japanese colonialism did lead to the
creation of an infrastructure more conducive to later development
than was the case in European colonies). Only
when a “modernizing elite” took charge and began to
place a high priority on economic development were the
stunning advances of recent decades achieved. Rural
poverty was reduced, if not eliminated, by stringent land
reform and population control programs. Profit incentives
and foreign investment were encouraged, and the
development of export markets received high priority.
There was, of course, another common factor in the
successes achieved by Japan and its emulators. All the
Little Tigers received substantial inputs of capital and
technology from the advanced nations of the West—
Taiwan and South Korea from the United States, Hong
Kong and Singapore from Britain. Japan relied to a
greater degree on its own efforts but received a significant
advantage by being placed under the U.S. security umbrella
and guaranteed access to markets and sources of
raw materials in a region dominated by U.S. naval power.
To some observers, economic advancement in the region
has sometimes been achieved at the cost of political
freedom and individual human rights. Until recently,
government repression of opposition has been common
throughout East Asia except in Japan. In addition, the
rights of national minorities and women are often still
limited in comparison with the advanced countries of the
West. Some commentators in the region take vigorous
exception to such criticism, and argue that pluralistic political
systems could be very dangerous and destabilizing
in the heterogeneous societies that currently exist in the
region (see the box on p. 307).
Recent developments such as the financial crisis of
1997 have somewhat tarnished the image of the “Asian
miracle,” and there is now widespread concern that some
of the very factors that contributed to economic success
in previous years are now making it difficult for governments
in the region to develop increased openness and
accountability in their financial systems. Still, it should
be kept in mind that progress in political pluralism and
human rights has not always been easy to achieve in Europe
and North America and even now frequently fails to
match expectations. A rising standard of living, increased
social mobility, and a changing regional environment
brought about by the end of the Cold War should go far
to enhance political freedoms and promote social justice
in the countries bordering the western Pacific.