In recent years, many developments in the Middle East
have been described in terms of a resurgence of traditional
values and customs in response to the pressure of
Western influence. Indeed, some conservative religious
forces in the area have consciously attempted to replace
foreign culture and values with allegedly “pure” Islamic
forms of belief and behavior.
But the Islamic revival that has taken place in the contemporary
Middle East is not a simple dichotomy between
traditional and modern, native and foreign, or irrational
and rational. In the first place, many Muslims in
the Middle East believe that Islamic values and modern
ways are not incompatible and may even be mutually reinforcing
in some ways. Second, the resurgence of what
are sometimes called “fundamentalist” Islamic groups
may, in a Middle Eastern context, appear to be a rational
and practical response to self-destructive practices, such
as corruption and hedonism, drunkenness, prostitution,
and the use of drugs. Finally, the reassertion of Islamic
values can be a means of establishing cultural identity and
fighting off the overwhelming impact of Western ideas.
Initially, many Muslim intellectuals responded to
Western influence by trying to reconcile the perceived
differences between tradition and modernity and by creating
an “updated” set of Islamic beliefs and practices that
would not clash with the demands of the modern world.
This process took place in most Islamic societies, but it
was especially prevalent in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran.
Mustapha Kemal Atatürk embraced the strategy when he
attempted to secularize the Islamic religion in the new
Turkish republic. The Turkish model was followed by
Shah Reza Khan and his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in
Iran and then by Nasser in postwar Egypt, all of whom
attempted to make use of Islamic values while asserting
the primacy of other issues such as political and economic
development. Religion, in effect, had become the handmaiden
of political power, national identity, and economic
prosperity.
For obvious reasons, these secularizing trends were particularly
noticeable among the political, intellectual, and
economic elites in urban areas. They had less influence in
the countryside, among the poor, and among devout elements
within the ulama. Many of the latter believed that
Western secular trends in the major cities had given birth
to regrettable and even repugnant social attitudes and behavioral
patterns, such as political and economic corruption,
sexual promiscuity, individualism, and the prevalence
of alcohol, pornography, and drugs. Although such
practices had long existed in the Middle East, they were
now far more visible and socially acceptable.
This reaction began early in the century and intensified
after World War I, when the Western presence
increased. In 1928, devout Muslims in Egypt formed the
Muslim Brotherhood as a means of promoting personal
piety. Later, the movement began to take a more activist
approach, including the eventual use of terrorism by a
radical minority. Despite Nasser’s surface commitment to
Islamic ideals and Arab unity, some Egyptians were
fiercely opposed to his policies and regarded his vision of
Arab socialism as a betrayal of Islamic principles. Nasser
reacted harshly and executed a number of his leading
opponents.
The movement to return to Islamic purity strengthened
after World War II and reached its zenith in Iran. It
is not surprising that Iran took the lead in light of its long
tradition of ideological purity within the Shi’ite sect as
well as the uncompromisingly secular character of the
shah’s reforms in the postwar era. In revolutionary Iran,
traditional Islamic beliefs are all-pervasive and extend
into education, clothing styles, social practices, and the
legal system.
While the political aspects of the Iranian Revolution
inspired distrust and suspicion among political elites elsewhere
in the region, its cultural and social effects were
profound. Although no other state in the Middle East
adopted the violent approach to cultural reform applied
in Iran, Iranian ideas have spread throughout the area
and affected social and cultural behavior in many ways. In
Algeria, the political influence of fundamentalist Islamic
groups has grown substantially and enabled them to win
a stunning victory in the national elections in 1992.
When the military stepped in to cancel the second round
of elections and crack down on the militants, the latter
responded with a campaign of terrorism against moderates
that has claimed thousands of lives.
A similar trend has emerged in Egypt, where militant
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have engaged in
terrorism, including the assassination of Sadat and more
recent attacks on foreign tourists, who are considered carriers
of corrupt Western influence. In 1994, the prominent
novelist Naguid Mahfouz was stabbed outside his
home, apparently in response to earlier writings that were
deemed blasphemous of Muslim belief.
Even in Turkey, generally considered the most secular
of Islamic societies, a militant political group, known as
the Islamic Welfare Party, took power in a coalition government
formed in 1996. Worried moderates voiced their
concern that the secular legacy of Kemal Atatürk was
being eroded, and eventually, the new prime minister,
Necmettin Erbakan, agreed to resign under heavy pressure
from the military. Uncomfortable with the militancy
of Arab neighbors, Turkey maintains close ties with the
United States and is currently adopting reforms to extend
human rights and freedom of expression in the hope of
gaining entry into the European Union. But religious and
economic discontent simmers beneath the surface.